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1 
Introduction* 
While competition policy has been for quite some time now an established domain of research in legal 
scholarship1, it was not until David Gerber’s (first) book that a broad inter-disciplinary literature 
actually emerged2. The past decade has seen the emergence of an impressive body of interdisciplinary 
literature with political scientists, sociologists and eventually historians opening a cross-disciplinary 
and comparative conversation on competition policies3. The recent edited volume by Kiran Patel and 
Heike Schweiter on the Historical foundations of EU competition law marks an important step in this 
regard as it offers the first fine-grained inter-disciplinary attempt to bring together a narrative of 
individual - collective agency in the history of competition policy and an account of the dynamics of 
legal and judicial change4. The book provides the richest synthesis to date of the early battles and 
critical junctures that shaped EU competition policy, from the very first antitrust provisions of the 
European Community of Coal and Steel to the mid-1980s period. However, because of its 
periodisation, the book stops right before the moment when the rather stable institutional settlement of 
EU competition law actually entered a phase of tremendous changes. This ebook brings together 
political scientists and legal scholars with a view to explore some of these transformations and in 
particular the emergence of a transnational field of competition policy since the 1990s. Beyond its 
insistence on “transnational fields” and the on-going conflicts and competitions that structure its 
dynamics, the book also suggests a new entry: the power-knowledge nexus that considers the 
production as much as the import-export of ideas, theories and “models” about competition policies as 
one essential lever through which these battles are fought.  
1. The transatlantic début of competition policy 
Up until recently, the transnational component of antitrust policy was essentially structured by an 
intense circulation of ideas across the Atlantic. While the role of the American lawyers and statesmen 
in drafting the ECSC treaty’s resolutions on competition policy is well known, recent contributions 
have also documented the role of German-American networks in shaping and making sense of 
Regulation 17/625. However, much remains to be done in order to understand how transatlantic 
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 This ebook orginates in a Workshop entitled “Exploring the Transnational Circulation of Policy Paradigms. Law Firms, 
Legal Networks and the Production of Expertise in the Field of Competition Policies” organized on 21 June 2013 at the 
European University Institute. The editors would like to thank in a particular way the Global Governance Program (its 
research strand on “Modes of governance”) and Miguel Maduro for their continuous support to this project. We would 
like to thank also Giorgio Monti who took an active part to our discussions. 
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 See the ongoing Ph.D research by Mélanie Vay, « Droit et économie dans la construction des services d’intérêt général 
européen. Approche socio-historique », Doctoral student, Université Paris 1-Sorbonne. 
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 David Gerber, Law and Competition in the XXth century. Protecting Prometheus, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. 
3
 In particular: H. Buch-Hansen (2008), Rethinking the History of European Level Merger Control. A Critical Political 
Economy Perspective, CBS PhD Series, 26; A. Wigger (2008), Competition for Competitiveness: The Politics of 
Transformation of the EU Competition Regime, PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social 
Sciences, VU University Amsterdam; Hubert Buch-Hansen and Angela Wigger, The Politics of European Competition 
Regulation: A Critical Political Economy Perspective (London : Routledge , 2011); Michelle Cini and Lee McGowan, 
Competition Policy in the European Union , 2nd edn (Basingstoke : Palgrave , 2009); Lee McGowan, ‘Theorising 
European Integration: Revisiting Neofunctionalism and Testing its Suitability for Explaining the Development of EC 
Competition Policy?’ , in European Integration Online Papers 11 (2007). Laurent Warlouzet, ‘The Rise of a European 
Competition Policy, 1950–1991: A Cross-Disciplinary Survey of a Contested Policy Sphere’, in EUI Working Papers, 
RSCAS 2010/80; And the very rich bibliography presented in the contributions to this volume. 
4
 Kiran Patel, Heike Schweitzer (eds), The Historical Foundations of EU Competition Law, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 
5
 Brigitte Leucht, ‘Transatlantic Policy Networks and the Creation of the first European Anti-trust Law: Mediating 
between American Anti-trust and German Ordo-liberalism’, in Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht, and Morten Rasmussen 
(eds), The History of European Union: Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity, 1950–1972 (London : Routledge, 
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networks have contributed to structure the field of competition policy in Brussels. In his recent book, 
L’Union par le droit, Antoine Vauchez has pointed at the fact that the first practitioners of EC 
competition policy in Brussels had actually been Americans. Between 1958 and 1965, all major Wall 
street law firms opened ‘satellite offices’ in Brussels close on the heels of the rapid increase of 
American corporations’ investments in Europe: Baker & McKenzie (1958), Cleary Gottlieb (1960), 
Simmons and Simmons (1962), Archibald (1963), Coudert Brothers (1965), not to mention of course 
the very special relationship that Cleary Gottlieb maintained with the High Authority all along the 
1950s that originated in the friendship between George Ball and Jean Monnet6. While they were up 
until then based in Paris for the most part, in part due to the presence of the International Chamber of 
Commerce, these US law firms saw the European Economic Community as a “new Eldorado” to quote 
one of the central players of that time. The unexpected success of Competition Commissioner van der 
Groeben in securing an ambitious supranational regulation for articles 85-86 of the Treaty of Rome 
(Regulation 17/62) as much as the strong support received from the European Court of Justice in the 
Consten & Grundig case (1966) were viewed as a form of confirmation that “an American-style 
market” would emerge there. While the venue proved less momentous than what had been hoped for, 
resulting in most American branches closing down their offices by the end of the 1970s, Wall Street 
lawyers nevertheless left a lasting footprint on the then-emerging European field of competition law. 
Part of it relates to the fact that the experience had lasted enough for them to actually co-opt and train 
a first generation of European competition lawyers who would then act as their “representatives” in 
Brussels. Belgian lawyers like Jean-Pierre de Bandt, Michel Waelbroeck, Walter van Gerven, Ivo van 
Bael, etc… actually all started their long professional careers in the field as lawyers in US law firms. 
Since they could take advantage of this portfolio of American and English clients, and benefit from 
what they called their “geographic advantage” close to the headquarters of the emerging European 
Communities, they would soon become the field’s repeat players. Interestingly, these Euro-lawyers 
were in a position to create the first law firms specialized in EC competition law at the turn of the 
1960-70s: one around former students and current professors of the Catholic University of Louvain 
forming the Bandt Van Hecke & van Bael law firm, and the other one around former students and 
current professors of the Université libre de Bruxelles with Michel Waelbroeck. Theses firms remains 
among the main sponsors and recruiting agents for future generations of EU competition lawyers, at 
least up until the late 1980s when a new wave of American and English law firms got interested in the 
perspectives of the 1992 Single European Market agenda. 
Despite the failure of US law firms to set profitable permanent satellites in Brussels in the 1970s, 
the “transatlantic network” never quite disappeared; quite the contrary: even if it took on new forms 
and conduits, it played a pivotal role both in the advent and in the framing of what is referred to as the 
“modernisation” of the EU competition policy  that is, of its recent transformation towards the more 
decentralized, more efficiency-based and free market-oriented competition model of the United 
States7. Indeed, the genealogy of this metamorphosis can be traced back to the hub of transatlantic 
connections that emerged through the Annual Fordham Competition Law Institute Conferences 
(FCLI) initiated in 1974 by Barry Hawk8, a young American law professor at Fordham who 
(Contd.)                                                                  
2009), 56–73; and Brigitte Leucht and Mel Marquis, “American Influences on EEC Competition Law. Two Paths, How 
Much Depedence?”, in Kiran Patel, Heike Schweitzer, op. cit. 
6
 Antoine Vauchez, L’Union par le droit. L’invention d’un programme institutionnel pour l’Europe, Paris, Presses de 
Sciences Po, 2013 (forthcoming at Cambridge University Press : Brokering Europe. Euro-lawyers and the Making of a 
Transnational Polity). 
7
 D. Gerber (1999), “The United-States – European Union Conflict Over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal 
Experience Perspective”, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, pp. 123-124; and D. Gerber (2007), “Two Forms of 
Modernization in European Competition Law”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 31, pp. 1235-1265. 
8
 Law professor at Fordham University School of Law since 1968, Barry Hawk was also a partner of Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom from 1989 to 2009. During his long career, along with the direction of the FCLI and his private practice 
as a lawyer, Barry Hawk also served as consultant to the Commission’s Legal Service and to the OECD, and has been 
deeply committed in the American Bar Association Antitrust Section 
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specialised in international and EC antitrust, which quickly became the annual rendez-vous of the 
nascent antitrust community. For the past 40 years, the FCLI, sponsored by dozens of leading law 
firms, and bringing together over 400 participants annually, has been recognized as one of the leading 
events in international antitrust9. From the 1980s onward, academics, legal practitioners and members 
of administrative and judicial competition authorities from both sides of the Atlantic would meet in 
this New York-based hybrid setting. This transnational forum where American and European 
competition experts belonging to different segments of the antitrust field could meet can be depicted 
as a lieu neutre10 within which a “conventional wisdom” about how antitrust provisions should be 
implemented and which global standards should be embraced was progressively elaborated. This 
triggered a critical import-export of instruments and paradigms across American and European 
judicial, administrative and political arenas which still remains to be studied11. Browsing the Fordham 
conference proceedings, one gets the sense that, as early as in the 1980s, at a time when a major part 
of DG IV officials still embraced the traditional European ordoliberal credo, the first lineaments of 
“modernisation” -from private enforcement to the need for a “more economic approach”- were 
actually debated and diffused transatlantically through the conduit of this “Fordham network”12. 
2. The Global Turn in the Field 
Ever since the mid-1980s, however, a number of important political and professional changes have 
prompted a move away from the rather circumscribed set of transatlantic networks to a broader 
transnational field of competition policy. While the EU-US duopoly still tends to dominate 
competition policy13, the professional market for expertise and consultancy in the area has extended 
and complexified dramatically over the past 25 years. The transformation started in Western Europe in 
the 1980s in the wake of the pro-market agendas and with the success of new public management 
reforms that prompted the creation of a multitude of regulatory agencies in the field of economics and 
finance. While the Bundeskartellamt, created in 1958, had long remained the only regulatory agency 
in the field of competition, countries like France (1986), the Netherlands (1989), Italy (1990), and 
many others, created their own independent body. While change occurred later in England, with 
Labour ascending to power, and with the enactment of the Competition Act 1998, this reform followed 
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 Besides the Annual Conference, the FCLI established in 2006 a training centre for antitrust and competition law officials, 
judges, and policy-makers from around the world that consists in summer sessions of courses taught by judges, authority 
staff, and academics with experience in competition law enforcement and which is specially open to participants from 
more recent competition regimes. 
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 Luc Boltanski, Pierre Bourdieu, “La production de l’idéologie dominante”, Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 
Vol. 2, n° 2-3, juin 1976, pp. 3-73. 
11
 See however Julie Bailleux’s ongoing research project: “Law Beyond States: Transnational Jurist Networks in the 
Making of a Global Rule of Law. The Case of the Globalization of Competition Law ». 
12
 See, for example, I. Forrester and C. Norall (1984), “The Laicization of Community Law – Self-Help and the Rule of 
Reason: How Competition Law is and Should Be Applied”, in Barry Hawk, ed., Fordham Competition Law Institute: 
International Antitrust Law and Policy 1983, Juris Publishing, pp. 305-346; C. Bright (1996), “Deregulation of EC 
Competition Policy: Rethinking Article 85 (1), in Barry Hawk, ed., Fordham Competition Law Institute: International 
Antitrust Law and Policy 1994, Juris Publishing, pp. 505-527; P. Massey (1997), “Reform of EC Competition Law : 
Substance, Procedure and Institutions”, in Barry Hawk, ed., Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust 
Law and Policy 1996, Juris Publishing, pp. 91-123; A. Pera and M. Todino (1997), “Enforcement of EC Competition 
Rules: Need for a Reform ?”, in Barry Hawk, ed., Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law and 
Policy 1996, Juris Publishing, pp. 125-148; or M. Siragusa (1998), Rethinking Article 85: Problems and Challenges in 
the Design and Enforcement of the EC Competition Rules”, in Barry Hawk, ed., Fordham Competition Law Institute: 
International Antitrust Law and Policy 1997, Juris Publishing, pp. 271-296. 
13
 D. Gerber (1999), “The United-States – European Union Conflict Over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal 
Experience Perspective”, New England Law Review, Vol. 34, pp. 123-143 ; K. Hamner (2002), “The Globalization of 
Law: International Merger Control and Competition Law in the United-States, the European Union, Latin America and 
China”, Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, Vol. 11, Spring, pp. 385-405. 
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the same lines: reducing the scope for intervention by the ministerial authority, granting investigatory 
powers to a new agency, and introducing a decentralized system of sanctions. This first wave was 
followed by at least two others: one in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, and, more recently, 
one in former developing countries such as Brazil, China, South Africa and Indonesia ; etc. As Mel 
Marquis points out in his paper, in the 1990s alone, over 60 new competition laws were adopted, 
thereby opening a whole new market for policy advisers and professional experts. Beyond national 
cases, there is a whole scene of bilateral and regional agreements that emerged where competition 
regulations took on an important role alongside the more traditional trade provisions. Marquis notes 
that, since the 1990s, a new generation of agreements (TACPs –trade agreements with competition 
provisions) has developed, to which one should add Europe’s Neighbourhood Policy (EuroMed 
countries and Eastern Europe or Central Asia) and the recent wave of regional initiatives in Central 
and Latin America as well as in Africa.  
Undoubtedly, there is a good deal of policy convergence across continents with the remarkable 
streamlining of the vocabulary and institutional arrangements used across the nearly hundred countries 
that have adopted new competition regulations; there is no denying the fact that the transformation of 
European Union competition policy towards a more free market-oriented competition model marked a 
rapprochement to the American model: as the promoter of the reform, commissioner Mario Monti 
indicates: “if there was ever a gap between both systems, it disappeared on 1 May 2004”14. However, 
this should not overshadow the fact that the definition of antitrust global standards has simultaneously 
triggered an increasing competition across both sides of the Atlantic. As various papers presented here 
show, this competition has been waged in part through the conduit of international organizations. Up 
until the late 1990s, the leading international player in the field was the so-called Committee of 
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices created in 1961 in the framework of the OECD. With the 
emergence of a global market for antitrust expertise, new international organizations have contested 
the OECD’s dominance as the global standard-setter in the field. As pointed out by Pablo Iglesias-
Rodríguez in his contribution to this volume, the push for change initially came from the European 
Commission and its Competition Commissioner in the 1990s, Leon Brittan, who championed an 
increasing role for the WTO in antitrust enforcement. In 1996, he launched an initiative to promote 
supranational governance in international antitrust that resulted in a counter-move by the US 
government which pushed for a competing global initiative grounded on the formation of a strictly 
voluntary and non-binding network of competition enforcers (which became the ICN). Given the lack 
of political momentum of the WTO, and the failure to maintain competition as part of trade law 
discussions during the Doha round, the ICN has been a much more successful international venue (for 
interesting developments on this, see Marquis in this volume).  
Simultaneously, a growing number of transnational arenas specialized in antitrust and competition 
law have emerged around lawyers, judges, scholars, and government officials involved in the area of 
antitrust and competition law. Beside the Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and 
Policy of the Fordham Competition Law Institute described supra, one should also mention the Global 
Competition Forum of the International Bar Association (IBA-GCF), and the Annual Competition 
Conference of the Antitrust Section of the IBA. The former used to hold Annual Competition 
Conferences in Fiesole, and a Global Competition Forum (CGF). Whereas the Antitrust Section has 
existed since the beginning of the 1970s, the GCF was founded in the beginning of the 1990s. At that 
time, the IBA teamed up with the World Bank to develop what was then a fledgling institution, the 
Global Forum for Competition Law which itself had been launched several years earlier by the Japan 
Foundation, the Canadian Competition Bureau, and the University of Toronto. Often organizing joint-
meetings with organizations such as the International Competition Network, the World Bank, 
UNCTAD, APEC, or national agencies of developing countries, the GCF was conceived as a global 
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 In A. Wigger (2008), Competition for Competitiveness: The Politics of Transformation of the EU Competition Regime, 
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meeting place for discussions of competition law issues gathering economists, lawyer, academics, 
practitioners and national and international policy-makers with a view to defining common standards.  
As a consequence of these very rapid changes, a whole world of competition regulators and 
practitioners has emerged that brings together not only civil servants or agency employees, but also 
representatives and advisors of private actors, lobbyists, lawyers and, increasingly economic 
consultants called upon to provide arguments and theories to support the particular claim of the parties 
before the enforcement authorities or in court. What makes this meso-level activity interesting to study 
is the fact that individual trajectories often cut across the dividing lines of the field and generate 
unnoticed forms of coordination and mainstreaming across seemingly opposed institutions and 
groups15. Actors in the field certainly differ on a variety of issues: the respective importance of law 
and economics, the more or less apolitical institutional setup of national regulatory or enforcement 
authorities, the respective role of courts and agencies, and the respective role of the various 
international organizations’ fora (WTO, UN, etc…), resulting in a large variety of possible 
institutional arrangements for supranational law and governance in the field of competition. Yet they 
share a number of commonly agreed-upon sets of problems, clusters of ideas and groups of solutions 
and, ultimately, beliefs starting with the intrinsic value of competition policy and a related reluctance 
to use it for other possible goals (market-building, industrial policy, etc…). As a result, although the 
field is getting more and more complex, and though it is characterized by an increased “polyarchy”, it 
has remained very much centred around a limited set of issues; these are essentially two: first, the 
“convergence” debate that spurred the increasing fear of fragmentation and conflict across countries 
and regional entities with different standards and models; and second, the “enforcement” debate that 
emerged with the development of global or regional standards and the related issue of concrete local 
implementation. 
3. Reflexive Politics 
One essential way through which conflicts across professionals, institutions and countries have been 
waged is knowledge and expertise: few policy fields have produced as many competing “schools of 
thought” (e.g., Chicago vs. Ordoliberals), “theories of implementation” (governance, etc…) and 
“national or regional models” (German, American, the EU), etc… Various contributions to this edited 
volume point in that direction and show how one of the essential strategies for diffusing one’s own 
national and professional model has been to engage in scientifization/universalization strategies. 
“Doctrines” of convergence (setting global standards) or enforcement (crafting implementation 
techniques) have become the battleground where all actors in the field tend to meet. Just as professions 
use abstract knowledge in order to strengthen their “jurisdiction”16, States, competition regulators and 
experts have intensively used increasingly sophisticated scientific arguments to secure their position, 
strengthen their institutional capabilities and expand their influence. Even private actors, as they 
engage in cases before regulating authorities, have invested more and more in the scientific 
battleground of competing economic models and theories, enlisting more and more frequently 
economists in addition to lawyers to support their cause. The Outokumpu case (2012) presented by 
Yane Svetiev very nicely exemplifies this increasing invocation of “objectivity” and “scientificity”: 
when this Finnish company decided to challenge the European Commission’s decision about the 
anticompetitive effects of its acquisition of a German steel company, it did so by nominating a three-
man panel of independent and well-respected economic scholars who were asked to review the data 
and assess the appropriateness of the economic model on which the European Commission had 
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 See Antoine Vauchez, “Communities of International Litigators" in Cesare Romano, Oxford Handbook of International 
Adjudication, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 655-668; and Antoine Vauchez, Bruno de Witte (eds), 
Lawyering Europe. European Law as a Transnational Social Field, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013. 
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grounded its decision. In other words, scientifization (i.e., the rise of scientific methodology and that 
of experts) has been one essential by-product of the increasing competition: a reflexive sub-field of 
intellectual production on global antitrust has progressively emerged where “ideas merchants and 
paradigm peddlers” (Mel Marquis) abound.  
While one should certainly not over-emphasize the autonomy of these expert settings, as an 
important share of its members are extra-academic professionals (high civil servants for the 
Commission, law firms, national policy makers, etc…), it is however the case that a whole 
“technology of expertise” (Michele Everson) has emerged: its first trope runs along the unity/diversity 
line from the stylization of national or regional “models” of competition (and the practical and cultural 
conditions for their successful transplant elsewhere) to the stimulation of “isomorphic processes” 
across these countries in order to achieve greater degrees of “substantive, procedural, institutional and 
intellectual convergence across jurisdictions”... ; its second trope regards the conditions of 
implementation and the crafting of new enforcement mechanisms through harmonizing legislation or 
policy coordination, etc. 
4. The 2003 Reform as a Laboratory  
The overhaul of EU competition policy and the implementation of the new Regulation 1/2003 is the 
perfect laboratory to observe in concreto these new knowledge-power dynamics. We would be 
reminded first of all that competition policy is not only a European policy in the context of the 
European Union: it is arguably one of its most consolidated success stories, and as such a defining 
model –if not a policy recipe - for the emergence of Europe’s supranational powers and institutional 
capabilities: it is on this ground that the Court and the Commission have established one of the most 
widespread and exclusive domains of competences ever since the 1960s. It is not hard to imagine that 
this move from a centralized/top-down type of regulation (through ex ante notification of restrictive 
agreements to DG IV) to a decentralized/bottom-up system of enforcement (ex post cartel control 
through “whistle-blowing” by individuals and companies has been an epochal change in terms of 
institutions, dynamics, types of knowledge, etc. One essential lever through which change occurred 
was actually through the unsettling of the previous knowledge settlement of EU competition law 
essentially centred around a legal approach and the related emergence of a “more economic approach” 
championed by Competition Commissioner Mario Monti17 and the rise of economists in competition 
policy domain. The implementation of the Regulation confirmed this increasing competition over 
types of knowledge. Drawing on a content-analysis of French and British regulatory agencies’ 
decisions, Andy Smith is able to point to an overall albeit differentiated “increase in neo-classical 
micro-analysis” (in particular through particular notions such as “damage to the economy”). While 
economists have dominated the definition of competition policy in England for a long time, in France 
things have long been different. Although the rise of economic analysis remains limited at the Autorité 
de la concurrence, the creation in 2007 of a Chief Economist position has opened the door to new 
theories and paradigms.  
This new knowledge settlement also includes what could be coined a “more political science 
approach” that draws extensively today on the vocabulary of new modes of governance to shape the 
issue of “decentralized enforcement”. As the question of implementation has become central in the 
new system, institutional techniques for policy coordination across national regulatory agencies and 
incentives for the broad inclusion of private and non-private actors within the “governance system” 
have become crucial. Against “principal – agent” theories, Basje Bender provides in this volume an in-
depth analysis of the relevance of the “experimentalist governance” paradigm which precisely values 
deliberation, peer review and reporting as techniques that can enable the formation of a common 
epistemic community of national and European competition regulators. These new enforcement 
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theories suggest forms of co-production under the stewardship of the European Commission: the 
revised Model Leniency Programme for the detection of cartels officially presented by the European 
Commission at the end of 2012 as a co-production of national agencies and DG Competition devised 
by working groups, can be presented as one concretization of these new techniques of “decentralized 
enforcement”. With the creation of the European Competition Network in 2004, the European 
Commission has engaged in a form of “strategic functionalism”: through the conscious design of 
informal exchanges and the setting of sector-specific working groups (on energy, food, etc…), the 
European Commission has been trying to generate “cross-fertilization”, “mutual learning”, diffusion 
of “best practices”, trust, and ultimately policy convergence across national administrative agencies, 
etc. What remains however in the blind-spot of these repeated attempts to manufacture an integrated 
transnational epistemic community of competition regulators in Europe is the risk of policy capture 
that these incentives may favor. In a context where courts and independent agencies have become the 
key regulators keeping political control at bay, transnational communities of professionals form the 
very “infrastructure” of the field, with an increasingly critical role in policy formulation and rule-
making. This has raised fears over risks of doctrinal and methodological capture of the policy by these 
networks. As Yane Svetiev rightly points out, independence from political control actually means 
increasing dependence on transnational networks of professionals : “to the extent that there is a 
cohesive and fairly monolithic competition epistemic community also on the private actor side, it 
could be precisely this community that is filling the political vacuum”. Far from being not definite 
answers, these points rather open new research questions that could lead to empirical projects on the 
formation, socialization, professional cultures and institutional identities of the various actors of this 
field of competition policy.  
5. Presentation of the papers 
The two first contributions of the volume investigate the modernized system of EU competition law 
enforcement using the conceptual framework of experimentalist governance.  
Basje Bender describes very precisely the functioning of the European Competition Network and 
wonders to what extent cooperation between DG Competition and NCAs within the ECN follows an 
experimentalist logic. Based on semi-structured interviews, her paper sheds new light on the role 
played by DG Competition within the network. Inter alia she stresses the fact that the latter might not 
be “the hierarchical control tool that it may have seemed” at the outset. On his side, Yane Svetiev 
exposes the conditions under which private actors (law firms, consultants, companies and their 
counsellors...) interacting with competition agencies could improve the “experimentalist character” of 
the new EU competition policy enforcement system - that is, the conditions in which it could lead to 
policy innovation and learning - by participating in individual cases and in policy formulation and 
rule-making. Meanwhile, Bender and Svetiev draw our attention to the different cooperation sites set 
up throughout the implementation process of the Modernisation reform, and to the different ways 
through which the circulation of policy concepts and the elaboration of “best practices” and common 
standards occur. 
While both these contributions focus mainly on what could be depicted as the “formal cooperation 
infrastructure” of the European field of competition policy, Andy Smith questions the actual 
circulation of competition policy paradigms. Based on “initial data on change or reproduction in the 
government of restrictive practices during the 2000s”, his paper suggests that, despite an overall 
growth of the influence of Chicago-school doctrine in France and the UK, important differences in the 
government of inter-firm competition remain between these two countries, and that this increased 
doctrinal influence cannot be apprehended bluntly as an expression of a more general 
“Europeanization” phenomenon.  
The last two papers of the volume explore the broader global field of competition policy. 
Nowadays, about one hundred countries have a competition policy and competition institutions, and in 
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recent years an increasing number of intergovernmental/inter-agency fora dedicated to the discussion, 
negotiation, and adoption of multilateral rules of competition have emerged. The papers focus on the 
competitive dynamics that have emerged among international actors and institutions to impose, at the 
global level, their own definition of what competition policy implies (paradigms, techniques, norm and 
institution design…). Investigating the rationale for the creation of the International Competition 
Network in the early 2000s, Pablo Iglesias-Rodríguez analyses this organisation as “a product of the 
OECD launched as a reaction to the threat of a shift of power in the definition of competition law and 
policy”; this threat being embodied by the emergence in the 1990s of institutions such as the World 
Trade Organization Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy or the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Intergovernmental Group of Experts on 
Competition Law and Policy, which claimed responsibility for being the new global standard setter in 
this policy area. In the same vein, but revealing quite a different picture of the field, Mel Marquis 
conducts an in depth analysis of what could be depicted as a series of different battlegrounds where 
two traditionally ‘dominant’ actors (the United States and the European Union) struggle for global 
influence in an evolving constellation of actors. 
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Experimentalist Governance in the European Competition Network 
Basje Bender* 
This contribution discusses the European Competition Network (ECN) through the theoretical 
perspective of experimentalist governance. Regulation 1/2003 introduced considerable changes to the 
enforcement of EU competition policy; most notably the abolition of the centralized cartel notification 
and the involvement of national competition authorities (NCAs) in enforcement of EU competition 
law. Also, a network (the ECN) was set up as a tool for cooperation and coordination between NCAs 
and the European Commission’s DG Competition, and between the NCAs amongst each other. 
Experimentalist governance considers decision-making under conditions of strategic uncertainty, 
polyarchy and interdependence. It can been defined as a ‘recursive process of provisional goal-setting 
and revision based on learning from the comparison of alternative approaches to advancing them in 
different contexts.’1 In other words, it is a process that allows for institutionalized learning (both top-
down and bottom-up) on the basis of discretion. Such learning may take place in policy networks, 
depending on the hierarchical character of the network, the possibility for in-depth peer review and the 
periodic revisability of the rules and goals.  
Traditionally, competition policy has been one of the most established and most centralized policy 
areas in the EU. It does not seem a likely case for experimentalist governance, because discretion and 
therefore the possibilities for learning from diversity have been relatively limited. However, the top-
down structure of EU competition policy is increasingly challenged by uncertainty and heterogeneity, 
as will be explained below. And since it proves difficult to sensibly capture the complex dynamics of 
EU competition enforcement after the introduction of Regulation 1/2003, it seems worthwhile to 
explore in more detail to what extent the ECN functions as a network with experimentalist features. 
Previous work by Svetiev, who also contributes to this working paper volume, suggests that the 
modernized system of EU competition enforcement and the ECN indeed offers scope for 
experimentalism. Both the design of the Model Leniency Programme (MLP), the ECN’s first output, 
and the practice of commitment decisions have been analysed through an experimentalist lens.2 
This paper will build upon the existing research on experimentalism in EU competition policy by 
exploring to what extent cooperation between DG Competition and the NCAs in the ECN follows an 
experimentalist logic. The contribution of the paper is twofold: on the one hand, it will use an 
innovative analytical framework to address modernization of EU competition policy and more 
specifically the working of the ECN; on the other hand, it will attempt to shed light on practices that 
are to a large extent not public, as the operation of the network is closed to non-members. In terms of 
materials, main points of reference are modernization Regulation 1/2003 and supporting documents;3 
the report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003;4 and DG Competition’s manual of procedure.5 In 
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addition, the paper is based on secondary literature and fifteen semi-structured interviews conducted 
with staff from DG Competition and NCAs in the period between September 2012 and June 2013.6  
1. Modernization of competition policy 
Before 2004, policy-making and enforcement of EU competition policy largely took place at the 
central level: they were dominated by the Commission’s DG Competition (previously DG IV). NCAs 
enjoyed limited room for manoeuvre. This was first of all because of the supremacy of European 
competition law, which has preference over national (competition) law. European courts ruled that the 
parallel application of national competition law may not obstruct the uniform application of European 
competition law.7 What is more, NCAs must disapply any national legislation that is incompatible 
with European competition rules.8  
EU competition law was in principle considered sufficiently precise, clear and unconditional to 
confer obligations and rights upon citizens in national legal orders: both the cartel prohibition (the 
current Article 101 TFEU) and the prohibition of abuse of dominance (the current Article 102 TFEU) 
had direct effect.9 Regulation 17/62, which concerned the implementation of the two prohibitions, 
however partially limited this direct effect in practice. Regulation 17/62 gave the Commission an 
exclusive competence to rule on the exemption provision for cartels by establishing a notification 
procedure at the central level. NCAs therefore had only a marginal role to play in the development of 
the European cartel regime. Although notification was not required for abuse of dominance cases 
(which concern mainly unilateral behaviour) this provision was less frequently applied than the cartel 
prohibition.10 Pre-2004 competition policy in the EU was therefore basically a top-down model of 
policy-making and enforcement.11  
A large-scale substantive and procedural modernization of competition policy that started at the 
end of the 1990s challenged some, though not all elements of this architecture. Substantive reforms of 
competition enforcement were aimed at increasing the focus on consumer welfare and economic 
effects of EU competition policy. Competition enforcement was to be less legal and static (with per se 
abuses) and more economics-based.12 On the procedural side, implementation Regulation 17/62 was 
replaced with Regulation 1/2003. The new regulation established an ex post system of cartel control, 
where detection mainly occurs through the encouragement of whistleblowing (leniency policy). 
Regulation 1 also obliges NCAs to apply EU competition provisions alongside their national laws in 
national cases with a community dimension (cases ‘which may affect trade between member states’), 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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in most cases creating a double legal basis for decisions.13 Potential conflicts and case allocation were 
to be resolved through the ECN, a network of all NCAs plus DG Competition. Whereas the more 
economic approach applies to all areas of competition policy, including mergers and state aid,14 
Regulation 1/2003 only covers the cartel prohibition (Article 101 TFEU) and the abuse of dominance 
prohibition (Article 102 TFEU).  
It has been argued that, by allowing NCAs to apply EU law, the new system of enforcement 
entailed a risk that the competition rules would be applied differently throughout the EU, creating 
significant legal uncertainty.15 On the other hand, it was feared that the regulation would not be 
decentralization at all, but rather centralization in disguise or a ‘coup’ on the part of DG Competition, 
attempting to tighten its grip on the NCAs.16 Also, a rich body of literature emerged on modernized 
EU competition policy as a system of new governance,17 multi-level governance18 or networked 
governance.19 The current dynamics in EU competition policy in any event seem difficult to 
characterize from the more traditional governance viewpoint of EU governance modes. Following 
Wallace, previously competition policy fell in the ‘community mode’ of governance - which basically 
is exhaustive, top-down harmonization. It was proposed that modernized EU competition policy fits 
mostly in the ‘regulatory’ mode of governance, but also has characteristics of the ‘community’ and the 
‘coordination’ mode.20 The regulatory mode of governance means foremost an important role for 
agencies, but is inherently difficult to describe as a coherent policy mode.21  
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The involvement of NCAs in EU competition policy, and more in particular the working of the 
ECN, is therefore not something that can easily be explained by or included in more traditional ways 
of conceptualizing EU policy-making. In this contribution I argue that the two main fears on the ECN, 
i.e. lack of consistency and centralization in disguise, should be nuanced. Direct application of central 
rules by NCAs in national contexts not only brings a risk of jeopardizing legal certainty and/or 
strengthening EU control, but allows for a third possibility: to engage in discussions with national 
peers on enforcement and policy issues in an ‘experimentalist’ manner. Such discussion can be 
facilitated in particular through the ECN.  
2. Experimentalist governance 
When discussing experimentalist governance, a terminological clarification seems useful to start out 
with. The term ‘governance’ here intends to capture decision-making processes in the broadest sense, 
and therefore not necessarily points at either a move away from government, or a move away from 
hard law solutions. ‘Experimentalism’ is used to characterize processes that 'provoke doubt about their 
own assumptions and produce on-going readjustment through comparison’.22 In this context, reference 
is made to the work of John Dewey, where experimentalism refers not to experiments but rather to 
experience.23 Experimentalist governance, in short, can be thought of as institutionalized learning from 
contextualized experience.  
Sabel and Zeitlin propose that an experimentalist policy cycle consists of four elements, although 
these should not be regarded as fixed.24 What is more, experimentalism is not necessarily a matter of 
conscious design: it can also arise more spontaneously.25 The four elements in an ideal-typical 
experimentalist policy cycle are the following. First, actors establish broad framework goals together 
at the central level; second, lower-level units have discretion in achieving the goals; third, lower-level 
units must regularly report on performance, for example through institutionalized peer review; and 
fourth this feeds back into the cycle by revision and readjustment of the goals.26 In EU policy-making, 
the Open Method of Coordination closely follows such an ideal-typical experimentalist policy cycle. 
Goals are established at the EU (central) level, but broad enough to leave discretion at member state 
level; usually there are fora for review and learning in place.27 However, an experimentalist logic is 
possible in any context where regulations allow for flexibility, combined with structures to learn from 
contextualized implementation.  
(Contd.)                                                                  
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In terms of scope conditions, both strategic uncertainty and polyarchy are considered to be 
favourable circumstances for the rise of experimentalist solutions. Interdependence is a contributing 
factor to experimentalism, although usually not included as a separate scope condition.28 Without 
strategic uncertainty and polyarchy, experimentalist governance is unlikely: 
‘in the absence of strategic uncertainty, actors are convinced that they know how to pursue their 
ends, so joint exploration of possibilities is superfluous (…). In the absence of polyarchy, one 
actor is dominant, or there is a struggle for dominance, and the powerful prefer to impose 
outcomes, rather than pursue them comparatively with others.’29 
Therefore, situations where there is no dominant actor and actors are unsure of what their goals are, or 
how they should achieve them, are expected to be favourable to the emergence of an experimentalist 
logic. Such a situation challenges a principal-agent model, which presumes that principals know in 
advance what the desired outcome is, delegate to agents and may take back the delegated powers if 
necessary. Under conditions of uncertainty, polyarchy and interdependence, hierarchy is expected to 
break down, because the principal cannot exhaustively regulate from the central level or take back the 
tasks given to agents. A strict separation between policy-making (by the principal) and enforcement 
(by the agent) is in such a situation increasingly hard to maintain.  
Experimentalist governance shares a number of features with new governance literature: it is 
similar in the idea of a broad inclusion of actors (including private/non-state actors) and the idea of 
policy-making that is bottom-up and flexible. It is however distinctive in other ways. Firstly, part of 
the new governance literature presumes that new governance exclusively generates soft law.30 That is 
not necessarily the case for experimentalism where, most importantly, the rules have to be flexible and 
adjustable. In some cases this will result in soft law solutions, which may be more suitable for such 
purposes. However it is by no means excluded that the rules in an experimentalist system can consist 
of hard law, such as regulations with relatively open norms, which then can be further interpreted at a 
lower level. Secondly, experimentalism more fundamentally departs from the premise of hierarchy 
than much of the new governance literature. In a situation with high levels of complexity 
(uncertainty), polyarchy and interdependence, the assumption is that a principal cannot delegate in a 
sensible way, as it will depend on input from agents to determine its goals. Experimentalist 
governance rejects a shadow of hierarchy (which proposes that new governance is effective because 
there is a credible threat of government intervention)31 and argues that principals cannot sensibly 
threaten to take back delegated tasks. Actors are forced to both identify and solve problems together: 
interests are constantly redefined. Finally, experimentalism has a strong emphasis on continuous 
institutionalized revision (instead of occasional review, or review only in cases of apparent failure) 
and on learning from contextualized implementation.32 
It should be emphasized that a deliberative governance architecture like experimentalism raises a 
number of democratic concerns. The rules it generates are not subjected to democratic control in a 
traditional way, and arguably leave rulemaking in the hands of a technocratic elite.33 But as 
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deliberation is open to public scrutiny, experimentalism may open possibilities for new forms of 
dynamic accountability. The legitimacy of an experimentalist system is mainly generated through 
mechanisms of transparency and contestation, and therefore by throughput (or process) rather than 
input or output legitimacy.34 By subjecting technocratic procedures to peer review and reporting, 
actors are obliged to justify their choices and therefore accountable – though not necessarily through 
traditional democratic representation. 35 
3. Scope conditions 
Below I will explore to what extent the scope conditions strategic uncertainty and polyarchy, which 
are considered to favour the emergence of an experimentalist design, are present in EU competition 
policy. An increase of these scope conditions is expected to challenge hierarchical governance 
structures and favour the emergence of an experimentalist design. It should be emphasized that the 
focus is mainly on the cartel and abuse of dominance prohibitions. Mergers and state aid are not 
covered by Regulation 1/2003 and not explicitly addressed here. 
3.1. Strategic uncertainty 
At a first glance, EU competition policy seems to be characterized by a high degree of certainty rather 
than uncertainty. The policy was for a long time the exclusive domain of lawyers, who strongly 
emphasized the necessity of legal certainty and the necessity not to deviate too much from precedent.36 
DG Competition developed a large body of competition-related experience and case law over the 
years, on which NCAs can build. The white paper on modernization read indeed:  
‘[a]t the time when the interpretation of Article [101(3)] was still uncertain and when the 
Community's primary objective was the integration of national markets, centralised enforcement of 
the EC competition rules by the Commission was the only appropriate system. (…) As law and 
policy have been clarified, the burden of enforcement can now be shared more equitably with 
national courts and authorities, which have the advantage of proximity to citizens and the 
problems they face’ [emphasis added].37  
However, competition policy is not static. Enforcement of cartels has seen the introduction of leniency 
and private enforcement, two trends that originated in US practice.38 More substantively, as mentioned 
above, competition policy is increasingly applied in a more economic manner. Where this is less of an 
issue in cartel cases, where many practices are still prohibited irrespective of their effect, in abuse of 
dominance cases the economic effects of the behaviour increasingly play a large role in enforcement.  
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DG Competition gave broad guidance on (its own) enforcement practice of abuse cases in 2009.39 
Abuse is inherently more varied in its appearance than a cartel: it may in principle assume almost any 
form, and therefore by nature it is hard to regulate it exhaustively at central level. An abuse may 
consist of high pricing (exploitative), low pricing (predatory pricing and rebate schemes) or a 
combination (margin squeeze); but it may also consist of a refusal to supply or deal, or of selling two 
products together (tying and bundling). Abusive conduct is therefore never abusive in the abstract: 
whether or not conduct is abusive highly depends on the context. In terms of sanctions, this not only 
assumes a broad toolkit of the competition authorities,40 but also that their role may be positive 
(regulatory). The sanction may be not only an obligation to terminate the infringement, but instead an 
obligation to (positively) engage in some kind of behaviour (e.g. giving access to a network or a 
patent, granting interoperability). There is thus a growing pressure on competition authorities to come 
up with more flexible solutions, such as commitment decisions, that directly involve the regulated 
environment.41 This is all increasingly relevant, as the number of Article 102 (abuse) decisions is 
rising, as is the number of decisions based on Article 102 and Article 101 taken together. The abuse of 
dominance provision is developing as a means of ensuring competition in oligopolistic markets - more 
in particular to ensure competition on liberalized markets. Abuse of dominance is also increasingly an 
issue in high tech markets, where refusal to licence intellectual property under certain circumstances 
may amount to an abuse.42  
3.2. Polyarchy  
As discussed above, in the pre-modernization era DG Competition was clearly in a strong position. 
This was not only due to the notification requirement and the supranational nature of the rules; it also 
was the result of a situation where there were simply not many active NCAs. At the time of the Treaty 
of Rome, only Germany had a competition regime in force (the Bundeskartellamt was established in 
1958). It was in the mid-1980s that most of today’s NCAs became operational: this was for example 
the case for the Netherlands (establishment of NMa and Mededingingswet in 1998), Italy 
(establishment of AGCM and national competition law in 1990), Belgium (establishment of Raad voor 
de Mededinging and Wet tot Bescherming van de Economische Mededinging in 1991), and France, 
(the Conseil de la Concurrence was given sanctioning powers in 1986). These NCAs built up notable 
experience and reputation in their own right: these are most notably the UK, German and French 
authorities, who together with DG Competition and the US authorities are rated as the ‘elite’ 
authorities worldwide.43 
In addition to the increase of competition enforcement in the old member states, the number of 
member states (and thus of NCAs) also rather dramatically increased from 16 to 27 (now 28) in the 
‘Big Bang’ enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007. Not only did enlargement make a notification 
procedure at the central level practically impossible - indeed, Commission workload was a main 
motivation for the abolishment of the procedure - but it also changed the position of DG Competition 
in the system in a broader sense. At the very least we may say that the increased number of 
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competition authorities in the EU will make it more difficult for DG Competition to unilaterally 
impose (uniform) measures - presumed that it would even want to do so.44  
At present, even though EU law is supranational, it should be remembered that there are a number 
of areas where member states do have discretion. This is mainly in the area of sanctions,45 as this 
touches upon national procedural autonomy. Regulation 1/2003 also leaves explicit freedom to NCAs 
to pursue stricter national legislation in the area of abuse of dominance.46 NCAs can set their own 
priorities in terms of enforcement and may include other policy goals than consumer welfare.47 Also, 
and perhaps most importantly, national variations may occur where sector specific regulations are in 
force. Sectoral rules are not exhaustively harmonized at EU level, and there are significant differences 
between member states. Although the ECJ ruled that obligations from sectoral regulation cannot be 
used as a defence under competition rules,48 competition policy does not always provide clear 
guidelines for enforcement, in particular for abuse cases, as has been discussed above.  
As is also discussed elsewhere in this volume, competition policy is characterized by strong 
epistemic dynamics.49 Quite apart from the external and formal ‘check’ of the courts, there is a more 
informal discussion ongoing between authorities and between authorities and practitioners. DG 
Competition therefore does not operate in a vacuum, as has been pointed out in other work,50 and can 
be subject to pressure from the (enlarged) epistemic community. On the other hand, strong epistemic 
dynamics may result in less diversification in practice than would be possible in theory.  
4. Learning in the ECN  
In the light of the increased strategic uncertainty and polyarchy in EU competition policy, in the 
following will be explored to what extent this has resulted in a more experimentalist governance 
architecture. The focus will be on the relation between NCAs and DG Competition in the ECN, and 
therefore particularly follow up the increased polyarchy - not so much addressing strategic uncertainty, 
which has been the focus of other work.51 Within the ECN, I make a distinction between case-specific 
(4.1) and non case-specific mechanisms (4.2) and then discuss contestation and transparency (4.3): the 
latter are fundamental to an experimentalist architecture, as they guarantee effective control 
mechanisms. 
4.1. Case-specific mechanisms  
Regulation 1/2003 foresees various procedures for mutual intervention in individual cases. NCAs have 
to notify the start of new cases, which have to be communicated to the other ECN members in a virtual 
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environment:52 NCAs are required to upload a limited summary of the case in English. For NCAs, this 
communication should occur at the time of the first formal investigative measure.53 Importantly, the 
quality of the summary and accuracy of the information depends upon input of the NCAs. DG 
Competition is not required to upload case information upon the first investigative measure. This 
system looks, prima facie, particularly suited to ensure smooth case allocation between national 
authorities and as a tool to detect cases where information exchange can be useful. Both practices are 
facilitated through Regulation 1/2003,54 but in practice neither seem to take place often.55 This is 
remarkable, because it was expected beforehand that case allocation was going to be a major issue in 
the ECN.56 
NCAs also have to notify their final decisions to DG Competition before adoption.57 In principle, 
NCAs should send a draft decision. This draft is considered by the Commission's legal service and a 
case handler from DG Competition, and the recommendations from these sides are communicated 
back to the NCA by DG Competition's ECN unit. Sometimes there is also direct contact between case 
handlers. The ECN unit tends to communicate more serious comments over the phone. In general 
however, comments are made in writing via e-mail; these internal communications are confidential 
and cannot be invoked in national procedures.58 DG Competition's advice is often welcomed and used 
to ‘strengthen’ the national case: the final decision remains the responsibility of the NCA. Although 
eventually DG Competition has the competence to take over a case from an NCA,59 in the 689 cases 
that have been notified between May 2004 and August 2013, this has never occurred.60 It therefore 
seems an ultimate remedy, and in any case not meant for frequent intervention. 
For DG Competition, prior to taking a decision, the opinion of the advisory committee is 
mandatory (though not binding).61 This committee already existed under Regulation 17/62 but was 
incorporated into the ECN by Regulation 1/2003: what is new is that it can also be used for national 
decisions (though this has not occurred in practice). The committee consists of representatives of the 
NCAs, who discuss DG Competition’s draft decision before it is sent out for adoption. In most cases 
meetings tend to be short, and the opinion is adopted by unanimous agreement. NCAs are not obliged 
to attend, and therefore it should be kept in mind that many meetings are not fully representative of all 
the ECN members.62 In terms of the possibility for the NCAs to influence the Commission decision, 
this seems to be limited in practice. Although the non-binding nature of the opinion not necessarily 
reflects the extent of the pressure of this mechanism, in practice the (public version of the) opinion is 
unanimous agreement with the proposed decision. This may be due to short preparation time for the 
attending parties;63 interviewees also pointed out that the Advisory Committee meetings occur in such 
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a late stage of the proceedings (just before sending the decision to the College of Commissioners for 
final adoption) that changes in the draft would involve a significant amount of work that is not 
considered feasible at this stage. In other words, although the advisory committee may be a useful 
‘check’ on the Commission and an occasion to make an official policy statement by NCAs, it does not 
or very seldom result in a negative opinion or fundamental changes of the decision. In practice 
possible concerns of NCAs may be addressed in an earlier stage of the procedure, but they are in any 
event not commonly expressed in the opinion. The committee meeting itself therefore seems more of a 
formality.  
Although there are notification and control mechanisms in place that allow for mutual review, these 
checks in themselves do not seem to limit the discretion of either the NCAs or DG Competition in a 
substantive manner. The notification of NCAs results in some limited form of advice or guidance by 
DG Competition, which is mostly welcomed, but sometimes not followed. The other way around, 
although the NCAs have the possibility to (negatively) advice on DG Competition’s decisions, in 
practice the advisory committee itself is more of a formality than an actual intervention mechanism. It 
is however possible that the mechanisms can have a disciplining effect by their mere existence.  
4.2. Non case-specific mechanisms 
The ECN also provides for more general structures of cooperation and socialization. An important part 
of the ECN work proceeds through working groups. The ECN working groups are flexible in nature: 
they can be established and abolished depending on the needs. In the past, there have been groups to 
prepare new regulation at the central level, for example in the context of the 2009 guidelines on 
enforcement priorities of abuse of dominance, the 2010 guidelines on horizontal agreements and 
finally the working group on TTBER, which is still active.64 These groups are useful for DG 
Competition to assess practice in the member states when drafting new regulation. This is all the more 
so for cases that DG Competition itself enforces little at present, such as vertical restraints cases. In 
addition, there are working groups that concern either sectoral issues (energy, transport, food) or 
specific elements of enforcement (e.g. cartels, IT).65  
The establishment and work of the groups is discussed in the Directors-General meeting (twice a 
year) and a plenary meeting for the heads of the ECN divisions (four times a year). Within the 
working groups, cases and enforcement issues are to be addressed by representatives from the NCAs. 
As is the case with the advisory committee, not all the working groups are well attended in practice, 
although the Commission pays for the travel costs. The meetings are mainly chaired and steered by 
DG Competition in terms of agenda, location and secretariat;66 however interviewees pointed out that 
the groups are open in nature, and that NCAs of newer member states can actively participate and 
learn. At times their participation can be limited because of lack of experience with the area in practice 
(e.g. in the context of the TTBER). It has been proposed that the working groups and meetings are 
‘important in order to develop common economic and legal principles for the assessment of 
complicated business practices, which are taking place in quickly developing markets and which are 
subject to evolving economic thinking.’67 However it seems that at least in the sectoral working 
groups, the discussion is complicated by different prioritization of the NCAs and lack of overall 
coherence in the sessions. This seriously hinders the possibility of mutual learning and in-depth peer 
review.  
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Considering the output of the working groups, the most notable and discussed example is the 2006 
Model Leniency Programme (MLP) for cartel detection, which was produced by a working group 
specifically set up for this purpose. This document is basically a set of recommendations for NCAs on 
how to set up an effective whistle-blowing programme. Instead of pursuing exhaustive modernization, 
the MLP provides minimal guidelines, which are revised every five years. The programme is widely 
considered a success, as the number of NCAs with a leniency programme has risen from 4 in 2002 to 
27 in 2013,68 and was revised on a number of smaller issues in 2012. Previously, this programme has 
been analyzed as an example of experimentalist governance: indeed it has relatively broad, open goals, 
some possibility for discretion and a revision mechanism.69 A second output of the ECN working 
groups is a 2012 the stock-taking exercise on investigation and decision-making powers.70 Notably, 
these two documents have been drawn up by the NCAs together and not by DG Competition. It is so 
far unclear what the follow-up of this work will be, and if the stock-taking exercise will result in some 
sort of harmonization.  
In terms of socialization more generally, in March and September staff from various NCAs spend a 
month at DG Competition for a stage of four weeks. The system is rotating, so that each NCA can 
send one official per year. Such stages help staff from NCAs learn from Commission practice and to 
meet with their peers in Brussels. However, the content of the stages seems to differ greatly. While 
some national officials can more or less actively participate in a case team, in other cases the match is 
less satisfactory. This can be because the unit in which officials are placed does not match their work 
at the NCA (e.g. transfer to a completely different sector), or because the case team to which the 
official is assigned simply does not have suitable work (too specific) at that stage of the case. The 
NCA trainees also participate in the regular introduction programme that DG Competition runs for 
new staff. A different and more intensive form of staff exchange takes place outside the ECN, through 
the system of seconded national experts (SNE). This is a more thorough exchange, and often lasts a 
few years (but can be as short as three months). During this period, the expert is paid by the NCA or 
national ministry. The idea is that the SNE will learn from Commission practice and will return with 
more expertise to the member state concerned; at the same time, the SNEs are recruited on the basis of 
the Commission’s needs.  
4.3. Transparency and contestation 
On paper, the ECN offers opportunity for contestation, most notably in its case specific mechanisms 
for mutual intervention. Formally both in the notification system and the advisory committee, NCAs 
and DG Competition will have to account for deviations from the advice. Also in the various working 
groups, for example in the groups where new Commission policy is discussed, DG Competition will 
have to defend its approach to the NCAs. However, it seems that contestation does not work optimally 
within the specific mechanisms that are provided: in the notification procedures, the advisory 
committee and various working groups it seems there are several problems. First of all, the case-
specific mechanisms occur at late stages in the procedure, when actual moderations are difficult to 
realize. In addition, there is not always sufficient preparation time and/or resources available for ECN 
issues.71 This is not only the case for small, but also for the larger and more experienced NCAs and 
consequently, the quality of the discussion varies (at best). In the context of the working groups, due to 
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the diverging prioritization of NCAs, there is the risk that there is little actual discussion or mutual 
inspiration.  
In terms of transparency, the ECN has made several improvements to the governance architecture 
of competition policy. There is now more information available on enforcement in the member states, 
at least at the central level of DG Competition but also mutually. This is important when new policy 
issues are identified, but also in taking up these issues and in the actual drafting process. In the ECN 
policy letter, which is public, the most important national competition cases and policy changes are 
discussed (in English), thus making this kind of information wider known beyond the mere language-
area of the case. However, the ECN correspondence and working group materials are confidential.72 
To some extent, this confidentiality is necessary to ensure the ‘ability to have a free and constructive 
dialogue.’73 However, it also makes any external control over the system difficult, and therefore may 
make the network vulnerable to criticism.  
Concluding remarks  
The question that this contribution intended discussed is: how do NCAs and DG Competition 
cooperate in the ECN? Can the ECN be considered as an experimentalist network, a tool that allows 
for mutual learning from local enforcement experience? The two main scope conditions (polyarchy 
and strategic uncertainty) for experimentalism have significantly increased in EU competition policy. 
There are a number of both substantive and procedural issues where high levels of uncertainty and 
potential for diversity exist. This is mainly the case in abuse of dominance cases, the number of which 
is increasing at the same time that NCAs have started to apply EU competition law in their national 
cases. The position of DG Competition, both in terms of policy-making and enforcement, is equally 
challenged as a result of more active competition enforcement in old member states and the inclusion 
of new member states. EU competition policy seems therefore in principle open to experimentalist 
solutions.  
Looking at the governance structure of the system, the following picture emerges. Both DG 
Competition and the NCAs enjoy levels of discretion that are not limited by the ECN: the network is 
certainly not the hierarchical control tool that it may have seemed. On the other hand, the learning 
mechanisms that the ECN provides do not seem to work entirely satisfactory on a number of levels, 
and therefore we cannot speak of a fully-fledged experimentalist logic either. There seems to be a lack 
of contestation in the mechanisms (both at the case-specific and at the non case-specific level), which 
is not only a result of short time frames, but also of internal prioritization both at the NCAs and at DG 
Competition. Although the ECN made national enforcement more visible than before, this is mainly 
towards the other members of the network. This lack of transparency is to an extent justified by the 
confidential nature of the proceedings, but on the other hand makes external checks difficult.  
The mechanisms in the ECN seem therefore too weak to characterize the system as fully 
experimentalist. However, the follow-up of the stock-taking exercise may make again more clear what 
kind of ‘animal’ the ECN is, and to what extent it may be used as a system for learning. Perceptions 
matter here. When the polyarchy and strategic uncertainty, although present in theory, are not 
perceived as such by the actors, chances of moving towards an experimentalist design will decrease. In 
a system that has been centralized for many years, perceptions do not change from one day to the next. 
But in terms of blueprint, the elements of experimentalism are embedded in the ECN structure.  
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Private Actors and Their Advisers in Administrative Agency Networks 
Yane Svetiev* 
The workshop for which this paper was written was titled “Exploring the Transnational Circulation of 
Policy Paradigms: Law Firms, Legal Networks and the Production of Expertise in the field of 
Competition Policy”. As such, the workshop brings welcome attention to both actors and processes 
which, even if more obscure and less obvious or transparent, have an important influence on the 
shaping of competition policy and law enforcement, thus continuing in the footsteps of the work done 
already by Vauchez1 and also in the spirit of the research on processes of transnationalisation of the 
legal profession and their effects on local legal practice.2  
This contribution to the workshop and the resulting volume could be situated in the context of two 
observations about the recent evolution of EU competition policy. The first is the identification of an 
EU competition law epistemic community, made up of practitioner-lawyers, judges, economists and 
academics (a community both characterized and strengthened by the revolving doors phenomenon).3 A 
further related claim of these authors is that this fairly cohesive epistemic community may be a reason 
and a ‘soft’ mechanism for a substantial harmonization of competition law across the EU, largely 
through informal exchanges and consensus building and often in the absence of any changes either in 
the text of the relevant competition laws or in the political direction from domestic governments about 
competition enforcement. 
The second observation stems from the literature that on the modernisation process of EU 
competition law enforcement, attempting to identify the impetus for this process and its effects both on 
the institutional enforcement arrangements and on the substantive development of competition law at 
EU and at national level in the Member States. One important focus of this literature is the networking 
of the national administrative agencies responsible for competition enforcement with the European 
Commission and the likely effects of this development.4 In the early years, just before and in the 
course of the implementation of the institutional reforms, one common view was that the 
modernization and the formalization of the network has been a way of extending the power of the 
Commission through the networked competition authorities to more directly influence the sphere of 
national competition enforcement5 and simultaneously spread a particular substantive vision of 
competition policy.6 An alternative interpretation of the modernization process is provided through the 
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lens of the need for learning in the enforcement of competition law, both in its dimension as a tool for 
promoting economic efficiency7 and if seen through the lens of a broader set of relevant policy goals.8 
The fact that there is considerable attention on the administrative authorities and their new 
networks is not accidental. This is part of a wider focus of scholars and practitioners on the growing 
tendency for EU law to mandate the creation of independent national regulatory or enforcement 
authorities in various sectors and policy areas. This tendency has been examined from different 
disciplinary perspectives precisely because it has important regulatory, constitutional and even private 
law consequences. Various scholars from different disciplinary perspectives have suggested that these 
processes of “agencification” and networking can be constitutionally suspect and can lead to a 
reduction of national autonomy in administrative as well as in private law.9  
The European Competition Network (“ECN”) is of course part, and some have argued even a 
precursor to such processes of formalizing (multi-level) governance arrangements in the EU.10 One 
challenge for research in this area is that characterising arrangements, such as the ECN, as an example 
of “new”, “multi-level” or “networked” governance can be consistent with either of the views about 
the underlying character and purpose of the network and the likely direction of EU competition policy 
described earlier. Thus, the networking of the agencies could be an attempt to generate channels of 
communication that engender informal exchanges and bonds of trust, leading to an indirect form of 
convergence irrespective of national political pressure, which in turn could be used to narrow 
competition policy goals and approaches.11 Alternatively, agency networking could be a platform for 
policy learning or differentiation by the participant national authorities,12 and even such differentiation 
and/or learning could proceed either in a disciplined or a more haphazard way.  
To come to the subject of the present working paper volume, a further challenge is that to gain 
some traction on how such networked agency arrangements operate, the role of private actors and their 
own networks and associations is also crucial. The literature on the independence of regulatory 
agencies (much like the earlier literature on independent central banks) focuses on the advantages such 
institutional arrangements offer for establishing policy commitment, resolving time inconsistency 
problems and building of specialized expertise.13 But at the same time, there is also (perhaps growing) 
recognition that there is no such thing as absolute agency independence: namely, where an 
enforcement institution is independent from political control (or anchor), we simply have to ask the 
question who is it dependent on for both policy direction and the knowledge necessary to implement 
or enforce its policy mandate both through writing rules and through filling the lacunae of the rules. 
To the extent that there is a cohesive and fairly monolithic competition epistemic community also on 
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the private actor side, it could be precisely this community that is filling the political vacuum and, as 
such, determining the direction of EU competition policy in terms of goals and substance. And even if 
the networking arrangements among the enforcement authorities either by conscious design, or as they 
come to operate, lead to policy innovation and learning, the way in which such arrangements 
incorporate the input of private actors in that process will be an important determinant of the kinds of 
policy innovation and learning that will take place. 
In prior work, I have suggested that the creation, or rather formalization, of the ECN as part of the 
Modernization Regulation 1/2003, left scope for the emergence of an experimentalist governance 
architecture in the implementation of EU competition law. But both this claim and the way that such a 
claim can be further tested and elaborated requires unpacking a number of different layers of 
argument, which are worth making more explicit here. 
The first layer is the legal one.14 Here the analysis focuses on the formal legal provisions that 
supply the substantive law to be applied, but also the “institutional” law, i.e. the kinds of interactions 
between the different authorities that the law envisages and permits. Arguably, the law can principally 
be permissive in the creation of an experimentalist learning architecture, but not determinative. Thus, 
on the one hand, a law that specifies narrowly the consequences that follow if certain concentration 
ratios or HHI indices are reached in markets, would limit the possibility for contextualization of the 
rules.15 On the other hand, a law that explicitly provides for peer review of agency decisions or for a 
sunset clause obliging the re-examination of the legal instrument, will create formal settings and 
requirements of review and reexamination, even if this does not mean they will be used in an 
experimentalist way.16  
As a consequence, a second level of analysis focuses on the existence of what I have termed an 
experimentalist “infrastructure.”17 Such an inquiry examines the modalities of interaction that emerge 
and perhaps even become formalized, quite apart from the law, within a network of implementation 
authorities, such as the ECN. Thus, a legal provision that gives the centre (in this case the 
Commission) the power to take over cases or otherwise override national decision-makers could be 
used to centralize enforcement and minimize local adaptation, but it need not be used that way, it 
could also be used as a penalty default.18 Conversely, the possibility for peer review of decisions of the 
Commission and national authorities does not necessarily mean that such review will be conducted 
thoroughly or substantively.19 There are other aspects of the network infrastructure that matter, 
including who has access to the information provided by authorities to the network and the extent to 
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which enforcement officials consult such information in their daily work. Finally, there are also less 
formal and human factors that might be more difficult to grasp, including the possibility that the 
Commission is held in very high regard or that national officials have career aspirations in Brussels 
that might influence the extent to which they might be willing to “challenge” the Commission. The 
latter kinds of considerations - over and above the legal provisions, the suggested cohesiveness of the 
epistemic community and the monolithic view of competition within the Commission’s competition 
directorate - seem to drive common concerns about the ECN being a vehicle for extending the 
hegemony of the Commission and a particular variety of competition policy.20 
This brings me to the third level of analysis, namely the question of the interaction of authorities 
and the private actors who are the objects (or beneficiaries) of competition enforcement, but also their 
representatives and advisors (as a principal focus of this working paper volume). The advisors of such 
parties include not only private lawyers, but also economic consultants who provide the economic 
research to support the particular claims made by parties before the enforcement authorities or in 
court. Similarly, a broader set of civil society actors, such as academics or industry observers are also 
relevant and may be offered opportunities to participate and provide input in the workings of the 
network structure. These interactions are crucial particularly in the context of the strengthened 
independence of national enforcement authorities from political actors and control, an independence 
that the Commission in recent times has shown willingness to defend from perceived attacks by 
Member State governments even in threatened enforcement proceedings before the EU courts. Again, 
this brings us back to the point made earlier that there is no such thing as complete independence. 
Independence from politics means dependence on some other source of knowledge: either a 
technocratic conception of policy knowledge or on other actors who are responsible for supplying the 
enforcement-relevant knowledge to the regulators. 
To take one example, critics of the Commission’s practice of using negotiated commitment 
remedies as a substitute for formal enforcement proceedings to enforce EU competition law – a 
practice also common among national authorities - have argued that this makes the Commission 
excessively dependent on the investigated entities.21 But another way to view commitments is as a tool 
of experimentalist enforcement precisely because it does not rely on fixed and inflexible (context-
independent) rules as the only guide to enforcement, but also because it opens up non-traditional 
channels for input into decision-making and introduces new review mechanisms, such as remedial 
monitors as well as other authorities in the network.22 Again, a key question relates to the way in 
which these other actors – including the undertakings themselves, but also the new monitoring agents 
for instance - plug into the enforcement infrastructure and the accountability and revision mechanisms 
that are used (or not) to evaluate interventions.23 
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1. Private actors in policy formulation and rule-making 
Given the scope of interest of the workshop and this resulting collection of working papers, in the 
remainder of this contribution I single out a few examples of private actor involvement in the 
formulation or enforcement of competition law and policy in the EU. My principal aim is to highlight 
some of the varying “spaces” that might require further examination, as well as the different 
conceptions of dependence and knowledge mentioned above that may be salient in those spaces. This 
is also meant to put into sharp relief the claim that a networked enforcement architecture can be 
consistent with different variants (or architectures) of “governance”, different conceptions of policy-
relevant knowledge and different processes of its incorporation into the formulation and 
implementation of policy. As such, these examples also highlight the importance of examining in 
closer detail the “infrastructure” of EU agency networks and the way in which this infrastructure 
affects agency decision-making in individual cases and the interaction with private parties and their 
representatives and advisers. 
Consider for example two policy initiatives discussed in Svetiev (2010) that arose in the early days 
of the formalization of the ECN, namely the formulation of a leniency policy for all EU competition 
authorities to adopt (something that on the basis of US experience was identified as a best practice in 
fighting cartels), as well as the commonly identified goal of stimulating private competition law 
actions by harmed parties in national courts.24 Both examples illustrate that even when a common goal 
is identified and some degree of harmonization is pursued through a common policy tool, the 
harmonization effort is constrained by (i) the absence of an ex ante policy template to harmonise to; 
and (ii) obstacles that might exist in the national legal and economic landscape to a harmonized tool 
(such as the national substantive and procedural law treatment of leniency applications for both 
evidentiary and secrecy purposes, or the required legal standards for proving and establishing damages 
in private competition law). Such national peculiarities provide scope for learning in both directions. 
Thus, the need to tailor a common mechanism, such as a leniency statement or private antitrust 
actions, to local conditions can reveal possible improvements in implementing the common tool (or at 
the very least a way to promote the common goal – such as incentivizing leniency applications by 
cartel members – that is less restrictive of some other common goal – such as that of transparency of 
competition enforcement25 or procedural fairness). Similarly, the experience of other network 
members in developing private damages claim mechanisms may reveal that some domestic procedural 
law rule has outlived its purpose, even if - as often happens - it is either revered or at least remains 
unquestioned in the national legal system merely due to its longevity.  
Moreover, whether these opportunities for learning are in fact realized will depend upon numerous 
factors including (1) whether or not the information is appropriately gathered in the network and either 
incorporated in common rules or otherwise disseminated in a way that discloses improvement 
opportunities; (2) the extent to which national actors seek and exploit such opportunities; (3) the extent 
to which national agencies which participate in a network such as the ECN are capable of changing 
local law or otherwise engaging the relevant national law-making actors to reform the law based on 
information gathered within the network. 
Thus, it could be said that since the cartels leniency policy principally affected the activities of the 
competition agencies at EU and national level, the formulation of policy was kept entirely within the 
ambit of the ECN. On the issue of private antitrust actions, by contrast, the Commission has for a long 
time now envisaged possible EU harmonization legislation, but as already mentioned and as the 
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Commission foresaw, this also requires an exercise of learning about what are the problems and 
obstacles to private antitrust actions at national level so as to produce harmonization legislation in 
light of those problems, an exercise that is to some extent outside the ECN’s enforcement focus. 
Perhaps for that reason, when the Commission sought the necessary information for harmonization 
of private antitrust law, as had previously been the case with collective consumer protection actions, 
critics point out that it turned to other sources, in particular more “private” sources such as private 
consultancies or even university-based researchers.26 This form of incorporation of private actors faces 
two possible concerns. One concern stems from the extent to which such private actors have access to 
accurate and relevant information on the issue at hand,27 the extent to which they are part of a cohesive 
epistemic community, as well as their incentives for the accurate and unbiased collection and 
presentation of the relevant information.28 A second - and related concern - is that the Commission, in 
its incarnation as a political – as opposed to expert – institution, may find it easier to instrumentalise 
such actors (given their incentives and potentially limited access to information) so as to firm up the 
basis for its proposals that in turn tilt the balance of power vis-à-vis the Member States (in their 
“political” or “regulatory” incarnation). Whether or not this is the case requires an examination of the 
bases on which such consultants are selected, the charge that is provided to them and the ways in 
which the Commission participates in, guides or reviews their work. Relatedly, a further problematic 
feature stems from the fact that this type of work product is typically not subjected to peer review or 
any other external scrutiny, yet it to some extent assumes an official quality upon its delivery or 
publication.  
2. Private actors in individual cases 
Apart from general information-gathering or consultations in setting the direction of policy or making 
specific soft or hard law instruments, a second area in which private actors interact directly with 
competition agencies is of course in the resolution of individual cases, where undertakings, 
represented by lawyers and economic consultants, can be either defendants or complainants or just 
affected market actors. 
Individual case-decision making is the most important way in which enforcement agencies give 
shape to competition law and policy and where they are most dependent upon information supplied by 
market actors and their advisors. The Modernization Regulation formalizes two forms of input to the 
Commission’s decision-making in individual cases. One is the market testing of commitments under 
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Article 9 of the Regulation, where market actors can provide input on the remedies negotiated by the 
Commission with a competition defendant. In the ordinary violation procedure such input can be 
provided to the Commission only informally, and the distinction is presumably justified by the fact 
that Article 7 decisions must contain a formal finding of violation and are subject to ordinary judicial 
review. 
A second form of peer review of Commission decision-making in individual cases (that can also 
extend to decisions under EU competition law of national competition authorities) is peer review by 
the representatives of national authorities sitting on the ACAPDP. Such an avenue of peer review is 
considered important in the literature on experimentalist governance29 both because it gives concrete 
expression to the input from lower level units in the formulation of the common policy and because it 
is a potential source of learning through recursivity (even if it is worth highlighting that the input of 
the Advisory Committee is provided ex ante before the implementation of the decision rather than by 
reference to a comparison of theories of harm with outcomes achieved). 
There are other limitations on the effective exercise of the ACAPDP’s review functions due to 
practicalities such as the time that is available in which to conduct a review of the findings and 
proposed remedies by the Commission, as well as the availability of human resources or analytic 
capacity for national authorities to be able to perform this task effectively.30 Modern competition cases 
ordinarily are also supported by extensive economic modeling which is subject to the constraints on 
economic tools of analysis (as adapted to the antitrust context) and which can itself be contested. Yet it 
is unlikely that national authorities would be in a position to dedicate resources and time to the full 
replication of the modeling or to provision of alternative models and scenarios in performing their 
review function. 
Here again, private parties can fill the void, particularly in individual cases where their interests are 
clearly not necessarily aligned with those of the enforcement authority, such as the Commission or 
where their interests are not monolithic, but differentiated and not so clearly defined ex ante in all 
situations across the board.  
Commentators who highlight the contestable nature of economic analysis – both theoretical and 
empirical – have tended to highlight the tendency for both parties to an antitrust dispute to be able to 
bring to the fore economic arguments, supported by eminent economic experts, that point to divergent 
conclusions about the competitive significance of the conduct or transaction at issue.31 This problem 
has also stimulated thinking about ways in which to overcome the possibly “tainted” analysis of the 
expert paid by the parties so as to ensure that a decision – including a court decision – is based on 
credible (read rigorous and independent) economic analysis of the evidence. One prominent proposal 
has been the suggestion to publish the economic expert reports of economists who participate in 
antitrust cases in peer reviewed economics journals and to thus subject them to scrutiny of the 
economic scientific peer community.32 
While such a proposal also seeks to introduce the logic of peer review in public decision-making it 
seems to be unworkable for both practical and conceptual reasons. Conceptually, peer reviewed 
scientific publications follow an entirely different logic since they serve a community with different 
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goals and rationality.33 The scientific community prizes output that is new and original yet builds on 
the existing disciplinary corpus, rather than output that is meant to be useful and perhaps innovative, 
even if  in many ways  openly incomplete. This in turn influences the process of review and 
publication that proceeds on altogether different criteria and schedule to that of economic expertise 
that is meant to aid in making concrete decisions. Further, as a practical matter, this kind of procedure 
could only work to protect from the worst excesses of bad faith expert evidence and it would only do 
so indirectly if hired experts are concerned about any consequences for their reputation that might 
result in their “scientific” community as a result of the publication of their analysis.34 
Apart from across-agency forms of peer review, such as the ACAPDP within the ECN, and 
international peer review of enforcement practices performed within the auspices of the OECD and the 
ICN or UNCTAD, agencies themselves have been experimenting with various formats and 
architectures for introducing review and generating learning as part of their own implementation 
techniques. Examples of such mechanisms include the integration of both lawyers and economists into 
the European Commission’s case teams for investigation and analysis from the very outset.35 This 
allows for the co-evolution of the hypotheses of competitive harm (often based on prior precedents) 
and the collection and analysis of the evidence (which might in fact disclose a context quite different 
from that in precedent cases). Such integration allows for the build up of synergies and a cooperative 
rather than antagonistic relationship, but it also risks the development of a “group think” mentality that 
is difficult to disrupt even by evidence pointing in a different direction. Thus, agencies have also been 
experimenting with the creation of internal review procedures by external experts or so-called “devil’s 
advocate” processes so as to test their approach to a particular case.36 
Moreover, in some circumstances private lawyers acting for parties directly involved in a particular 
case have themselves proposed innovative instruments on an ad hoc basis. Thus, in its analysis of the 
proposed acquisition by Outokumpu (a Finnish stainless steel producer) of Inoxum (the stainless steel 
division of ThyssenKrupp of Germany), the European Commission was concerned about 
anticompetitive effects of the merger. Among other evidence, the Commission relied on economic 
modeling (based on a Bertrand-Edgeworth model) supported by its own Chief Economist Unit to 
buttress its concerns. The Commission in turn requested significant divestments by Outokumpu by 
way of remedy in return for approval of the merger. 
The legal representatives of Outokumpu wished to resist the requested remedies and were advised 
by their own expert economic advisers that the economic modeling by the Commission’s Chief 
Economist unit was unsound. Yet the analysis of these economic advisers was of course tainted by the 
fact that they were experts paid by the party seeking to procure an approval of the merger, even if they 
themselves were convinced of the soundness of their position.37 In order to overcome this problem, 
Outokumpu’s legal representatives decided on a rather unorthodox strategy: they asked three 
independent and well-respected academic economists to themselves review the data and assess the 
appropriateness of Bertrand-Edgworth model used by the Commission’s economist, to do so without 
direction from Outokumpu or Outokumpu’s representatives and to deliver a report simultaneously to 
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both Outokumpu and the Commission, without an opportunity for Outokumpu’s lawyers to review or 
even see the report before it was delivered to the Commission.38  
A full review of the merits of this instrument of peer review is beyond the scope of this 
contribution. Notwithstanding the fact that the Commission’s decision extensively refers to points 
raised in the so-called “wise men” panel report,39 the legal representative of Outokumpu who decided 
to introduce this procedure recognized that the static nature of the questions posed to the “wise men” 
panel and the absence of a discursive procedure left the conclusions of the panel open to 
misinterpretation or even misrepresentation. Nonetheless, the use of this form of peer review does lead 
to a number of observations. First, it suggests that even in settings where the investigative and 
decision-making procedure is largely based on a negotiation between an enforcer, such as the 
Commission, and an undertaking, healthy disagreement and debate can ensue about the proper 
understanding of the features and competitive dynamics in the market.40 Secondly, the negotiation 
procedure allows the parties to find novel ways in which to test and propose their arguments in a way 
that may be more difficult in a more rigidly formal setting (such as a court).41 A court setting would 
have allowed for closer scrutiny of the independent expert report vis-à-vis the Commission’s own 
modeling, but the problem is that a relatively less well informed party (the judge) would have to 
develop criteria to decide the merits of the modeling dispute.42 Finally, the argument that there may be 
a high degree of consensus in the competition epistemic community about the proper view and 
function of competition law and policy, even if it were true, may be less significant than first appears 
if it does not entail a consensus view about the outcomes of individual cases. This is not least because 
the interests and rationality, even of the competition law professionals, may not be as cohesive as 
might appear at first glance.43 
Conclusion 
As already indicated at the outset, I situate this contribution to the volume in the context of the 
ongoing debate about the so-called “agencification” in the EU that has proceeded at a fast pace in 
recent times both at the EU level and, pursuant to EU mandates, also at national level. This process 
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has lead to the creation of regulatory and enforcement agencies in many Member States where such 
entities were relatively unknown and constitutionally unfamiliar. Yet, as some scholars have pointed 
out – writing from within different contexts – the processes of departure from the so-called 
“transmission belt” model of the public administration have been going on for a much longer period of 
time, even if imperceptibly, often hidden under the doctrinal paean of non-delegation.44 After central 
banks, competition agencies were the first target for the formalization of independence. But do such 
processes lead to an elaboration of a “technology of expertise” that, is supposed to derive its 
legitimacy from technocratic neutrality and the suppression (or concealment) of value conflicts?45 Or 
is the world of agencies vulnerable to capture by informal networks and epistemic communities and 
less perceptible subversion to their own interests and purposes? Or do they provide deliberative 
transnational settings for policy learning, which even discloses an experimentalist character so that 
private parties who participate in policy implementation are themselves one of the “lower level 
actors”46 who can regain their autonomy from top-down regulation by contributing to the learning 
process? 
In this contribution, I have sought to show that different scenarios may be detected in different 
settings. One challenge is to identify the different points or spaces in which firms, lawyers, consultants 
are given the opportunity to influence policy in the agency and network settings and this can range 
from information gathering, to drafting policy proposals and rules to their participation in individual 
case resolution. Moreover, the interests and incentives of private parties and their advisers, their 
capacity to contribute towards policy learning, as well as the way they are incorporated into the 
decision-making infrastructure and the methods of review of their input can vary substantially in those 
different settings. Focusing on these spaces of influence and on the way that private actors are 
incorporated into the governance infrastructure can also be a part of the processes of recursivity and 
learning given that most EU enforcement arrangements are themselves works-in-progress often put in 
place haphazardly either in response to crisis or as a short-cut to pursue an intermediate policy goal or 
to overcome political gridlock.  
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When ‘Chicago’ meets London and Paris: Competition elites and the regulation of 
restrictive practices 
Andy Smith* 
The general impact of European Union (EU) competition policy upon the government of economic 
activity in Europe has been well documented1. However, as specialists acknowledge2, the question of 
whether this policy has been fully appropriated within the member states has hardly been researched at 
all. Instead, stimulating but unsubstantiated claims have been made about how DG COMP has been 
the importer into Europe of a particular approach to governing inter-firm competition inspired by ‘the 
Chicago school’ of law and economics3. More precisely, from these claims ‘Chicago’s doctrine on the 
regulation of cartels and other restrictive practices can be hypothesized as having prompted three 
changes in EU policy and national practices: 
(i) a switch away from deciding in terms of what is prescribed by law towards judgements based 
more upon economic analysis of the actual impact of a practice upon markets; 
(ii) replacing a concern for outlawing any restrictive practice in a market (‘prohibition’) towards 
banning only those which are deemed ‘abusive’; 
(iii) using leniency clauses in order to encourage firms to act as whistle-blowers as regards the 
cartels they themselves have been involved in. 
More fundamentally, formulating claims about the influence of ‘Chicago’ as hypotheses is heuristic 
because this guides research to operationalize generalizable questions about the role of doctrine within 
policy and decision-making, its transfer across polities4 and, in the case of the EU, ‘Europeanization’5. 
In order to test these hypotheses, this text successively presents initial data on change or 
reproduction in the government of restrictive practices within France and the United Kingdom (UK) 
during the 2000s6. These states have been chosen chiefly because although both began regulating 
inter-firm competition in the 1990s from very low national bases, the UK is frequently seen as much 
more open to both ‘American’ influences and the siren call of ‘economic-based’ policymaking. 
Although my principal findings do not frontally contradict these culturalist generalizations, they show 
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that the actual conduits for change in both countries have little to do with national stereotypes. Instead, 
the causes of ‘Chicago’s’ respective influence upon competition regulators based in Paris and in 
London can only be captured by examining the specific organizations involved and the professions 
that dominate them. 
1. Paris: Still dominated by law and lawyers 
Until the 1980s, the prevalence of neo-mercantilism within French politics, administration and 
business practices meant that very little regulation of inter-firm competition had been 
institutionalized7. However, since then such regulation has emerged and deepened over three periods 
of change. Lasting from only 1986 to 1989, the first established a Conseil de la Concurrence that was 
independent of the state and given powers to sanction anti-competitive behaviour both discursively 
and with fines. Indeed, as of 1989 staff of the Conseil began to develop an offensive against cartels 
and other such restrictive practices, building up along the way considerable jurisprudence favourable 
to this aim. At the time, the causes and effects of change were almost exclusively national. From the 
early 1990s to the mid-2000s, this active approach to regulating competition was deepened and 
consolidated during a second period of activity marked increasingly by references to EU law and 
interactions between staff of the Conseil de la Concurrence and that of DG COMP. Unsurprisingly, 
the creation of the European Competition Network (ECN) in 2004 formalized and further structured 
this extra-national co-operation and interdependence8. Nevertheless, as a third period of change 
underlines, activity at a national scale has of course remained extremely important. Indeed, the 
transformation in January 2009 of the Conseil into an Autorité de la Concurrence doted with increased 
investigative powers owes more to an internally-centred report (the Rapport Attali) and the national 
legislation (la Loi sur la modernisation de l’économie9) which it largely inspired and legitimated. 
As regards the regulation of restrictive practices, and as tables 1 and 2 highlight, the activity of the 
Conseil then the Autorité de la Concurrence has become particularly intense. Indeed, over the last 20 
years cartels and abuse of dominant position have frequently been sanctioned through increasingly 
heavy fines10.  
When examined more closely, these tables also reveal a number of other key features of French 
competition regulation. First, the activity of the Conseil/Autorité has been dominated by nationally-
bounded thinking and action. Of course, whenever trans-frontier trade is in question the Commission 
is more likely to intervene directly. Nevertheless, it is surprising that so few references to Community 
law and principles, or other member states11, feature in the decisions studied here (only 19 out of 301, 
i.e. 6%). 
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Table 1: Decisions over collusions by the Conseil de la Concurrence (1999-2008) 
Year Decisions
12
 Cartels Abuse of 
dominant 
position 
EU evoked Economic 
analysis 
1999 18 14 4 1 0 
2000 19 11 8 3 0 
2001 36 26 10 2 0 
2002 19 16 3 0 0 
2003 38 25 13 3 1 
2004 39 22 17 1 0 
2005 43 27 16 3 3 
2006 24 14 10 2 2 
2007 41 26 15 1 5 
2008 24 18 6 3 9 
Total 301 199 102 19 20 
(Source: author’s analysis of decisions published on website of the Conseil de la concurrence 
(July 2009). 
Table 2: Decisions over collusions by the Autorité de la Concurrence (2009-11)  
Year Decisions Cartels Abuse of 
dominant 
position 
Mixture 
ADP/ 
cartel 
EU evoked Economic 
analysis 
Fines 
(millions 
of euros) 
2009 15 9 4 2 6 1 206,6 
2010 11 10 0 1 5 1 442,4 
2011 8 7 1 0 6 2 419,8 
Total 34 26 5 3 17 4 1068,8 
(Source: author’s analysis of decisions published on website of the Autorité de la concurrence 
(July 2012). 
As regards the usage of economic analysis, this only appears at all after 2005. Since then, particularly 
in cases of abuse of dominant position, a gradual increase in neo-classical micro-analysis has occurred. 
Indeed, ever since a key decision made by the appeal court in Paris13, during this period a new 
criterion – damage to the economy – has emerged wherein the influence of economists in general, and 
those influenced by ‘Chicago’ in particular, can be discerned. 
Indeed, a hypothesis that merits further testing is that this development is linked to the appointment 
since 2007 of a Chief Economist to the Conseil and then the Autorité de la concurrence. The career 
trajectories of the three persons who have held this post (see Box 1) confirm that mainstream neo-
classic economics has been the preference of these organizations. However, none were trained in the 
United States and are instead typical examples of French ‘state economists’14 who in their 
presentations of themselves highlight neither their experience overseas nor their implication in EU-
scale activities. This biographical information clearly needs supplementing of course, in particular by 
producing data on the other six members of the ‘service économique’ that the chief economist heads 
and, above all, what they actually do within the Autorité de la Concurrence.  
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Box 1: The first three chief economists of French competition policy 
 Initial training Phd. training Posts held Overseas 
experience 
Philippe Choné 
(2007-9) 
Ecole nationale de 
la statistique et de 
l’administration 
économique 
(ENSAE) in Paris 
Toulouse school 
of economics 
Professor at 
l’ENSAE 
(2010 >) 
Director of the 
CREST-INSEE 
research centre 
(Paris), 2004-5 
Economist at the 
Conseil de la 
Concurrence 
(2002-3) 
Only conferences 
in the US, but 
also in Germany, 
Italy and, Hong 
Kong 
Thibaud Vergé 
(2010 >13) 
Ecole 
Polytechnique 
(Paris) then 
Toulouse 
University 
(Masters) 
Toulouse school 
of economics 
Lecturer in 
economics at the 
Universities of 
Bristol (2000-2) 
and Southampton 
(2002-5);  
Reader at CREST 
in Paris (2005-10) 
Apart from 5 
years teaching in 
the UK, his CV 
only lists his role 
in The 
Association of 
Competition 
Economics since 
2011 
Etienne Pfister 
(2013 >) 
 University of 
Paris 1 
Head of anti-trust 
unit 3 at Conseil 
de la Concurrence 
since 2007; 
Assistant 
professor at 
University of 
Nancy 
 
The final result of our documentary analysis which needs to be underlined here concerns the use of 
leniency clauses in order to facilitate the inquiries undertaken by the Conseil then the Autorité de la 
Concurrence. Present in French law since 200115, this practice seems to have been inspired by that of 
the Commission (1998), the UK (also 1998) and the US (early 1990s). Moreover, at the end of 2012 
the Commission published a new Model leniency programme officially presented as a coproduction by 
national agencies and DG COMP16. Nevertheless, the actual usage of leniency clauses in France 
remains exceptional. It is therefore important not to overstate the impact of this practice in France, nor 
the borrowing from ‘Chicago’ approaches to regulation upon which it is said to be based. 
Overall, the governing of inter-firm relations in France has certainly changed a great deal since the 
late 1980s. From a time when the Minister for Economic Affairs could take decisions on such matters 
quite autonomously, the government of competition has become much more dense and less dependent 
upon such ministerial involvement. This said, the hypothesis that would explain this change in terms 
of institutional transfer must be used only sparingly for the following two reasons. 
Firstly, the low introduction of economic analysis and leniency clauses into the practices of the 
Conseil then the Autorité de la Concurrence reveal how strong judicial reasoning still is in the French 
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case. Indeed, backing up this point is the fact that the four people who have held the presidency of 
these organizations have all had strong levels of legal training and had even previously worked within 
the Conseil d’Etat (Pierre Laurent, from 1987 to 1993, Charles Barbeau from 1993 to 1998, Marie-
Dominique Hagelsteen from 1998 to 2004 and, since 2004, Bruno Lasserre). 
Secondly, if there is no doubt that the French government of competition is integrated within that 
of the EU and that this has been accelerated by the ECN, references to Europe within actual decision-
making remain rare. Instead, other sources of legitimacy and legal instruments specific to France still 
play a much more important role. 
2. London: ‘Economics’ in the UK  
If many commentators today automatically equate the UK as a polity with neo-liberalism, the history 
of competition policy in this country is a powerful reminder both that its linkages with this ideology 
have not always been so tight and that, in any case, they always need to be examined around specific 
domains of policymaking and implementation. Indeed, until the mid-1990s British decision-making 
over inter-firm competition was very ad hoc, thereby leaving much room for ministerial autonomy17. 
Since 2000, however, a much more systematic approach has been institutionalized which, moreover, 
has entailed the importing of recipes from the EU but also the US.  
As regards the organizations that have developed and structured this field, three in particular need 
highlighting: first the ministry known for many years as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
and now as the Department of Business; second the Monoplies and Mergers Commission (MMC) 
which subsequently became the Competition Commission (CC), and third the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT). Despite the ad hoc nature of decision-making prior to the mid-1990s, economists have long 
played a considerable role within each of these organizations18. Indeed, Dumez and Jeunemaître 
highlight that as early as 1991 the presence amongst MMC commissioners of economists close to the 
Chicago school of law and economics19.  
Meanwhile initial proposals for a genuine UK competition policy first came from civil servants in 
the DTI who, between 1986 and 1989 and then again between 1992 and 1996, prepared a ‘white 
paper’ and two ‘green papers’ on this issue. None of these proposals themselves became law due to 
opposition marshalled around the defence of a common law approach, resistance by the Confederation 
of British Industry (CBI)20 and nationalist anti-Europeanism within the governing Conservative Party. 
However, when the Labour Party came to power in 1997 each of these points was overcome. In 
particular, the CBI changed its preferences largely because many of its members now came to see the 
advantage of aligning British law and policy better with what had been institutionalized at the scale of 
the EU. Consequently, first in 1998 through ‘The Competition Act’ then in 2002 through ‘The 
Enterprise Act’, five major changes were either made or codified in law. The first three were 
essentially procedural and entailed the abandoning of ministerial authority, the creation of 
investigatory powers and the introduction of a system of sanctions. More fundamentally, however, by 
introducing a series of per se rules, these pieces of legislation also modified the substance of UK law 
in two ways. First they replaced an approach which had previously only condemned abuse of 
dominant position by one that sought to exclude all situations of dominant position where abuse might 
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possibly occur – a change more in keeping with German and EU ordoliberalism than with the Chicago 
school of reasoning. Second, and conversely, a vague criterion couched in terms of ‘defending the 
public interest’ was replaced by a commitment to outlaw company or inter-firm practices each time 
there was ‘a substantial reduction in competition’21– a move very much in line with the prescriptions 
made by the Chicago School.  
If all these changes seemed to make British competition regulation resemble that of the EU, it 
would be wrong to assume, as many have done, that this was the result of top-down 
‘Europeanization’22. Instead, as Cini23 hypothesizes but does not demonstrate, British competition 
elites have imported policy recipes as much from the US as from the EU. As a step towards verifying 
this claim, let us now examine the actual decision-making (by the OFT) and doctrinal or 
recommendation making (by the CC) that has taken actually place since 2000. 
The first thing to highlight about formalized decision-making by the OFT set out in table 4 is that 
this takes place much less frequently than in the French case. Between 2001 and 2011 this 
organization only took 67 decisions (7 per year on average) as compared to 298 (27 per year) by its 
counterpart across the channel. One explanation is that the OFT is not authorized to intervene in cases 
concerning individuals which, in the UK, are a matter for the courts24. Another is that OFT’s formal 
decisions are only made after an initial economic study has already demonstrated that they concern 
matters of general interest. By systematically using economic analysis but remaining relatively ad hoc, 
the OFT’s practices thus largely reproduce those that existed before 2000. Moreover, amongst the 
OFT’s published decisions very few explicitly reference the EU and its competition policy (7/67, i.e. 
10%). 
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Table 3: OFT decisions over collusions (2001-2011) 
Year Decisions Cartels Abuse of 
dominant 
position 
EU evoked Economic 
analysis 
2001 10 3 7 1 4 
2002 9 4 5 0 2 
2003 13 6 7 0 4 
2004 13 5 8 1 3 
2005 6 5 1 1 2 
2006 7 4 3 0 2 
2007 2 1 1 0 0 
2008 1 0 1 0 0 
2009 1 1 0 0 0 
2010 2 1 1 1 1 
2011 3 1 2 3 1 
Total 67 31 36 7 19 
Analysis of the formal decisions actually taken by the OFT since 2000 reveals that they often entail 
economic analysis, particularly when cases of abuse of dominant position are at issue. Moreover, in 
keeping with ‘Chicago’ doctrine, this analysis is used to identify instances where dominant positions 
have indeed been ‘abused’. In addition, this doctrine is also in evidence over the more frequent usage 
of leniency causes than in the French cases. Since 2002 virtually all OFT decisions that have 
culminated in fines have been put together with the help of whistleblowers benefitting from this form 
of leniency. 
This said, when examining the career trajectories of the OFT’s two chief economists to date the 
case for wholesale importing of ‘Chicago’ into this organization becomes less solid. As box 2 sets out, 
in terms of their training both the persons in question are pure products of British universities (Oxford 
and London), not those of the US. If both worked during the early stages of their career for economic 
consultancies known to be dominated by neo-classical economics, more research is needed in order to 
identify the depth to which the doctrines of ‘Chicago’ have really permeated thinking and practice in 
the OFT.  
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Box 2: The OFT’s first two chief economists  
 Initial training Phd. training Posts held Overseas 
experience 
Amelia Fletcher 
(2001-13) 
Oxford University  Oxford University Consultant at 
London 
Economics Ltd. 
(1994-99) then 
at Frontier 
Economics Ltd. 
(1999-2001) 
None 
Chris Walters  
(2013 >) 
University of 
London 
University of 
London (Phd in 
econometrics) 
OFT (2007-13: 
Mergers then 
Goods and 
Consumer 
services); 
Competition 
Commission 
(2003-7); 
Lexecon Ltd 
(2001-2003); 
London 
Economics Ltd 
(1999-2000) 
None 
As regards the opinions prepared and published by The Competition Commission, as table 5 
underlines, once again one finds little reference to the EU’s government of competition but much 
importance given to economic analysis25. Indeed, over the last 10 years only 2 out of 25 reports on 
restrictive practices published by this organization have not included a substantial ‘economic’ 
dimension. 
Table 5: Opinions published on restrictive practices by The Competition Commission (1999-
2011) 
Year Opinions EU evoked Economic 
Analysis 
1999 3 0 2 
2000 6 1 5 
2001 1 0 1 
2002 3 0 3 
2003 2 0 2 
2004 0 0 0 
2005 1 0 1 
2006 2 0 2 
2007 2 0 2 
2008 5 0 5 
2009 0 0 0 
2010 0 0 0 
2011 0 0 0 
Total 25 1 23 
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This analysis can be deepened by examining the career trajectories of the CC’s last four chief 
economists. As box 3 shows, if their involvement in other countries is greater than for their 
counterparts in France or the OFT, obvious links with the ‘Chicago school’ of law and economics do 
not appear to be present here either.  
Box 3: The Competition Commission’s Last Four Chief Economists 
 Initial Training Phd. Posts held Overseas 
experience 
Daniel Gordon 
(2013 >) 
Oxford University Oxford University Director of 
Ofcom; director at 
the OFT 2002-13; 
The 
Treasury 1999-
2002; MMC 
(1994-99) 
None 
Miguel de la 
Mano (2011-
2013) 
Universities of 
Kiel and 
Saarbrucken 
(Germany) 
Oxford University DG COMP 
(2001 >) 
European 
Commission civil 
servant 
Alison Oldale 
(2009-2011) 
University of 
Cambridge 
London School of 
Economics 
Consultant with 
LECG Ltd. 
(1999-2009) 
3 years of 
consultancy in 
Brussels 
John Davies  
(2003-9) 
Oxford University No Phd., just a 
D.Phil 
Consultant with 
Frontier 
Economics Ltd. 
From 2009 to 
2013 he headed 
Mauritius’ 
Competition 
Commission. 
Since 2013 he is 
director of the 
OECD’s 
competition 
directorate. 
Overall, a first provisional conclusion on the British case is that the government of inter-firm 
competition has changed considerably over the last twenty years. Moreover, some of the instruments 
and practices put into place confirm Cini’s hypothesis regarding American influence in the UK, and 
that of ‘the Chicago School’ in particular26. However, this national case is both more complex and 
stimulating than this hypothesis would lead one to believe. Firstly, much of the commitment to 
economic analysis largely predated formal change in competition policy at the end of the 1990s. 
Secondly, more research needs to be done on the economists who actually work within the British 
government of competition and on the doctrines and methods of analysis they have contributed to 
institutionalizing as stabilized aspects of policy in this country.  
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Conclusion 
This text has sought to show difference and similarities in the government of inter-firm competition in 
France and Britain whilst questioning the extent of EU influence upon both. As many other research 
projects have shown, in both cases, this government of competition has become more institutionalized 
and a more structural part of governing national economic activity. From this angle considerable 
similarities and even some convergence can be identified between these two member states. However, 
as table 6 underlines, considerable differences remain over key aspects of policy and economic 
doctrine. Analysis in terms of institutionalized path dependency can perhaps explain some of the 
persistence of legalistic reasoning in ‘Paris’ and that based on ‘economics’ in ‘London’. However, this 
question requires much greater attention being paid to the organizations and individuals who have 
built and ‘carried’ proposals for governmental practice, and thus contributed directly to their 
institutionalization. This text has made some initial steps in this direction but much more needs to be 
done by taking greater inspiration from the sociology of professions and fields27 that have thus far 
been heuristically applied to other areas of social and economic life.  
Table 6: Institutional Change Compared 
 France UK 
i) Usage of Economic analysis Growing but still very rare Systematic 
ii) Accent upon actual abuse of 
dominant position  
Growing but limited Growing and structural  
iii) Usage of leniency clauses Only occasional Systematic 
iv) Reference to the ECN and 
EU 
Occasional Occasional 
Finally, by so doing a more general contribution to the study of the EU and its impact upon national 
polities could also be made. Existing research on the ‘Europeanization’ of policy areas where 
employees of the European Commission ostensibly have hierarchical power provides a means of 
further problematizing this potential contribution. On the one hand Bulmer and Padgett (2004) 
consider that in such cases top-down, EU > national institutional transfers are highly likely to be made 
because EU competence is coercive and because it encourages emulation across member states. On the 
other hand, Knill and Lenshow (2005) rightly underline that the formal power of law is rarely enough 
to prompt institutional change. Indeed, given that to do so such law has to have provoked contentious 
decisions and even court cases, it is actually more likely that ‘hierarchical’ EU competence encourages 
member state actors to keep a low profile and adopt EU-inspired reforms only rarely. For the moment 
our analysis of competition policy in France and the UK gives more credence to Knill and Lenshow’s 
interpretation. But only more research will enable the drawing of firm conclusions on this point. 
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The political economy of global competition law and policy: an institutional approach 
Pablo Iglesias-Rodríguez* 
Recent decades have seen an increasing globalization of the markets and, contemporarily, a 
proliferation of national competition regimes and authorities whose priorities and competences are 
often circumscribed to the domestic level. Such a fragmentation of competition regulation and 
enforcement in a globalized economic environment poses some challenges with a potential negative 
impact on consumers, businesses and, more generally, competition.1 For example, national 
competition authorities may not always be able to tackle competition problems with a 
multijurisdictional nature owing to inter alia lack of resources or powers to either investigate foreign 
firms or enforce decisions against them.2 Also, there is the risk of inconsistent or duplicative 
competition rules and procedures across jurisdictions.3 
Global Networks of Competition authorities (GCNs) perform very relevant functions that may help 
to mitigate the problems mentioned above. For example, they provide forums for the exchange of 
information and debate among competition authorities, facilitate their coordination and issue standards 
aimed at the adoption of best practices in the area of competition law and policy at the international 
level.4 
Among the different GCNs, the International Competition Network (ICN) launched in the year 
2001 by representatives of competition authorities from 14 jurisdictions, has emerged as the main 
global standard-setter in the field.5 From an institutional perspective the ICN is a very interesting 
phenomenon. Since its creation it has grown rapidly in membership, reaching in the year 2014, 324 
members from 100 jurisdictions. It has also become a powerful organization and its standards are very 
influential among jurisdictions worldwide.6 
Whereas the literature on the ICN has paid substantial attention to the analysis of the emergence 
and rationale of the ICN, the arguments offered till date are rather incomplete. These generally tend to 
explain the ICN as an institutional development aimed at overcoming alleged weaknesses of other 
GCNs existing at the time of its creation.7 While these accounts of the ICN’s origins provide some 
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useful insights, they however dismiss important political economy considerations, which are relevant 
to understand not only the reasons behind the creation of the ICN but also its legitimacy. 
This paper argues that from an institutional political economy perspective the ICN essentially 
constitutes a product of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
launched as a reaction to the threat of a shift of power in the definition of competition law and policy 
at the global level and primarily aimed at keeping the hegemony of the OECD in this field. The paper 
proceeds as follows. First, it starts with an analysis of the evolution of the global institutional setting 
of competition law and policy with a focus on the emergence, in the 1990s, of bodies with a global 
dimension vested with responsibilities in competition law and policy that threatened the traditional 
preeminence of the OECD as a standard-setter in competition matters. The paper continues with an 
explanation of the ICN as a reaction to such threat. This argument is supported by the analysis of the 
process of creation of the ICN – launched and backed by OECD members – and of the internal rules 
governing its functioning – which have been devised so as to grant the OECD jurisdictions a 
privileged position within the ICN. The paper concludes with some considerations about the input-
legitimacy and the output-legitimacy of the ICN, the rationale of the OECD’s ascendancy over the 
network, as well as some insights as regards the future of the ICN. 
1. Global competition law and policy in perspective 
1.1. From 1961 to 1996: the preeminence of the OECD as a standard-setter in competition law and 
policy 
Traditionally the definition of global standards in the field of competition law and policy has been a 
matter reserved to the OECD jurisdictions, mostly, through the so-called Committee of Experts on 
Restrictive Business Practices, created in the year 1961.8 This Committee, later renamed, the 
Committee on Competition Law and Policy,9 and, subsequently – and, currently – the Competition 
Committee,10 is in charge of inter alia: “Enhancing the effectiveness of competition law enforcement, 
through measures that include the development of best practices and the promotion of cooperation 
among competition authorities of Member countries”.11 One of the main rulemaking outputs of the 
Competition Committee consists of recommendations that are submitted to the OECD Council for 
their adoption.12 Some of these are aimed at the enhancement of the cooperation between competition 
authorities in the investigation of breaches of competition laws and their enforcement13 whereas others 
are intended to set standards in substantive fields of competition law and policy, such as cartels.14  
From an input-legitimacy perspective the Competition Committee is a rather elitist entity, as it 
essentially comprises representatives of competition authorities of the OECD member countries – who 
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 This Committee was set by the Resolution of the Council concerning action in the field of restrictive business practices 
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also elect the Chair of the Competition Committee.15 As a result, the recommendations and other 
policy outcomes elaborated by the Competition Committee principally source from debates and 
discussions among economically developed countries.16 Despite the fact that the work and the 
recommendations of the Competition Committee are primarily addressed to the OECD member 
countries,17 the Competition Committee also encourages non-member jurisdictions to endorse and 
apply its standards.18 For instance, the Competition Committee conducts reviews of the competition 
regulatory frameworks of countries aspiring to become members of the OECD, in order to assess 
whether they comply with OECD competition-related criteria and to give guidance on how to 
converge towards them.19 Owing to the fact that compliance with the OECD competition policy 
standards has an impact on the likeness of an admission of a country to the OECD,20 the results of the 
reviews carried out by the Competition Committee may create very powerful incentives on candidate 
countries to endorse and implement the OECD’s competition law principles in a sound manner. 
The access of non-OECD countries to the activities performed by the OECD in the field of 
competition law and policy was enhanced with the creation of the Global Forum on Competition 
(GFC) in the year 2001.21 The GFC is intended as a forum of, inter alia, exchange and debate on 
competition law issues between the OECD countries and non-OECD jurisdictions.22 Despite its 
inclusive character, the GFC has some features that restrict the influence of non-OECD countries in 
global standard-setting activities. In this regard, the scope of the activities of the GFC is much more 
limited than that of the Competition Committee. Whereas the Competition Committee is a true 
standard-setting entity with a clear organizational structure and continuous operation throughout the 
year, the GFC essentially consists of an annual event that follows a workshop format and where staff 
from the OECD, representatives of competition authorities from both OECD and non-OECD countries 
as well as members of civil society, academia and international organizations make presentations and 
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discuss about various topics in the field of competition law and policy.23 Moreover, the decisions 
about who participates in the GFC as well as what issues are debated on it are made by the OECD 
members,24 that, as a result, exercise a substantial influence in the definition of the agenda of the GFC. 
The hierarchical relation between the Competition Committee and the GFC is also evidenced by the 
fact that the latter is used, not only as a space of debate and discussion between OECD and non-OECD 
countries, but also as a tool for the dissemination and promotion of the OECD’s views in the area of 
competition law.25 
1.2. From 1996 to 1997: the emergence of alternative global forums in the field of competition law 
and policy 
1.2.1. The World Trade Organization Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy 
The mid 1990s saw the advent of new institutional settings that performed functions with regard to 
competition law issues with a global dimension and that operated in parallel to the Competition 
Committee. The first of these forums was the World Trade Organization (WTO) Working Group on 
the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP). The roots of the WGTCP can be 
traced to the Singapore Ministerial Conference of the WTO in the year 1996 that proposed the creation 
of: “…a working group to study issues raised by Members relating to the interaction between trade 
and competition policy, including anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may 
merit further consideration in the WTO framework”.26 The WGTCP was part of a policy initiative, 
initially launched and supported by the European Commission, to consolidate the WTO as the leading 
standard-setter in global competition law and policy.27 
The work of the WGTCP did not directly overlap with the activities performed by the Competition 
Committee; for instance, the scope of the tasks of the WGTCP was rather narrow and focused on 
aspects of competition law with an impact on trade and vice versa; moreover, the WGTCP intended 
not to duplicate the tasks carried out by other international bodies working on competition policy 
issues.28 However, at the same time, the creation of the WGTCP meant that the definition of the global 
policy agenda concerning the discussion about core aspects of competition law was not anymore 
monopolized by the main economic powers. In this respect, unlike the Competition Committee, that 
represented the most economically developed countries of the world, the WGTCP comprised all the 
members of the WTO,29 and, hence, it was much more inclusive than its OECD counterpart. The 
broader membership of the WGTCP was also reflected in its working mechanisms. The initial 
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mandate of the WGTCP was indeed decided by a WTO Ministerial Conference30 and the definition of 
the specific work to be conducted under such mandate was the result of a process open to all WTO 
jurisdictions and where both economically developing and developed countries gave their opinions.31 
1.2.2. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts on Competition Law and Policy 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts (IGE) on Competition Law and Policy was formally established in the year 1997 by the UN 
General Assembly32 upon recommendation of the UNCTAD. The IGE took over the duties previously 
performed by the so-called Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, 
which was in charge of, inter alia, monitoring the application and implementation of the United 
Nations Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices (UN Set).33 The UN Set is a non-binding multilateral agreement aimed at the 
control of anticompetitive practices, with a particular focus on the protection of less economically 
developed countries. It also provides mechanisms for the exchange of best practices in competition 
law and policy among countries.34  
The UN Set has been subject to several reviews by the members of UNCTAD. It was in one of 
those reviews – the Third Review Conference, held in November 1995 –35 when the UNCTAD 
jurisdictions assembled recommended that the UN General Assembly changed the name of the IGE 
from “Restrictive Business Practices” to “Competition Law and Policy”.36 This proposal to change the 
name of the IGE, which was later adopted by the UN General Assembly, somehow reflected the 
determination of an important part of the UNCTAD members to consolidate the IGE as the global 
forum of reference in the field of competition law and policy. This is indeed patent in some of the 
passages of the Report of the Third United Nations Conference to Review all Aspects of the Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices. 
For instance, with respect to the closing statements by the Vice-President of the Review Conference, 
the Report states: 
“The resolution [of the Review Conference] had also recommended that the General Assembly 
change the Group’s title to Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, a 
title similar to that of the equivalent OECD expert group, and which was in line with the nature of 
the Group’s work and with the changes taking place in this area in the real world. The Review 
Conference would thus send a strong signal to UNCTAD IX, for the Intergovernmental Group was 
the only universal forum providing the opportunity to work in a useful and efficient manner on the 
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development of the tools and institutions necessary for the implementation of competition policy 
in the context of globalization. He [the Vice-President of the Conference speaking on behalf of the 
President] therefore hoped that the General Assembly and UNCTAD IX, each within its 
competence, would provide a stimulus to the Group’s work.”37 
The IGE is composed of experts on competition law – in most cases they are members of competition 
authorities –38 from the UNCTAD jurisdictions, which, as at early 2014, comprised 194 member 
states.39 
2. The rationale of the ICN: a response to the threat to the preeminence of the OECD in 
the definition of global competition law and policy 
As explained above, since the 1960s the Competition Committee had been exercising a de facto 
monopoly in the definition of global standards in the field of competition law and policy. Such a 
preeminent role started to be threatened in the 1990s with the creation of the WGTCP – in the year 
1996 – and of the IGE – in the year 1998 –, which brought about the possibility of fragmentation in 
the definition of global competition policies among the OECD, the WTO and the UNCTAD or even 
the potential of a shift of leadership in the performance of such role from the OECD to the WTO 
and/or the UNCTAD. Indeed, the creation of the WGTCP and of the IGE were part of institutional 
strategies launched respectively by the WTO and by the UNCTAD aimed at expanding the roles of 
both organizations in competition law and policy in the global arena. 
The possibility of either of those scenarios raised concerns among some OECD jurisdictions, such 
as the US, which preferred the definition of global competition standards to be led by an organization 
whose members represented well-developed free-market economies with more like-minded 
perspectives about competition law issues.40 Both the WTO’s WGTCP and the UNCTAD’s IGE were 
indeed much more inclusive than the OECD’s Competition Committee because they were composed 
of economically developing and developed countries, which, in addition, formally enjoyed equal 
decision-making rights in the internal decision-making procedures of the WGTCP and the IGE, 
respectively. The emergence of either the WGTCP and/or the IGE as the main standard-setter(s) in 
competition law and policy in the global arena could indeed have the effect of shifting the global 
competition agenda towards issues and perspectives that represented the interests of less-economically 
developed nations but not necessarily those of the OECD jurisdictions. 
Against this background, the process of creation of the ICN, which started in the year 1997 – 
hence, immediately after WGTCP and the IGE were launched –, can be analyzed as an institutional 
response of the OECD jurisdictions to the WTO and the UNCTAD’s initiatives. Indeed, the ICN is, 
above all, an OECD-driven institutional development in the field of competition law and policy. 
The main instigator of the creation of the ICN was the US, one of the OECD founding countries. In 
this respect the origins of the ICN can be traced to the work of the International Competition Policy 
Advisory Committee (ICPAC). The ICPAC was a committee of experts41 created in the year 1997 by 
Ms. Janet Reno – the US Attorney General – and Mr. Joel Klein – the US Assistant Attorney General 
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in charge of the Antitrust Division.42 The ICPAC was entrusted with the provision of advice to the US 
Department of Justice and the US Government on competition law and policy issues with an 
international dimension and of relevance to the US.43 In February 2000 the ICPAC published its report 
(ICPAC Report) where it recommended, inter alia, the creation of a “Global Competition Initiative”, 
an international venue that would gather government officials, private firms and non-governmental 
organizations to consult and discuss about competition law and policy44 so as to achieve greater 
degrees of legal convergence and foster a common culture in the field.45  
The idea of a Global Competition Initiative, as proposed by the ICPAC Report was endorsed by 
both Mr. Joel Klein and the Competition Commissioner, Mr. Mario Monti, at the ‘EC Merger Control: 
10th anniversary conference’ held in Brussels on 14 and 15 September 200046 as well as by senior 
competition law officials gathered by the International Bar Association in Ditchley Park (UK) in 
February 2001.47 The ICN was officially launched at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute Annual 
Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy in October 2001.48 The founders of the ICN 
were representatives of 16 competition authorities from 14 jurisdictions. Ten out of those 14 
jurisdictions were OECD members.49 
3. The ICN and the illusion of greater legitimacy in global competition law and policy 
The initial success of the ICN and its ability to consolidate itself as the main standard-setter in global 
competition law and policy depended to a great extent on its capacity to convey the impression, among 
its potential members, that it would overcome some of the weaknesses of other institutional 
alternatives – e.g., the Competition Committee, the WGTCP and the IGE – and, notably, to show that 
it was an organization vested with greater legitimacy than its counterparts, open to the participation of 
both economically developing and developed countries and to discussion on a broad range of 
competition law issues. 
The need of greater legitimacy in global competition law and policy was indeed among the core 
reasons put forward to justify the creation of the ICN. For instance, in the view of the ICPAC, the 
Global Competition Initiative would overcome some of the limitations of the global competition 
forums existing at the time. Unlike the WTO, that focused its work on competition law issues with an 
impact on trade, the Global Competition Initiative would address “the full range of competition policy 
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matters of consequence to the global economy”.50 Moreover, in contrast to the OECD’s Competition 
Committee limited membership, the Global Competition Initiative would be “inclusive in its 
membership, open to developed and developing nations, and comprehensive, or at least open to the 
possibility of breadth, in its coverage of issue areas”.51 
The ICN is certainly much more inclusive than the OECD Competition Committee. Its 324 
members52 come from more than 100 jurisdictions53 that represent different degrees of economic 
development, from very modest to the most advanced. In addition, decisions at the ICN are adopted at 
the ICN Annual Conferences by consensus of the ICN members – that enjoy the same voting rights.54 
Hence, formally, from the point of view of participatory rights, all the members of the ICN have equal 
footing in the activities of the network. 
Despite the ICN’s input-legitimacy achievements, a closer look at the evolution of its internal 
governance evidences that, from the very same moment of the ICN’s inception, OECD jurisdictions 
took a series of measures aimed at ensuring their preeminence within the network. These have resulted 
in certain asymmetries in the position that different jurisdictions hold within the ICN.  
3.1. The influence of the OECD on the ICN’s governance 
The rules of the ICN have been devised, from the onset, in a manner that has enabled OECD 
jurisdictions to keep control of central aspects of the governance of the ICN.  
The process of establishment of ascendancy over the ICN by its founding members started in the 
very early stages of development of the ICN. Those jurisdictions were in charge of drafting the 
seminal rules of the ICN in the year 2002: the Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of 
the International Competition Network (ICN Memorandum) and the International Competition 
Network Interim Operational Framework (ICN Interim Operational Framework).55 Both documents 
devoted particular attention to the configuration of the so-called Steering Group (SG) of the ICN. On 
the one side, they entrusted the SG with the performance of the most relevant functions within the 
ICN. These powers included, inter alia, the guidance of the work of the ICN, the establishment of the 
ICN Working Groups, the designation of their chairs, the provision of recommendations about their 
composition and the review and approval of the work plans of the Working Groups.56 The work of the 
ICN is to a great extent based on the activities performed by its Working Groups.57 Therefore, by 
virtue of the provisions of the ICN Memorandum and of the ICN Interim Operational Framework, the 
SG was able to exercise substantial influence on the work and structure of the ICN from its inception. 
On the other side, the ICN Memorandum also stipulated that: “To ensure an effective launch of ICN, 
antitrust agencies of the following jurisdictions will serve as an interim steering group until they are 
confirmed by ICN at the first conference: Australia, Canada, European Union, France, Germany, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Zambia”. In 
other words, the ICN founding jurisdictions allocated themselves all the seats of the interim SG – and 
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hence, the core powers within the ICN. Whereas this organizational arrangement was grounded on 
some plausible arguments – e.g., the need to ensure that the ICN founding members were able to 
successfully pre-organize and launch the ICN –, it nevertheless resulted in a concentration of power in 
the OECD-ICN members from the onset. Indeed, the composition of the Interim SG was confirmed at 
the first ICN Annual Conference, held in Naples (Italy) on September 28-29, 2002, and the Interim SG 
became the SG.58 
The second step in the consolidation of the power of the OECD jurisdictions within the SG – and, 
hence, within the ICN – came with the amendments operated in the year 2003 on the ICN Interim 
Operational Framework adopted by the First ICN Annual Conference in the year 2002. Those 
amendments were in first instance proposed by the ICN Operational Framework Working Group 
(OFWG) whose creation was instigated by the SG.59 The SG requested the OFWG advice on, inter 
alia, the method for the selection and appointment of the members of the SG – a matter that was not 
specified in the ICN Interim Operational Framework.60 The OFWG came up with some proposals that 
were later adopted by the SG61 and by the ICN Members at the Second ICN Annual Conference, held 
in Mérida (Mexico) on June 23-25, 2003,62 and which resulted in further enhancement of the position 
of the OECD jurisdictions within the SG. 
First, the OFWG proposed that the SG be composed of 15 members divided in 2 categories. On the 
one hand there would be ex-officio members, a group consisting of the ICN members designated to 
host an ICN annual conference. These would be part of the SG until its renewal following the relevant 
annual conference of the ICN. On the other hand, the rest of the SG would comprise ICN members 
appointed by consensus of the ICN members at the ICN Annual Conference in odd-numbered years, 
upon recommendation of the outgoing SG. In cases of renounce by one of the members of the SG, the 
SG would also have the power to appoint a replacement.63 
This system, which granted the SG the power to select its own members, had the effect of giving 
the founding members of the ICN – and members of its first SG – considerable influence in the 
definition of the composition of subsequent SGs. The fact that the proposals of the OFWG did not 
contemplate any mechanism for the solution of potential disagreements about SG appointments 
between the SG and the ICN Members at the Annual Conference, factually relegated the role of the 
latter to a mere rubber-stamp of the selection/recommendations of the outgoing SG. Indeed, the 
OFWG used the wording: “Steering Group members are confirmed by consensus of ICN 
Members…”, suggesting that the functions of the ICN Annual Conference in the appointment process 
would be rather passive. 
It is also worth noting that the system proposed by the OFWG – and adopted by the SG and by the 
second ICN Annual Conference in 2003 – placed no restrictions on the potential continuation of 
members of the outgoing steering group after the initial 2-year term.64 Indeed, the proposed rules 
granted discretion to the members of the outgoing SG in deciding whether to recommend the 
                                                     
58
 See E.M. Fox, A Report on the First Annual Conference of The International Competition Network (2002), p. 11. 
59
 In accordance with the duties of the SG – as set in the ICN Interim Operational Framework, adopted at the first ICN 
Annual Conference, held in Naples (Italy) on September 29, 2002 – which, as referred above, included the establishment 
of working groups, the designation of their leaders and the recommendation of their composition. 
60
 See e.g., OFWG, Report to the Steering Group (2003), p.1. 
61
 See e.g., OFWG, Report to the Steering Group, p.1. 
62
 ICN Operational Framework (2003). 
63
 OFWG, Report to the Steering Group, pp. 2-3. 
64
 See OFWG, Report to the Steering Group, p. 3: “Any ICN Member, including a member of the outgoing Steering Group, 
may ask the outgoing Steering Group to be nominated to be on the next Steering Group.” 
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appointment of new members at the moment of renewal,65 hence, opening the door to potential 
persistence in the composition of the SG.  
Secondly, the OFWG proposed certain criteria to be considered by the members of an outgoing SG 
when they selected and recommended the members of the incoming SG. Some of these criteria have 
contributed, directly or indirectly to the hegemony of the OECD within the ICN. For example, the 
OFWP proposed that an outgoing SG selected incoming SG members according to the degree of 
participation of the latter in the activities of the ICN.66 Taking the plausible assumption that the extent 
of actual and/or potential quantitative and qualitative engagement of competition authorities in the 
ICN bears some relation with their budgets, the proposal of the OFWG favoured the selection to the 
SG of members from among well-funded competition authorities. 
The composition of the OFWG – whose members were designated by the SG – may have played a 
role in the content of the proposals submitted to the SG. Notably, the OFWG was chaired by Canada 
and Italy and 10 out of its 18 members were from OECD countries – moreover, 8 of those 10 members 
were, contemporarily, members of the ICN Interim SG.67 
Other amendments operated over the years on the rules concerning the SG have further enhanced 
the preeminence of well-developed economies within the SG. For instance, with regard to the selection 
criteria, the ICN Operational Framework in force as at 2014 requires that: “(i) All elected ICN 
Steering Group members shall meet the following criteria: (a) Significant resource commitment to the 
ICN, mindful of the relative size of the member agency; and (b) Consistent and effective ICN 
participation, which may include, but is not limited to: Working Group co-chair experience; leadership 
of an ICN time-specific or ongoing project; or a substantial contribution to the overall work of the 
ICN”.68 In other words, the ICN Operational Framework links the eligibility to the SG to the resources 
of the relevant ICN members, therefore limiting to a large extent the access of competition authorities 
from modest economies. 
The persistent encompassment – by the ICN Operational Framework – of the preeminence of 
OECD countries within the SG may contribute to explain its path dependent membership. Indeed, the 
elected members of the SG of the year 2014 represented 17 jurisdictions,69 of which 10 were among 
the ICN founding jurisdictions that were contemporarily part of the original SG and OECD members. 
Moreover, 13 out of the 18 jurisdictions represented in the SG of the year 2014 are OECD members. 
This is shown in table 1 below. 
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 See OFWG, Report to the Steering Group, p. 3: “In making its recommendations, the outgoing Steering Group shall 
consider:… The desirability of confirming new Steering Group member(s) in each round”. 
66
 OFWG, Report to the Steering Group, p. 3. 
67
 The composition of the OFWG is available at OFWG, Report to the Steering Group, Appendix A. 
68
 Section 3.2.3(i) ICN Operational Framework. 
69
 The membership of the SG is available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/steering-
group/members.aspx. The SG of the year 2014 comprised 19 members, which represented 18 jurisdictions – the US had 
two members: the US Department of Justice and the US Federal Trade Commission. The Polish Office of Competition 
and Consumer Protection was an ex-officio member – see the Minutes of the ICN Steering Group Meeting, 
Wednesday, April 10, 2013 (2013), available at 
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Table 1 
Composition of the ICN Steering Group 
 Year 
2001 
Year 
2014 
OECD 
Member 
Australia ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Barbados ✖ ✔ ✖ 
Brazil ✖ ✔ ✖ 
Canada ✔ ✔ ✔ 
European Union ✔ ✔ ✖ 
France ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Germany ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Israel ✔ ✖ ✔ 
Italy ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Japan ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Korea ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Mexico ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Netherlands ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Poland ✖ ✔ ✔ 
Russian Federation ✖ ✔ ✖ 
South Africa ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Turkey ✖ ✔ ✔ 
United Kingdom ✔ ✔ ✔ 
United States of America ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Zambia ✔ ✖ ✖ 
Conclusion 
The creation of the ICN in the year 2001 has enabled OECD jurisdictions to keep control of the 
definition of global standards in competition law and policy through a twofold process. 
In the first place, the ICN was designed as an organization open to a broad membership and to 
discussion on several competition law topics. This contributed to the fast growth of its membership 
throughout the years and its consolidation as the main global standard-setting organization in the field 
of competition law and policy. Owing to, inter alia, the scarcity of resources of which competition 
authorities dispose, the allocation of funds to participation in the activities of the ICN has limited the 
ability of several competition authorities – especially those with more modest budgets – to participate 
in other global standard-setting forums.70 This, in turn, may explain, to some extent, the fate of the 
ICN’s counterparts. The WTO’s WGTCP became inactive in the year 200371 and the UNCTAD’s 
IGE, which has lost part of its appeal since the creation of the ICN, largely remains as a forum for the 
discussion of competition law issues of interest, primarily, to low-income countries.72 
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 H.M. Hollman and W.E. Kovacic, ‘The International Competition Network: Its Past, Current and Future Role’ in P. 
Lugard (Ed.), The International Competition Network at Ten. Origins, Accomplishments and Aspirations (Cambridge: 
Intersentia, 2011), pp. 71, 80, 81. 
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Secondly, the ICN founding competition authorities, which principally came from OECD 
jurisdictions, developed the rules of the ICN – and of its SG – so as to keep control of the internal 
governance and agenda of the organization from the onset. Such an OECD preeminence, which is also 
reflected in the composition of the ICN’s Working Groups,73 had led in certain instances to policy 
outputs that reflect, above all, the interests of competition authorities from economically developed 
jurisdictions.74 This questions, not only the input-legitimacy of the ICN, but also the output-legitimacy 
of the network and of its regulatory outputs. 
The OECD’s hegemony within the ICN might have had some rationale when the ICN was created. 
In effect, in the year 2001 a number of jurisdictions from economically developing countries did not 
have sound competition regimes.75 However the scenario of 2014 barely resembles that of the year 
2001.76 Several emerging countries have become key actors in the global economic arena displacing 
the position of other traditional powers. Such greater relevance has been matched with an increasing 
interest in achieving more important roles in global policy-making.77 If the ICN fails to provide a 
framework better suited to the participatory needs and wishes of non-OECD countries, there is the risk 
that the latter will shift their attention and resources to other global forums where they can engage 
more actively and in a more meaningful manner. 
The future of the ICN will in large part be related to its ability to transform itself and build a truly 
inclusive internal governance regime where all its members are in a level playing field position. A 
move in such a direction requires, not only an active stand by non-OECD jurisdictions – which must 
actively demand a more prominent position within the ICN – but also the commitment of the hardcore 
members of the ICN’s SG to move forward and support the active participation of non-OECD 
countries in the governance of the network. 
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 For example, as at March 2014, the competition authorities that chaired the ICN’s Working Group came from France, 
Portugal and Mauritus (Advocacy Working Group), Mexico, the US and Norway (Agency Effectiveness Working 
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Idea merchants and paradigm peddlers in global antitrust 
Mel Marquis* 
1. Introduction 
By rough analogy to other fields of activity, in the world of competition law, proponents of ideas and 
paradigms – competition authorities and competition law systems – compete for what may loosely be 
termed market share. With competition law, while notional degrees of market share defy precise 
measurement, we might take as an imperfect proxy certain observed isomorphic processes. 
Isomorphism should not necessarily be understood as mimicry; actual and potential ‘buyers’ of 
concepts and paradigms may be sophisticated enough to absorb attractive ideas by way of a self-
regarding selective adaptation and vernacularization that partly or fully takes account of local needs 
and other constraints such as the cultural infrastructure and political (and political economy) 
constraints, as well as institutional resources, (in)capacities and (dys)functions. A ‘transaction’ can 
thus occur not only where an isomorphic shift is purely mimetic but also where the shift is a matter of 
degree or hybridization. Occasionally, exported ideas fail to take root in foreign soil. They may have 
no chance to flourish due to resource/capacity constraints and weak institutions and enforcement; or 
there may be a mismatch between elite-level approximation or replication of foreign solutions and a 
country’s cultural/multi-cultural norms or shifting political currents. And in the end, an injudicious 
transaction may breed contempt, which may have far-reaching consequences.1  
From the perspective of the ‘merchants’ and ‘peddlers’, the more they can stimulate isomorphic 
processes, the easier it will be to achieve greater degrees of substantive, procedural, institutional and 
intellectual convergence across jurisdictions. This objective dovetails with that of gaining, as it were, a 
large share of the market. Attentive observers have cautioned that convergence is not to be pursued as 
an inherently desirable goal; relative costs, risks and benefits as well as capacities should be taken into 
account along with the particular contextual fabric of the jurisdiction or group of jurisdictions that may 
be interested in making a ‘purchase’. One risk may be that a foreign-spawned tool or principle, which 
may be based on a chain of possibly contingent choices, could exacerbate pre-existing problems. For 
example, a green light for territorial restrictions agreed between non-competitors, which flashed on in 
the United States in the late 1970s, was deemed inapposite in the European context, where markets 
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 Foreign competition law approaches imposed on Latin American countries, largely as part of conditional loan packages, 
illustrate how the leveraging of paradigms can backfire. See generally Eleanor Fox and D. Daniel Sokol, eds., 
Competition Law and Policy in Latin America (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009); Julian Peña, ‘Competition Policies in 
Latin America’, in Philip Marsden, ed., Handbook of Research in Trans-Atlantic Antitrust (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2006) 732-758. The backlash and shift toward socialism is described in more political terms in Jorge Castañeda, ‘Latin 
America’s Left Turn’, 85(3) Foreign Affairs (May-June 2006), http://sandovalhernandezj.people.cofc.edu/r21.pdf. The 
impediments to successful transplants, and the importance of adequate pre-conditions, have been highlighted in a 
substantial corpus of literature. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-François Richard, ‘Economic 
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect’, 47 European Economic Review 165-195 (2003); and similarly, Tay-
Cheng Ma, ‘Legal Transplant, Legal Origin, and Antitrust Effectiveness’, 9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 
65-88 (2013). See also Franz Kronthaler, Implementation of Competition Law in Developing and Transition Countries 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), for example at 89-90. Diffusion as a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon is discussed in 
William Twining, ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’, 1 Journal of Comparative Law 237-260 (2004); William 
Twining, ‘Social Science and Diffusion of Law’, 32 Journal of Law and Society 203-240 (2005). For a legal 
anthropology perspective, see Julia Eckert, ‘Who is afraid of legal transfers?’, in Günter Frankenberg, ed., Order from 
Transfer: Comparative Constitutional Design and Legal Culture (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013) 171-186. 
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across the Continent tended to be, and in many cases still are, highly fragmented (and not only because 
of enlargements to the East).2 Another risk may be harm to competition law’s perceived legitimacy if a 
particular form of competition law is pushed too hard on a culture deeply rooted on different prior 
beliefs and values.3 The unreflexive assumption that convergence between systems, concepts and 
analytical approaches is desirable for its own sake has therefore understandably been criticized.4 An 
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 The distinct, historically determined structure of the European economy is a factor relevant not just to vertical restraints 
doctrine but to other areas of the law as well such as the application of Article 102 TFEU. For example, fragmented 
markets may hinder the process of creative destruction or similar self-corrective mechanisms. Cf. Gustatvo Ghidini and 
Emanuela Arezzo, ‘La prospettiva costituzionale della tutela della concorrenza’, in Marilisa D’Amico and Barbara 
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Vickers, ‘Competition Law and Economics: A Mid-Atlantic Viewpoint’, 3 European Competition Journal 1-15 (2007), 
at 6 (‘competitive self-righting mechanisms’ in Europe may be less robust as compared to the U.S. because of Europe’s 
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enormous litigation apparatus in the U.S., more rigorous standards for unilateral conduct in Europe may be less apt to 
inhibit desirable aggressive competition on the part of dominant firms. See ibid.  
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 See Thomas Cheng, ‘Convergence and Its Discontents: A Reconsideration of the Merits of Convergence of Global 
Competition Law’, 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 433-490 (2012), at 489 (advocating culturally sensitive 
convergence, and not opposing convergence as such). According to Cheng, the risk is linked to the relative permanence 
of local cultural values, which do not change fundamentally despite forces of globalization. In this regard, he cites Ronald 
Inglehart and Wayne Baker, ‘Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values’, 65 American 
Sociological Review 19-51 (2000), at 21-22. At page 22, Inglehart and Baker write: “Weber [in The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Captialism (1904)] argued that traditional religious values have an enduring influence on the institutions of a 
society. Following this tradition, Huntington [in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996)] 
argues that the world is divided into eight major civilizations or ‘cultural zones’ based on cultural [and specifically, 
religious] differences that have persisted for centuries. […] Scholars from various disciplines have observed that 
distinctive cultural traits endure over long periods of time and continue to shape a society's political and economic 
performance. For example, Putnam [in Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993)] shows that 
the regions of Italy in which democratic institutions function most successfully today are those in which civil society was 
relatively well developed in the nineteenth century and even earlier. Fukuyama [in Trust: The Social Virtues and the 
Creation of Prosperity (1995)] argues that a cultural heritage of ‘low-trust’ puts a society at a competitive disadvantage 
in global markets because it is less able to develop large and complex social institutions. Hamilton [in ‘Civilizations and 
Organization of Economies’, in Smelser and Sedberg, eds., The Handbook of Economic Sociology (1994) 183-204] 
argues that, although capitalism has become an almost universal way of life, civilizational factors continue to structure 
the organization of economies and societies: ‘What we witness with the development of a global economy is not 
increasing uniformity, in the form of a universalization of Western culture, but rather the continuation of civilizational 
diversity through the active reinvention and reincorporation of non-Western civilizational patterns’ (p. 184).”  
 Cheng would nevertheless likely agree that although culture is slow to change and path dependencies tend to be durable, 
it does not follow that efforts to engender a ‘competition culture’ are futile. Mindful of the point made by Inglehart and 
Baker, expectations and strategies of social change should be realistic and, to the extent possible, harmonious with the 
logic and philosophy of a particular ‘cultural zone’. Furthermore, with respect to the developing world, some 
recommended ‘building blocks’ have been identified by, e.g., Sokol and Stephan: “In order to build competition culture, 
competition authorities must choose their cases carefully so as to maximize positive media coverage, information 
dissemination, and interest by ordinary members of the public. Bid-rigging cases [which most taxpayers can avidly 
applaud] may be a good place to start.” D. Daniel Sokol and Andreas Stephan, ‘Prioritizing Cartel Enforcement in 
Developing World Competition Agencies’, in D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas Cheng and Ioannis Lianos, eds., Competition 
Law and Development (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013) 137-154, at 153. Sequencing, strategic planning, and 
the identification of genuine shared interests thus become avenues to dissolving or at least softening cultural barriers, 
rather than trying to break through them. 
4
 For broader discussion of the advantages and risks of participation in global convergence, see generally Cheng, 
‘Convergence and its Discontents’ cited previous footnote. For discussion of the rhetoric and mechanisms of convergence 
and a variety of impediments to it, see David Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets and Globalization (Oxford: 
OUP, 2010), for example at 281-292. Within the specific context of competition laws and enforcement patterns in the 
European Union, the convergence process has rather unique dynamics which set it apart from the subject of global 
convergence. See, e.g., Laurence Idot, ‘Réflexions sur la convergence des droits de la concurrence’, novembre 2012, 
Concurrences n° 4-2012 (www.concurrences.com, article n° 49321).  
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additional critique that has been aired is that if convergence were adopted by all actors and 
jurisdictions as an overriding goal, desirable innovation might be suppressed. Kerber and Budzinski 
therefore plead for diversity and experimentation as part of a discovery procedure needed to address 
Hayek’s problem of constitutional ignorance.5 Furthermore, even supposing convergence were 
desirable, as things stand today there are some areas of law (abuse of dominance in particular) in 
which differences in objectives, implementation capabilities and institutions appear to preclude the 
identification of any truly universal approach and thus render the convergence enterprise, even as 
between developed countries let alone the rest of the world, largely illusory.6 
Taking account of the risks, drawbacks and in some cases the impracticability of convergence, and 
particularly where the ‘country of import’ is a developing or least developed country, its historical-
cultural, social and economic conditions may be so different that they are advised to be eclectic with 
their choices, and to “develop their own brand of competition law, resisting pressures to copy 
‘international standards’ without regard to fit”.7 As noted later, some of them are following this 
advice. Meanwhile, starting from somewhat different, or rather overlapping, premises – and 
responding to the counter-risk that this recommended diversity might lead to excessive fragmentation 
– one of the catch phrases circulating in recent years is ‘informed divergence’.8 This reference to 
divergence may in reality be a long-term convergence strategy.9 But it is a ‘soft’ strategy that allows 
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 Wolfgang Kerber and Oliver Budzinski, ‘Competition of Competition Laws: Mission Impossible?’, in Michael Greve and 
Richard Epstein, eds., Competition Laws in Conflict: Antitrust Jurisdiction in the Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: 
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The Governance of Global Competition: Competence Allocation in International Competition Policy (Cheltenham: 
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Systems (Munich: Sellier European Law Publishers, 2009) 27-44. 
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 See Giorgio Monti, ‘Unilateral conduct: the search for global standards’, in Ariel Ezrachi, ed., Research Handbook on 
International Competition Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012) 345-368. Cf. Alden Abbott, ‘Competition Policy and 
its Convergence as Key Drivers of Economic Development’, 28 Mississippi College Law Review 37-50 (2009) 
(emphasizing growing agreement on basic principles as regards unilateral conduct).  
7
 Eleanor Fox, ‘Competition, development and regional integration: in search of a competition law fit for developing 
countries’, in Josef Drexl, Mor Bakhoum, Eleanor Fox, Michal Gal and David Gerber, eds., Competition Policy and 
Regional Integration in Developing Countries (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012) 273-290, at 273. Fox recognizes that 
an internal evaluation, sensitive to local conditions and needs, may lead a jurisdiction to conclude that the benefits of 
copying or otherwise embracing a global standard outweigh the disadvantages. But she stresses the importance of making 
an informed choice. See ibid. at 286 and 290; and see Eleanor Fox and Michal Gal, ‘Drafting Competition Law for 
Developing Jurisdictions: Learning from Experience’, New York University Law and Economics Working Paper 14-11 
(need for eclectic, tailored solutions); forthcoming in Mor Bakhoum et al., eds., The Unique Characteristics of 
Developing Economies and Their Effects on Competition Laws (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). The costs and benefits to be 
considered by a developing country when deciding whether to move closer to a competition model based on neoclassical 
economics are discussed in detail by David Gerber, ‘Economic Development and Global Competition Law 
Convergence’, in Sokol, Cheng and Lianos, eds., Competition Law and Development, cited above note 3, 13-34.  
8
 Strictly speaking, and as originally used, ‘informed divergence’ operates at the level of the diverging actor, which (as 
highlighted in the previous footnote) should be making well-informed choices about whether to follow global standards. 
See (in a different context) Laurence Helfer and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication’, 107 Yale Law Journal 273-392 (1997), at 287 and 374. The popularity of the term ‘informed divergence’ 
stems from Slaughter’s later use of it in A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), at 24 and 172. 
However, the term is helpfully also used ‘multilaterally’ to imply that the relevant community of interest is or should be 
equally informed of, and that it understands or should understand, the divergence and the reasons for it. Cf. John 
Fingleton, ‘Competition agencies and global markets: the challenges ahead’, speech of 5 June 2009, 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/2009/spe0909paper.pdf, 1-30, at 27. Of course, if no brakes were applied to 
the informed divergence concept, then the risk of unravelling would rear its head again, but the group dynamics of the 
ICN tend to serve as a buffer against disintegrative tendencies. 
9
 Fingleton refers to the “interplay” between convergence and informed divergence. He also seems to assume that 
divergent approaches will ultimately be phased out, in particular when developing economies reach a certain stage of 
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for flexibility, which is meant in part to be a pressure valve enabling the convergence process to 
advance.10 The concept of informed divergence seems to exhibit an inherent tension that is unlikely 
ever to be fully resolved, even if such full resolution were desirable. It is not inconceivable that one 
day we may see a move from markets toward ‘hierarchies’ or quasi-hierarchies: some form of top-
down (and partial) harmonization in some areas of competition law may occur. Such a development 
would substantially change the character of discussions about convergence, and the locus of debate 
might then shift to processes of splintering and drift. But most would agree that top-down global 
harmonization of broad scope, e.g., via a WTO framework agreement or via some new international 
institution, will not happen in the foreseeable future.11 For some, this is just as well.12  
While convergence is often a central point of emphasis in the modern global antitrust conversation 
and cannot be ignored, the present essay develops a related but different theme: the interest here is on 
the supply side, and the drive to increase market share, which may perhaps also be interpreted as the 
drive to project soft power, to borrow Joseph Nye’s popular term. In this context, the self-interest of 
key actors, in a broad sense, is not the whole story but it plays a central role.13 Another related 
(Contd.)                                                                  
development. See ‘Competition agencies and global markets’, cited previous footnote, at 27 (specifically, points 87 and 
90). For the notion that informed divergence is intended to ‘lay the groundwork’ for possible long-term convergence, see 
Eleanor Fox, John Fingleton and Sophie Mitchell, ‘The past and future of international antitrust: gaps, overlaps and the 
institutional challenge’, in David Lewis, ed., Building New Competition Regimes: Selected Essays (Cheltenham: Edward 
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by other authors. See, e.g., Anu Piilola, ‘Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of International 
Antitrust Regulation’, 39 Stanford Journal of International Law 207-251 (2003), at 246. 
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emerges through a more subtle process of adaptation. Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, ‘International Antitrust Institutions’, in 
Andrew Guzman, ed., Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 187-213, at 196 (“In soft law 
antitrust, broad principles in antitrust allow for each country to adopt the language and theoretical underpinnings behind 
it in a manner that can be more easily incorporated within the existing legal and political traditions. This flexibility allows 
for ‘fit’ within an existing tradition and is not a pure transplant across legal systems […].”). If broad principles are 
adopted with the possibility to frame them within different theoretical perspectives, then a degree of divergence seems 
likely given high degrees of heterogeneity across a large number of jurisdictions and ‘culture zones’. That is to say, 
‘informed divergence’ may be a strategy of managed convergence but at the same time it is a conceptual description of 
what may be an endemic feature of the international system when hard obligations have not been undertaken.  
11
 See, e.g., Fingleton, ‘Competition agencies and global markets’, cited above note 8, at 18; D. Daniel Sokol, ‘Antitrust, 
Institutions, and Merger Control’, 17 George Mason Law Review 1055-1141 (2010), at 1099; Daniel Crane, The 
Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 229. Crane suggests laying a foundation for 
plurilateral or multilateral hard law gradually and issue-by-issue, beginning with procedure and progressing to substance 
and institutions. His example is pre-merger notification, which could be standardized as a step toward a treaty on 
substantive merger norms. See ibid. at 243. On the need for hard law solutions for certain issue-specific challenges, see 
also note 48 below.  
12
 One risk with a multilateral consensus-based agreement is to get stuck with a bad deal that can’t feasibly be reversed, 
although a carefully crafted agreement might provide for a workable solution by its own terms. Apart from this, some 
argue that global hard law is in fact undesirable and inferior to the voluntary system of soft convergence and cooperation 
that has developed in the last dozen years. See Anu Bradford, ‘International Antitrust Cooperation and the Preference for 
Nonbinding Regimes’, in Guzman, ed., Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy, cited above note 10, 319-343, at 
343 (“First, as cooperation under nonbinding agreements is largely self-enforcing, the added value of a binding 
agreement with provisions for monitoring, enforcement, and sanctions is trivial. Second, in the absence of coordinated 
domestic interest group support for international antitrust cooperation, a binding agreement would not provide states with 
any domestic political economy rents and therefore will remain a low national priority. Finally, the emerging voluntary 
convergence will slowly eradicate negative externalities stemming from decentralized antitrust regimes, making the case 
for a binding international agreement less compelling.”).  
13
 The term ‘self-interest’ is not primarily a reference to national welfare- or budget-maximizing strategies, or profit-
shifting in the sense of strategic trade theory. A government (and/or legislator) may well be guided by such strategies, 
and if it (they) can (openly or subtly) dictate the policies of the competition authority established in the jurisdiction 
concerned, the authority would no doubt act self-interestedly in this narrow sense as well. Similarly, a competition 
authority may be co-opted directly by (globally active) commercial interests. Without denying these possibilities, the 
reference to self-interest in the main text is concerned with a wider range of motivations including, for example, the 
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dynamic at play is the distorted lens through which many if not all of us see the world, a lens of self-
certified enlightenment, or satori. Many American antitrust lawyers seem pre-disposed to the 
sentiment that they understand antitrust in a privileged way; after all, the U.S. was the undisputed 
antitrust heavyweight champion for 70 years until the 1960s finally witnessed the incipient influence 
of competition authorities in Bonn and Brussels. In Europe, meanwhile, many at some level hold to 
the view that while competition law principles and antitrust-type analytical tools took longer to 
develop in Europe, lawyers here have surpassed the Americans in competition enlightenment, for 
example because in Europe there is a somewhat richer history of competition law ideas from which to 
draw. At least some European competition experts may feel that while Chicago, or an alloyed version 
of Chicago, has been the slow death of American antitrust, Europe has largely escaped this fate; and 
that even in the age of the more economic approach (thought by many to be a post- or anti-ordoliberal 
approach with de-ethicizing overtones), it is the EU competition law regime that keeps an otherwise 
largely unaccountable global industry honest.14  
The theme here, then, is the conscious/unconscious will to compete for influence via the diffusion 
of ideas, paradigms, techniques, norm and institution design, and so on. The term ‘competition’ may 
fail to capture the simultaneous cooperative efforts made among competition authorities, and in this 
sense the alternative term ‘co-opetition’ could be used.15 However, with some exceptions the emphasis 
in this text is on competition and not cooperation; since the co-opetitive dimensions are not explored 
in detail, this terminology is not used either.  
With regard to competition among competition authorities, the aim is not to set out to prove that 
such competition produces good results, as it tends to do in most real markets. Previous work suggests 
that ‘yardstick’ competition among competition law institutions (as opposed to the usual Tieboutian 
competition among legislators analysed in most discussions of regulatory competition, where 
regulatees/voters can relocate or otherwise select laws) will indeed tend, in general, to be welfare-
enhancing.16 This is a sensible view; it seems quite improbable that adequate agency self-improvement 
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desire to achieve prestige and gain influence in a global community of interest, and to respond to or anticipate 
competitive pressures generated by the activities of rival authorities engaged in a similar game. These motivations seem 
particularly relevant to the extent that competition authorities engaged in the global promotion of their own competition 
law regimes operate with relative independence from globalized industry and from other organs of government.  
14
 A side note here is that, by its own terms, a ‘more economic approach’ is not an ‘exclusively economic approach’ (which 
probably cannot be practiced even in the U.S., not least because subtextual content will always seep into competition law 
as conceived or as applied, as it can do in practically all areas of law). Giorgio Monti has commented on this, explaining 
that “there are good reasons for the Commission to insist in its public communications that its approach is only about 
using more economics, because contemporary EC competition law is governed by: a distributive concern about ensuring 
consumer welfare (which is very difficult to implement in certain instances); other non-economic values; a policy choice 
(at present at least) in favour of efficiency in the short term over long term dynamic efficiencies; and a wish to see the 
law enforced to protect the process of competition” (emphasis added; footnote omitted). Monti, ‘EC Competition Law: 
The Dominance of Economic Analysis?’, in Roger Zäch, Andreas Heinemann and Andreas Kellerhals, eds., The 
Development of Competition Law: Global Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010) 3-28, at 12-13. Later in the 
text we return to consider further the last of Monti’s themes, the protection of the “process of competition”.  
15
 See Daniel Esty and Damien Geradin, ‘Regulatory Co-Opetition’, 3 Journal of International Economic Law 235-256 
(2000); Damien Geradin and Joseph McCahery, ‘Regulatory co-opetition: transcending the regulatory competition 
debate’, in Jacinta Jordana and David Levi-Faur, eds., The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms 
for the Age of Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004) 90-123, at 93 (“a flexible mix of competition and 
cooperation between governmental actors, as well as between governmental and non-governmental actors”). The 
regulatory co-opetition perspective does not require a mix of competition and cooperation. It is a broad framework that 
accommodates pure competition, pure cooperation, and combinations of the two.  
16
 See generally Kerber and Budzinski, cited above note 5, with references. This is not to say that competition law 
authorities never compete in ways comparable to interjurisdictional competition between legislators (e.g., to attract scarce 
capital). For example, as suggested above (in note 13), it may be that competitive pressures on legislators sometimes 
create derivative pressures on competition authorities; where this is so, a risk of regulatory degradation may arise. 
However, in general, the assumptions that must hold in order to draw a direct analogy with regulatory competition may 
be either unrealistic or too uncertain, or both. Cf. Eleanor Fox, ‘Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, 
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could take place in the absence of competitive forces. I take the desirability of such yardstick 
competition as a given and do no more than conduct an indicative survey of the modes in which 
competition authorities compete globally through their activities. 
Structure of this essay 
The remaining text proceeds first by setting out how the structure of the ‘market’ is evolving and who 
the main players are (section 2). Then, more expansively it considers the processes by which 
competition in this sense manifests itself (section 3). In this context, reference is made first of all to the 
contrasting grand visions (hard law versus soft law, supranational versus souverainiste, etc.) that have 
been embraced and pushed by the most prominent rival jurisdictions as to how antitrust should be 
governed at the global level (section 3.1). The analysis then turns to international antitrust cooperation, 
another competitive field where different strategic formats are employed and where interest has 
intensified in the absence of formal multilateral antitrust governance (sections 3.2 and 3.3). A final 
focal point concerns ‘competition in competition ideas’ (section 3.4). This form of competition 
concerns alternative models with regard to what antitrust law should seek to achieve, and consequently 
how it should be shaped. A summary of the main points concludes the essay (section 4). 
2. Which market players? 
Inevitable reference is made above and below to the United States and the European Union. 
Historically, since most of the few then-existing competition law regimes worldwide tended to be 
weak in terms of political power and/or legal powers, and since they amounted in some cases to 
extensions of the economic policies of the dominant political party (which in turn was beholden to 
industry), the number of (generally) functional and influential regimes was arguably three: those in the 
US, the EEC and Germany. As Claus Ehlermann says in a recent book review,17 DG IV faced two 
competitors, the most prominent initially being the Bundeskartellamt (BKA), followed later by the 
federal American agencies (counting the DOJ and FTC, which certainly compete inter se, as a single 
rival18). Others have similarly referred (albeit without reference to the BKA) to the ‘duopolistic’ 
market on which the Community and the U.S. operated as competitors.19 
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and Sideways’, 75 New York University Law Review 1781-1807 (2000), at 1789 (“[U]nlike the phenomenon of corporate 
charters, states or nations are not in direct competition with one another to have the most desirable competition law from 
the viewpoint of a firm that is a target of opportunity of that nation or state.”).  
17
 Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Review of Kiran Klaus Patel and Heike Schweitzer, eds., The Historical Foundations of EU 
Competition Law (Oxford: OUP, 2013), in 51 Common Market Law Review 326-328 (2014). 
18
 With an already quite chequered history behind it, the influence and stature of the FTC from the 1960s to the 1980s was 
at another low ebb, meaning that during this period DG IV’s perceived rival would have been principally the DOJ. It may 
be added that U.S. federal antitrust enforcement also competes to some extent with enforcement at the state level. See, 
e.g., Richard Posner, ‘Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General’, 2 Georgetown 
Journal of Law and Public Policy 5-15 (2004), at 8, 10, 11 and 13. The unstructured federalist governance in the US is 
contrasted with the EU’s more juridified framework in Firat Cengiz, ‘Management of Networks between the Competition 
Authorities in the EC and the US: Different Polities, Different Designs’, 3 European Competition Journal 413-436 
(2007). In further detail, see Firat Cengiz, Antitrust Federalism in the EU and the US (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 
chapter 4.  
19
 See William Kovacic, ‘Dominance, duopoly and oligopoly: the United States and the development of global competition 
policy’, Global Competition Review (December 2010), 39-42. Only a dozen years ago, after the European Commission 
had attracted the notice of U.S. newspapers with its handling of the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas and GE/Honeywell 
merger cases, Fred McChesney made the rather anachronistic observation that the U.S. was “still the dominant antitrust 
enforcer” but that the European Community was “striving to create a niche for itself”. McChesney, ‘Talking ‘Bout My 
Antitrust Generation: Competition For and in the Field of Competition Law’, 52 Emory Law Journal 1401-1438 (2003), 
at 1436; McChesney, ‘Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation’, 27 Regulation 48-55 (2004), at 55 (same quoted 
language).  
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But today we live in a multipolar world, to use an already-stock phrase, and the transformation has 
occurred in a breathtakingly short time span. Against a background of (i) globalized markets, (ii) 
increased exposure to international trade including, occasionally, cartelized trade, (iii) sometimes, a 
perceived need to attract foreign investment to support local development (although FDI arguments 
are double-edged), and (iv) a process of reincarnation in Eastern Europe following the disintegration 
of the USSR, the antitrust idea has grown and reproduced,20 with the adoption of over 60 new 
competition laws in the 1990s alone.21 Today there are more than 120 jurisdictions outfitted with 
competition laws,22 even if it is important to recognize that the implementation and (funding of) 
enforcement of such laws remains in many cases inadequate.23 With this dispersion and diffusion of 
laws, the supply side of the market has become, as Kovacic says, oligopolistic.24 China has risen – or 
pounced, and seems to have the better part of the antitrust world mesmerized.25 In Japan, the JFTC in 
the last decade has started to shake free of its dog-that-didn’t-bark past and to become a serious, 
though still idiosyncratic institution.26 Competition authorities in, for example, Brazil and South Korea 
                                                     
20
 The term ‘antitrust idea’ is borrowed from Lawrence Sullivan and Wolfgang Fikentscher, ‘On the Growth of the Antitrust 
Idea’, 16 Berkeley Journal of International Law 197-233 (1998).  
21
 See, e.g., Imelda Maher and Anestis Papadopoulos, ‘Competition agency networks around the world’, in Ezrachi, ed., 
Research Handbook, cited above note 6, 60-88, at 87. David Lewis has observed that in many countries the adoption of a 
competition law came too late: “[W]hat is remarkable is how frequently liberal market policies were implemented 
without first introducing the competition rules necessary to underpin the effective functioning of the newly ‘liberalized’ 
markets. This latter omission has opened the door to monopolization and concomitant abuses, which have caused a great 
deal of the misery and inequality that often accompanied liberalization.” Lewis, ‘Embedding a Competition Culture: Holy 
Grail or Attainable Objective?’, in Sokol, Cheng and Lianos, eds., Competition Law and Development, cited above note 
3, 228-248, at 229. Two additional points seem nearly self-evident: first, it is not just competition rules but a constellation 
of policies, which by purpose or effect become a country’s competition policy, that deserve attention; second, without a 
minimal development of functioning institutions, the simple adoption of competition rules will likely have only symbolic 
value, if any. See, e.g., William Kovacic, ‘Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition 
Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement’, 77 Chicago-Kent Law Review 265-315 (2001); 
Michal Gal, ‘The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law Enforcement in Developing Countries’, in 
UNCTAD, Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons from Developing Countries (New York and 
Geneva, 2004) 21-52.  
22
 See Hugh Hollman, William Kovacic and Andrew Robertson, ‘Building global antitrust standards: the ICN’s practicable 
approach’, in Ezrachi, ed., Research Handbook, cited above note 6, 89-109, at 92.  
23
 For a cross-country statistical and econometric analysis of around 100 countries, of whom 80 had competition laws and 
21 did not, see Abel Mateus, ‘Competition and Development: What Competition Law Regime?’, in Sokol, Cheng and 
Lianos, eds., Competition Law and Development, cited above note 3, 115-136, at 123-134. Sixty-seven of the 80 
countries with a competition law had established a competition authority, but in only 30 countries did the authority 
appear to have resources suitable for its tasks; indeed, by a stricter measure only 12 did. Mateus concludes at page 24 that 
“governments around the world have not placed competition law enforcement among their highest priorities and have 
generally not endowed their [competition authorities] with sufficient resources for effective enforcement”. (footnote 
omitted) 
24
 See Kovacic, ‘Dominance, duopoly and oligopoly’, cited above note 19. 
25
 Two recent edited volumes indicate the torrent of competition law activity in China during the first five years of its 
application. See Adrian Emch and David Stallibrass, eds., China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: The First Five Years (Alphen 
aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2013); Michael Faure and Xinzhu Zhang, eds., The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law: New 
Developments and Empirical Evidence (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013).  
26
  For arguments as to why the enforcement of competition law in Japan has been experiencing a long-awaited renaissance, 
see Mel Marquis and Tadashi Shiraishi, ‘Japanese Cartel Control in Transition’, CEU San Pablo Madrid working paper, 
available at the SSRN website: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407825, 1-21 (also discussing the 
December 2013 amendments to the Antimonopoly Act); Simon Vande Walle, “Competition and competition law in 
Japan: between scepticism and embrace”, in Michael Dowdle, John Gillespie and Imelda Maher, eds., Asian Capitalism 
and the Regulation of Competition: Towards a Regulatory Geography of Global Competition Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) 123-143.  
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have become very active and punch above their weight.27 Australia, another significant antitrust 
jurisdiction, has had remarkable regional and global influence, the pending ‘root and branch’ review 
notwithstanding;28 and for the future, India could potentially become yet another important jurisdiction 
if the efforts of the Competition Commission can gain credibility and provoke cultural change. (This 
will likely take years to accomplish; several factors will have to conspire if the necessary environment 
is to be created.) Meanwhile, among the EU Member States it is no longer only the Bundeskartellamt 
that commands attention; intra-regional competition occurs routinely in the sister jurisdictions of the 
EU, paradoxically in parallel with an intensification of interaction and cooperation, a sort of grand 
‘concerted practice’ established formally by, and informally in connection with, Regulation 1/2003.29 
(Here again one could refer to ‘co-opetition’ among European competition authorities – both 
horizontal and vertical, since the Commission is not free from co-opetitive pressures from ‘below’ 
despite its central role and ultimately superior powers.)  
It therefore seems that, more than ever before, except perhaps in 1962 when the European 
Commission was endowed with substantial enforcement powers,30 competition is breaking out in the 
global antitrust ‘space’. The European Commission and the U.S. agencies remain the market leaders, 
certainly. As Sokol says they still “compete for dominance” in relation to “system design and 
analytical presumptions”,31 and inevitably they are used as the main examples in this paper. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing field of other significant players, and a general dynamism in the 
market for market governance. 
3. Modes of competition 
If the global antitrust field is now characterized by oligopolistic competition with two market leaders, 
a key question to be explored is: in what arenas, or through which mechanisms, does global 
competition take place? In this third section, we take a tour through these arenas and mechanisms, or 
                                                     
27
 On Brazil, see Marcelo Calliari and Denis Alves Guimarāes, ‘Brazil: Toward a Mature Cartel Enforcement Jurisdiction?’, 
in Adrian Emch, Jose Regazzini and Vassily Rudomino, eds., Competition Law in the BRICS Countries (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2012), 13-25, at 13 (“Brazil has experienced a veritable revolution in antitrust enforcement in the 
last 10 years, particularly in relation to cartel enforcement”). On South Korea, see Jaemin Lee, ‘Korea’, in Mark 
Williams, ed., The Political Economy of Competition Law in Asia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013) 47-87, at 47 (while 
the KFTC answers to the Korean Prime Minister, the enforcement of competition law based on a consumer welfare 
criterion but also encompassing fair trade rules “has become one of the major tasks of the Korean government and the 
KFTC has been the vehicle to implement this objective” – which it is doing with notable verve).  
28
 See, e.g., Gerber, Global Competition, cited above note 4, at 262 (attributing Australia’s influence, like that of Canada, to 
the country’s neutrality, independence, eclecticism, and “lack of power”, i.e., the ability to relate to other countries 
without necessarily causing them to assume a defensive or suspicious posture, an advantage hegemons often do not 
have). For further discussion of Australia, see Deborah Healey, ‘Australia’, in Williams, ed., The Political Economy of 
Competition Law in Asia, cited previous footnote, 344-378, for example at 344 (“Australia has a strong competition law, 
well-developed competition policy and a significant ongoing commitment to markets and competition”). In early 2014 
the Australian Government launched a far-reaching review of national competition laws and policy. See further the 
Competition Policy Review Issues Paper of 14 April 2014, 
http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/files/2014/04/Competition_Policy_Review_Issues_Paper.pdf. A final report is 
expected in 2015.  
29
 For a thumbnail statistical ‘scoreboard’ of how various Member States have performed in the post-2004 ‘modernization’ 
era (taking numbers of envisaged final decisions notified to the Commission as an indicator), see Wouter Wils, ’Ten 
years of Regulation 1/2003 – A Retrospective’, 4 Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 293-301, at 295-
296 (2013) (with the ‘top ten’ on this admittedly decontextualized index being France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, Romania, Slovenia and Hungary; the UK was 12th; Poland was 15th).  
30
 For the story surrounding the adoption of Regulation 17/62, see Lorenzo Federico Pace and Katja Seidel, ‘The Drafting 
and the Role of Regulation 17: A Hard-Fought Compromise’, in Patel and Schweitzer, eds., The Historical Foundations 
of EU Competition Law, cited above note 17, 54-88. 
31
 D. Daniel Sokol, ‘International Antitrust Institutions’, cited above note 10, at 211. 
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to cut syllables, these ‘modes’ of competition. The tour is not exhaustive, but a sense of the ‘multi-
market’ nature of competition among antitrust enforcers seems to emerge from a consideration of the 
modes discussed below. 
3.1. Competing visions of a global framework for antitrust law 
By the 1990s, one of the big questions being debated was: which vector of governance ought to apply 
to the enforcement of antitrust? Considering, for example, that (i) effective policing of internationally 
active cartels and efficient merger control often require significant coordination among agencies from 
various jurisdictions (the number of which was growing fast, as noted above), or that (ii) divergence of 
rules across jurisdictions tends to create externalities, or that (iii), inconsistent application within one 
and the same jurisdiction can result in discrimination and competitive distortions, was there a need for 
supranational institutions? Or was it better to preserve decentralized, sovereignty-based enforcement? 
Relatedly: was it desirable to have formal frameworks of cooperation, or was informal and 
spontaneous cooperation the better approach?  
Sensing a window of opportunity sliding open, then-Competition Commissioner Leon Brittan in 
1992 began to advocate the envelopment of certain aspects of antitrust enforcement within the 
structures of what was to become the World Trade Organization,32 just months after twelve legal 
experts led by Wolfgang Fikentscher had begun to give the idea shape in a far-reaching Draft 
International Antitrust Code (DIAC), eventually published in July 1993.33 For a while, Commissioner 
Brittan’s initiative gained some momentum and was supported by the incoming Competition 
Commissioner in 1993, Karel van Miert (if not always by DG IV officials). In December 1996, 
competition law became a ‘Singapore issue’ (in retrospect a dubious honour), and in submissions to 
the WTO’s Working Group on Trade and Competition Policy, the Commission took the (revised) 
position that multilateral WTO rules should be developed to ensure the prohibition of hard core cartels 
and to ensure that each WTO Member’s competition law met common standards of non-
discrimination, transparency and due process.34 
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 See Leon Brittan, Competition Policy and International Relations (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 1992). 
Following a reallocation of portfolios within the Commission in 1993, Brittan assumed responsibility for trade matters 
and became the European Community’s lead negotiator in the Uruguay Round.  
33
 See Wolfgang Fikentscher, ‘Competition Rules for Private Agents in the GATT/WTO System’, 49 Swiss Review of 
International Economic Relations (Aussenwirtschaft) 281-325 (1994); Wolfgang Fikentscher, ‘The Draft International 
Antitrust Code (DIAC) in the Context of International Technological Integration - The Institutional and Jurisdictional 
Architecture’, 72 Chicago-Kent Law Review 533-543 (1996); Daniel Gifford, ‘The Draft International Antitrust Code 
Proposed at Munich: Good Intentions Gone Awry’, 6 Michigan Journal of Global Trade 1-66 (1997); Eleanor Fox, 
‘Competition Law and the Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade’, 4 Pacific Rim Law and 
Policy Journal 1-36 (1995), at 29-36; Eleanor Fox, ‘Toward World Antitrust and Market Access’, 91 American Journal 
of International Law 1-25 (1997), at 15-16. The members of the Munich Group understood that political constraints 
likely precluded the full realization of their proposals but proceeded deliberately on a normative (de lege ferenda) basis to 
establish “the best that world antitrust law and institutions could be”. Eleanor Fox, ‘A Liberal Competition Code for the 
World Whose Time Has Not Yet Come’, remarks delivered at the Global Competition Law Conference, Chicago, 28 
October 2011 and reported in Concurrences No 1-2013, at point 1. Fox and Lawrence Sullivan, also among the Munich 
Group participants, considered that the DIAC’s substantive rules were too specific and failed to leave room for national 
diversity; they prepared an ‘alternative DIAC’ with rules they thought to be less intrusive. See generally ibid. (with points 
16-52 reproducing and commenting in hindsight on the alternative Code).  
34
 The drivers behind the EU’s (or at that time the Community’s) attempt to introduce a competition law discipline within 
the framework of the WTO included the natural affinity of European officials for supranational structures with binding 
rules and legal consequences such as the WTO, particularly given the analogy between WTO trade liberalization and the 
Community/Union’s own internal fight against trade barriers. For the former point, see Matthew Baldwin, ‘EU Trade 
Politics: Heaven or Hell?’, 13 Journal of European Public Policy 526-542 (2006), at 533; on the latter, see Fox, ‘Toward 
World Antitrust and Market Access’, cited previous footnote, at 4-10; Anestis Papadopoulos, The International 
Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), at 215-216. 
Papadopoulos adds other factors as well, such as the goal of promoting broad convergence through multilateralism, and 
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But it was not to be. In speeches beginning in 1996 and becoming more trenchant through 1999,35 
Joel Klein, the then-Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust (AAG), announced his scepticism at the 
proposal to extend the WTO’s competences to competition law (i.e., to extend them beyond their 
current oblique application to antitrust issues36), and this set the stage for a key counter-move. In 1997, 
Klein enlisted an expert advisory committee – the International Competition Policy Advisory 
Committee (ICPAC) – to study and recommend to Klein and to the Attorney General ways of 
developing desirable forms of global antitrust governance. In a celebrated report of February 2000, 
ICPAC stated: “While recognizing that certain core WTO non-discrimination principles of national 
treatment and transparency would apply to the enforcement of domestic competition laws, the ICPAC 
Report specifically endorsed a more modest role for the WTO than the establishment of new 
competition rules subject to WTO dispute settlement.”37 At the same time, ICPAC unveiled its idea of, 
among other things, a new ‘Global Competition Initiative’ consisting of a voluntary network of 
competition enforcers (and non-governmental advisors but no trade officials) developing soft 
instruments and working toward cooperation, consultation and soft convergence on ‘process’ issues 
(but not initially on substantive rules38). This was of course the genesis of the International 
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that of gaining greater market access abroad for European firms (ibid. at 216-217); and, less publicly, a desire to obviate 
the extraterritorial application of antitrust law by the U.S. agencies against European companies (217-218), and the 
possibility of using the Singapore issues as bargaining chips to delay agricultural reform (218-219). 
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 See Joel Klein, ‘A Note of Caution with Respect to a WTO Agenda on Competition Policy’, speech before the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 18 November 1996, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/0998.htm; Joel Klein, 
‘A Reality Check on Antitrust Rules in the World Trade Organization, And a Practical Way Forward on International 
Antitrust’, in OECD, Trade and Competition Policies: Exploring the Ways Forward (Paris: OECD, 1999), 37-45. 
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 A few scattershot rules in the WTO Agreements address certain matters that are also of concern to antitrust (see also note 
48 below). For example, under Article VIII GATS, a WTO member is supposed to ensure that monopolies and exclusive 
service providers established in its jurisdiction operate consistently with the most favoured nation (MFN) principle, and 
that they do not abuse their monopoly position in a way that jeopardizes the value of any specific commitments the 
member has made. Article IX GATS requires a WTO member to consult upon request (but the obligation goes no further 
than this) if another member complains about other anticompetitive business practices causing harm to it. See Petros 
Mavroidis and Mark Wu, The Law of the World Trade Organization (WTO): Documents, Cases and Materials, 2nd 
edition (St. Paul: West Academic Publishing, 2013) 764. See also, e.g., Robert D. Anderson and Anna Caroline Müller, 
‘Competition Policy and the Multilateral Trading System: Three Propositions, an Observation and Some Questions for 
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and Public Policies (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014); Eleanor Fox and Amadeo Arena, ‘The International Institutions of 
Competition Law: The Systems’ Norms’, in Eleanor Fox and Michael Trebilcock, eds., The Design of Competition Law 
Institutions (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 444-487, at 452-460; Brendan Sweeney, The Internationalisation of Competition Rules 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), at 330-352 and 375-377; Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘Basic Principles of the WTO and the Role of 
Competition Policy’, 3 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 363-386 (2004); Brendan Sweeney, 
‘Globalisation of Competition Law and Policy: Some Aspects of the Interface between Trade and Competition’, 5 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 375-433 (2004), at 401-413; Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Lothar Ehring, ‘WTO 
Dispute Settlement and Competition Law: Views from the Perspective of the Appellate Body’s Experience’, 26 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1505-1561 (2003); Daniel Tarullo, ‘Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy’, 94 
American Journal of International Law 478-504 (2000), at 489-494; Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘Competition Law and Policy in 
the Context of the WTO System’, 44 Depaul Law Review 1097-1118 (1995).  
 Few are under the delusion that the WTO agreements establish cohesive rules to ensure that WTO members punish, 
prevent or even discourage firms from engaging in most forms of anticompetitive behaviour. Outside of the 
telecommunications sector, where WTO members can opt in to the terms of a ‘Reference Paper’ and thereby undertake to 
police the conduct of major telecoms suppliers (see Eleanor Fox, ‘WTO's First Antitrust Case - Mexican Telecom: A 
Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition’, 9 Journal of International Economic Law 271-292 (2006)), the limited 
experiments of WTO panels in solving antitrust problems have generally ended in disappointment. It could hardly be 
otherwise, given that, regardless of provisions such as the above-described Article VIII GATS, the WTO has no 
competence whatsoever to impose sanctions directly on private actors.  
37
 Merit Janow and James Rill, ‘The Origins of the ICN’, in Paul Lugard, ed., The International Competition Network at 
Ten (Cambridge and Antwerp: Intersentia, 2011) 21-38, at 30. 
38
 See chapter 6 of the Report, http://www.justice.gov/atr/icpac/chapter6.htm (PDF), for example at 282-285. Merit Janow 
and Jim Rill, two of the ICPAC members, explain that they had several meetings with U.S. officials, including AAG 
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Competition Network, which has been a powerful magnet, more so than many might have thought 
possible when it made its first imagined appearance in the ICPAC report.39 Meanwhile, the idea of 
bringing some aspects of competition law firmly under the wing of trade law was rejected in the fall of 
2003 in Cancún amidst Doha Round talks.40 It has not been revived, and it is hard to imagine a change 
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Klein, and reassured them that “the objective of the GCI was to provide a consultative forum focusing initially on process 
and it was not designed to force substantive harmonization”. Merit and Rill, cited previous footnote, at 32. On the other 
hand, the ICN’s later work has perhaps inevitably crept into substantive fields and has generated thinly veiled messages 
to the ICN membership about where their substantive rules and application thereof should be moving. See G. Monti, 
‘Unilateral conduct’, cited above note 6, for example at 354 and 360. 
39
 Obviously, the success of the ICN does not mean it is free of deficiencies. For example, as several observers have pointed 
out, the competition authorities of small and developing countries have sometimes found themselves sidelined in the 
ICN’s activities and decision-making, while the bigger and more established players, quite plausibly acting on impulses 
emanating in part from global commercial interests, set the agenda or attempt to set it. See Michal Gal, ‘Antitrust in a 
Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions’, 33 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1-56 (2009), at 46-54; Eleanor Fox and Amadeo Arena, ‘The International Institutions of 
Competition Law’, cited above note 36, at 483 (but also noting at 483 and 485 that the ICN is accountable to its 
members); Eleanor Fox, ‘Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network’, 43 International Lawyer 151-174 
(2009), at 167-168 and 171; Eleanor Fox, ‘Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path’, 13 
Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade In The Americas 211-236 (2007), at 235; Kathryn McMahon, ‘Competition law 
and developing economies: between “informed divergence” and international convergence’, in Ariel Ezrachi, ed., 
Research Handbook, cited above note 6, 209-237, at 233-235; Pablo Iglesias-Rodríguez, ‘The political economy of 
global competition law and policy: an institutional approach’, this collection, 43-52, for example at 52-54 (portraying the 
development of the ICN as a progressive and, it is argued, deliberate attempt to protect the agenda and prerogatives of 
OECD countries despite the ICN’s formally open and inclusive membership). Asymmetric influence in international 
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of the ICN’s success, as it ensures the necessary investment on the part of the U.S. and the EU. See D. Daniel Sokol, 
‘Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age’, 4 Berkeley 
Business Law Journal 37-122 (2007), at 107. In that sense, a symbiotic relationship, of sorts, may develop between the 
powerful and less powerful members. On the other hand, given the ICN’s voluntary nature, the possibility of a 
widespread feeling of lack of ‘ownership’ among its members bears risks, as reflected in the discourse of the ICN’s 
leadership. See, e.g., Andreas Mundt, ‘The ICN’s 12th Birthday – What’s New?’, Competition Policy International 
(October 2013), at 3 (“focus and inclusiveness will remain indispensable elements of our path forward”) (emphasis 
added).  
 For the likely reasons why the ICN has been rapidly accepted by the global community of antitrust enforcers (save the 
authorities established in China, which I surmise may be seeking (i) to consolidate their standing, while making the 
political point that China can resist international norms if it so wishes, leaving themselves the option (ii) to join the ICN 
later in a position of increased strength and prestige, and thus possibly greater ‘bargaining power’, even if entry is 
formally free with nothing to bargain about), see Sokol, ‘Monopolists Without Borders’, cited above, at 105-116 and 121-
122; Sokol, ‘International Antitrust Institutions’, cited above note 10. For further reflections on the ICN, see, among 
others, Hugh Hollman and William Kovacic, ‘The ICN: Its Past, Current and Future Role’, in Lugard, ed., The 
International Competition Network at Ten, cited above note 37, 51-91; Hollman, Kovacic and Robertson, ‘Building 
global antitrust standards’, cited above note 22; Oliver Budzinski, Competence Allocation, cited above note 5, at 142-
147; Yane Svetiev, ‘The Limits of Informal International Law: Enforcement, Norm-generation, and Learning in the ICN’, 
in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses Wessel and Jan Wouters, eds., Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 271-
294; and the assessments of Marie-Laure Djelic in papers such as ‘International Competition Network’, in Thomas Hale 
and David Held, eds., Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions and Innovations (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2011) 80-87 or Marie-Laure Djelic and Thibaut Kleiner, ‘The international competition network: Moving towards 
transnational governance’, in Marie-Laure Djelic and Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, eds., Transnational Governance: 
Institutional Dynamics of Regulation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 287-307. See also Marie-Laure 
Djelic and Sigrid Quack, ‘Overcoming Path Dependency: Path Generation in Open Systems’, 36 Theory and Society 161-
186 (2007), at 177-179 (discussing the ICN).  
40
 Among many others, see Josef Drexl, ‘International Competition Policy after Cancún: Placing a Singapore Issue on the 
WTO Development Agenda’, 27 World Competition 419-457 (2004); Taimoon Stewart, ‘The Fate of Competition Policy 
in Cancun: Politics or Substance?’, 31 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 7-11 (2004); Andrew Guzman, ‘Global 
Governance and the WTO’, 45 Harvard International Law Journal 303-352 (2004); Aditya Bhattacharjea, ‘The Case of a 
Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing Country Perspective’, 9 Journal of International Economic 
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in the wind in the coming years. A multilateral trade deal agreed in Bali in December 2013 is of little 
moment. That agreement may come as a relief from a trade perspective, having spared multilateralism 
in trade from an ignominious demise; but on the whole it is unambitious and does not address cross-
border competition law issues.41 There is simply no political momentum at present for the 
development of a WTO-level competition law initiative of a scope comparable to those contemplated 
in the discussions from 1996 to 2003.42  
With the WTO relegated to the background as far as competition issues are concerned, the ICN is 
riding a wave of popularity and good will (the term ‘bubble’ is best avoided). It has been described as 
not just successful but dramatically successful and it continues to perform important roles.43 
Unavoidably, the organization puts further strain on the resources of smaller authorities.44 But it has 
clearly not been made redundant by (nor has it made redundant) the host of criss-crossing policy 
networks engaged in some of the same activities, like those organized under the aegis of the OECD or 
UNCTAD,45 or those meeting in newer fora such as, e.g., the African Competition Forum.46 As time 
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Law 293-324 (2006); Anu Bradford, ‘International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO’, 48 Harvard 
International Law Journal 383-439 (2007); Fox, ‘Linked-In’, cited previous footnote, at 154-157; Papadopoulos, 
International Dimension, cited above note 34, at 225-242; Alberto Heimler, ‘Competition Policy as a Tool of EU Foreign 
Policy: Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Soft Convergence’, in Federiga Bindi, ed., The Foreign Policy of the European 
Union : Assessing Europe's Role in the World (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 82-98; Gerber, 
Global Competition, cited above note 4, at 101-107; Einer Elhauge and Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and 
Economics (Oxford: 2011, Hart Publishing) 1246-1247. 
41
 See Bridges Daily Update # 5 (7 December 2013), http://ictsd.org/i/wto/wto-mc9-bali-2013/bridges-daily-updates-bali-
2013/180991/. 
42
 The ultimate effects of future preferential trade agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
are difficult to predict; most likely, such PTAs bode ill for multilateralism in general (though it is not entirely 
inconceivable that they could prompt key developing countries to engage more seriously with multilateral initiatives). 
This is not to suggest that there is no pending discussion of a return to the WTO as a forum for developing some kind of 
system to deal with issues of international competition law. For example, it is argued that a functioning competitive order 
on a worldwide basis is a global public good and that, given the limits of other global solutions (soft law, soft 
convergence and extraterritorial application of domestic laws), the WTO seems to be a logical forum in which to hammer 
out such competition law disciplines. See Lúcio Tomé Féteira, ‘Right to Development and International Transfer of 
Technology: a Competition Law Perspective’, in Mario Viola de Azevedo Cunha, Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, 
Lucas Lixinski and Lúcio Tomé Féteira, eds., New Technologies and Human Rights: Challenges to Regulation (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2013) 91-120. In the latter essay, Tomé Féteira carries forward Josef Drexl’s proposal of a new perspective in 
which the protection of competition in its global dimension assumes a “quasi-constitutional character” in the WTO 
system. See Drexl, ‘International Competition Policy after Cancún’, cited above note 40, at 456. As discussed below (see 
note 48), and in light of the political climate alluded to here in the main text, the WTO may conceivably prove relevant 
for initiatives drawn more narrowly than the proposals that were on the table in the run-up to Cancún. 
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 Fox, ‘Linked-In’, cited above note 39, at 173. Fox describes the ICN as a success when judged by its own organizational 
mission and as a success relative to other international organizations. See ibid. at 165-166. In another essay she 
emphasizes the subsidiarity principle as a key factor behind this success. See Eleanor Fox, ‘Antitrust without Borders: 
From Roots to Codes to Networks’, in Guzman, ed., Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy, cited above, 265-285. 
Her references to subsidiarity are not accidental, as subsidiarity can operate not only as a decentralizing force but as a 
justification for centralized solutions, depending on the particular problems requiring a response and the distribution of 
capacities within a given system (in this case the international system of competition law jurisdiction).  
44
 Agencies that belong to both the ICN and other competition policy networks participate to varying degrees in these 
organizations if they have, despite tight budgets, the money and personnel to do so. Although financial aid is sometimes 
generated by ICN fundraising activities, smaller agencies are nonetheless typically faced with resource dilemmas and 
must sometimes choose between investing in one forum or another. On the phenomenon of ‘overlapping networks’, see 
Maher and Papadopoulos, ‘Competition agency networks around the world’, cited above note 21, at 84-86. See also Dan 
Sjöblom and Monica Widegren, ‘ICN Membership – Opportunities and Challenges for a Competition Authority’, in 
Lugard, ed., The International Competition Network at Ten, cited above note 37, at point 4 (discussing the resource 
dilemmas of the Swedish authority, as it is granted no additional funds or personnel by the government for its ICN work; 
and as the attention the authority gives to the ICN must compete with its other activities). 
45
 As the theme of this essay is competition, one might note that in some senses the ICN, as a new entrant (or, with respect 
to some activities, as a potential entrant), has put a bit of pressure on the OECD and on UNCTAD to continue to innovate 
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goes on, however, the limitations and latent tensions of the ICN47 may lead to a collective and parallel 
search for solutions to problems that cannot be addressed in an ICN context, in particular due to some 
of its defining features – no de jure power whatsoever, and a fundamentally modest albeit elastic 
mandate. It should not be ruled out that, despite the retreat from the WTO at Cancún and the 
prevailing wisdom that competition is to be kept out of that more formal environment, a cautious new 
impetus might arise in the coming years, leading to the launch of certain issue-specific initiatives that 
could generate (possibly plurilateral) WTO rules in a circumscribed field.48 In such a scenario, and 
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and supply high quality services. Cf. Eleanor Fox, ‘From Roots to Codes to Networks’, cited above note 43, 265-285, at 
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Differences, Similarities and Complementarities’, in Lugard, ed., The International Competition Network at Ten, cited 
above note 37, 93-104, at 104.  
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 The inaugural meeting of the African Competition Forum convened in Nairobi on 3 March 2011. Delegates from 19 
African countries participated, together with representatives of several international organizations and other guests. The 
introductory speech on that occasion by Uhuru Kenyatta, at that time Kenya’s Minister of Finance (and today a highly 
controversial figure), is posted on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UX7LtqGA__w (linking competition 
policy in Africa to allocative efficiency, consumer welfare and the de-concentration of economic power to promote an 
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 Given the inescapable heterogeneity among the ICN’s members, it has been suggested at least with regard to some areas 
of the law that working toward ‘superior practices’, and the implicit expectation that ICN members can and will conform 
as far as possible to them, is an inappropriate basis for the ICN system. On this view, it would be better if the goal 
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pressure valve that moderates the pace of and to some extent ‘legitimates’ a broader convergence process. On 
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 To cite just one example, there are the bitter experiences of developing countries that have been exploited by export 
cartels. The term ‘export cartels’ in this context excludes exporters colluding on the direct or delegated instructions of a 
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raw materials sector shows; the reference is thus limited to export cartels falling outside of that provision. Many scholars 
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Transfer of Wealth’, in Sokol, Cheng and Lianos, eds., Competition Law and Development, cited above note 3, 199-211. 
Not all export cartels are pernicious; but some have been compared to ‘hazardous waste’ (borrowing Fox’s term), and 
here there is a troubling international regulatory gap. Externalities imposed on developing countries – in particular, those 
lacking the capacity for credible extraterritorial law enforcement – can result in exorbitant wealth transfers in favour of 
foreign price-fixers, transfers likely exacerbated in the age of severe penalties for cartelists that get caught in developed 
jurisdictions (since credible sanctions tend to encourage ‘trade diversion’ in illegal conduct where there is sufficient 
capital mobility). Certain WTO provisions, including for example Article 11.1(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, could conceivably be interpreted in a manner that disciplines export cartels in a few countries, 
including large ones. See Daniel D. Sokol, ‘What Do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the 
Appropriate Solution?’, 4 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 967-982 (2008), at 977-978. Article 11:3 of the 
Agreement on Safeguards could potentially be invoked to challenge explicit exemptions for export cartels, such as those 
provided for in U.S. law. But it is almost inconceivable that Article 11:3 could be applied against the more common form 
of implicit exemption, such as one finds under EU law – which arise de facto from the Westphalian tradition that states 
do not normally regulate (mis)conduct with purely foreign consequences (i.e., where the ‘effects test’ fails). Cf. Roland 
Weinrauch, Competition Law in the WTO: The Rationale for a Framework Agreement (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2004) 147 
(“For example, [the question of] whether the mere non-enforcement of competition law against import cartels falls within 
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depending on the enterprise taken up, it may be expected that certain industrial interests in the 
developed world would mobilize against and seek to sabotage, or seek at least to persuade 
governments to water down, any such rules.49 A strong effort should therefore be devoted to 
stimulating a cultural change, reinforced if necessary by quid pro quos to alter the incentives of 
developed countries.50  
Further digressions about the ICN’s nature, work and capabilities could be added. But I leave these 
items to other contributions in this collection and return to the central theme. In this regard it may be 
said that one perceives, in the episode described above regarding the emergence of the ICN,51 a contest 
between two models, each championed by a different jurisdiction. They were not just two models that 
happened to ‘be there’. The search for and development of a new global initiative was really a search 
for an American global initiative (all sovereignty, all the time), and a strategic response to Europe’s 
(Contd.)                                                                  
the scope of [Article 11:3] is highly doubtful.”). And if implicit exemptions or non-enforcement cannot be challenged 
under Article 11:3, then even a successful challenge of an explicit exemption does not really remove the possibility for 
the defendant WTO member to maintain an exemption. Furthermore, since non-violation complaints at the WTO 
constitute a notoriously weak discipline, it must be concluded that the current ensemble of WTO provisions is inadequate 
to address the export cartel problem. Particularly in the developing world – i.e., where many countries opposed and 
derailed a WTO-level competition law regime – there have been calls for an issue-specific WTO-level solution involving 
new provisions, or for the development of a joint solution by the WTO and UNCTAD. According to one approach, a 
high-level commission could be appointed to study and define the problem and focus objectives, following which it 
would prepare an initial draft of a multilateral agreement for further consideration. (See CUTS, Contribution to the 
UNCTAD Roundtable on Cross-border anticompetitive practices: The challenges for developing countries and 
economies in transition (2012), http://www.cuts-international.org/pdf/CUTS_contribution_at_UNCTAD-IGE_2012.pdf, 
at 6.) Sokol has advanced a more defined approach, suggesting an enforceable WTO obligation of notification and 
transparency, with clearance procedures for “legitimate export joint ventures” in home jurisdictions that would 
beneficially raise the cost of cross-border predatory collusion. It appears that other pure export cartels (it is not entirely 
clear which ones) would be bereft of any antitrust immunity. See Sokol, ‘What Do We Really Know?’, cited above, at 
980-982. Solutions such as this seem fit for further consideration. However, not everyone accepts that a global solution is 
necessary to combat export cartels. See Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement, cited above note 11, 
at 231 (taking the view – questionable, to my mind – that extraterritoriality and bilateral trade agreements can adequately 
address the problem).  
 For further examples of leftover issues from the years of trade-and-competition discussions that seem, in the main, 
insoluble in the framework of the ICN, see, e.g., Fox, ‘Linked-In’, cited above note 39, at 168 and 173. In addition to 
export cartels, Fox refers to the adverse effects of antidumping used as a trade remedy, market access impediments, the 
use of state authority to immunize private conduct from antitrust attack, and more generally, issues at the intersection 
between competition law and trade law (whereas the ICN is supposed to be all antitrust all the time, a formula meant to 
exclude trade matters). See also Fox, ‘From Roots to Codes to Networks’, cited above note 43; Fox, Fingleton and 
Mitchell, ‘The past and future of international antitrust’, cited above note 9; Brendan Sweeney, ‘Global Competition: 
Searching for a Rational Basis for Global Competition Rules’, 30 Sydney Law Review 209-244 (2008), for example at 
219-226 and 243-244, with references; Brendan Sweeney, ‘International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in 
Progress’, 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 58-69 (2009), at 61-62 and 69; Brendan Sweeney, The 
Internationalisation of Competition Rules, cited above note 36, for example at 399-401 and chapter 9 generally.  
49
 Cf. Bradford, ‘Preference for Nonbinding Regimes’, cited above, at 327 (“The United States would also likely oppose 
rules banning export cartels […]”). Sokol recalls the strident objections of the U.S Department of Commerce (reflecting 
those of certain private interests) to any attempt to curtail the Webb-Pomerene Act during the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission hearings. See Sokol, ‘What Do We Really Know?’, cited above note 48, at 975, footnote 42.  
50
 See Sokol, ‘What Do We Really Know?’, cited above note 48, at 981 (“To provide an incentive for [exporting countries] 
to agree to the WTO solution, developing world countries would need to provide increased market access in other 
areas.”); Bernard Hoekman and Kamal Saggi, ‘Tariff Bindings and Bilateral Cooperation on Export Cartels’, 83 Journal 
of Development Economics 141-156 (2007) (showing that ceteris paribus a developing country could offer greater market 
access through tariff reductions but recognizing that tariff bindings required by trade agreements already in force 
constrain this possibility, effectively raising the ‘price’ of the pecuniary or non-pecuniary quid pro quo). 
51
 The above version of events is quite abbreviated. For a fuller discussion of the rise of the ICN, see generally Lugard, ed., 
The International Competition Network at Ten, cited above note 37; and cf. Iglesias-Rodríguez, ‘The political economy 
of global competition law and policy’, cited above note 37, at 48-49. 
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attempt to promote supranationalist governance in international antitrust.52 The choice of the ICN as 
the leading framework for global cooperation in this field has been quite a coup for the U.S. DOJ, 
even though DG Comp itself was ambivalent about DG Trade’s WTO gambit,53 and even though all 
the EU Competition Commissioners from Mario Monti and Neelie Kroes to Joaquín Almunia have 
fully supported the ICN’s activities. At the same time, the ICN’s broad appeal has furnished scholars 
focusing on Slaughter’s ‘new world order’ and related ideas with a useful case study of transnational 
network governance and communities of interest.54 
The question of whose preferred model prevailed is however of little importance for our purposes. 
What seems significant is the emergence in the 1990s of two competing and possibly incompatible 
visions of global governance,55 arguably reflecting the anxiety of a former hegemon about its influence 
and leadership role being diverted to its chief rival. One might perhaps say something similar about 
the Commission’s full self-immersion in the ICN: to ignore it would have assured American 
dominance in an emerging, high-stakes sector. 
3.2. Bilateral relationships 
In the field of antitrust, and to oversimplify a bit,56 bilateral relationships are established in two main 
ways: (i) by concluding a bilateral cooperation agreement (‘BCA’), nearly always with non-binding 
terms and no dispute resolution mechanism (amounting de facto to ‘soft’ commitments from the 
perspective of international law57), or its cousin, a Memorandum of Understanding (‘MOU’, signed at 
the agency level),58 or (ii) by concluding a trade agreement with competition provisions (‘TACP’), 
                                                     
52
 See Oliver Budzinski, Competence Allocation, cited above note 5, at 143. Cf. also Gerber, Global Competition, cited 
above note 4, at 111 and 115 (ICN launch “had the strategic effect of further undermining support for a multilateral 
competition law project”; some interpreted ICPAC’s hearings in Washington, D.C. “as a means of reasserting [U.S.] 
control of the agenda of transnational competition law development”).  
53
 See Anestis Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), at 243-245. Furthermore, DG Trade’s support for the WTO option sat awkwardly next to the 
opposition of significant business interests, as expressed by UNICE in position papers. See ibid., at 214-215.  
54
 See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, ‘Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits’, 34 Yale Journal of International Law 
113-172 (2009); Svetiev, ‘Enforcement, Norm-generation and Learning’, cited above note 39. For an early exposition of 
network governance as a response to the ‘globalization paradox’, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘The Real New World 
Order’, 76 Foreign Affairs 183-197 (September-October 1997). 
55
 Informal networks can undoubtedly operate side by side with formal institutions and binding multilateral rules. When a 
WTO framework agreement on competition law issues was being discussed, the European Commission considered that 
the ICN could function as a complement to what would have been the relevant WTO disciplines. See Fiona Marshall, 
Competition Regulation and Policy at the World Trade Organisation (Nottingham: Cameron May Ltd, 2010), at 147. 
Nevertheless, one may argue that reliance on the ICN as a central competition agency network and reliance on the WTO 
as a dispute resolution forum spring from quite different philosophies about antitrust sovereignty, and it may be argued 
furthermore that the full expression of the ICN concept as we know it and the formal incursion of the WTO into the 
antitrust field would at the very least pose some mutual tension. Hypothetically speaking, if a broadly framed WTO 
agreement on competition law were adopted, the ICN’s role and functioning would likely have to be redefined to some 
extent.  
56
 For a more taxonomical discussion, see Valerie Desmedts, ‘International Competition Law Enforcement: Different 
Means, One Goal?’, 8(3) Competition Law Review 223-253 (2012), at 237-249.  
57
 See Mitsuo Matsushita, ‘International Cooperation in the Enforcement of Competition Policy’, 1 Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 463-475 (2002), at 468-469. 
58
 ‘First generation’ BCAs have been concluded on the basis of somewhat diverse legal authority depending on the 
jurisdiction concerned. For example, in the U.S., such agreements have taken the form of executive agreements; 
therefore, in the absence of ratification by the U.S. Senate they do not constitute international treaties. By contrast, so far 
as the European Commission is concerned and with respect to agreements reached with third countries (but not 
agreements of lesser stature, i.e., so-called ‘administrative arrangements’), jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice 
requires the intervention of the EU legislator, which first authorizes the Commission to negotiate the terms and later 
‘concludes’ the agreement, thereby making it definitively valid under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
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whose terms create international obligations but whose competition chapters may be either binding or, 
not uncommonly, merely discretionary.59 In addition, with or without such agreements in place, 
agencies frequently engage in regular or ad hoc informal cooperation within the bounds of their legal 
capacities.60 Informal cooperation of this kind may follow the general contours of more formal 
agreements while avoiding their less expedient provisions, and it is also often inspired by or based on 
the Recommendation of the OECD Council on international enforcement cooperation61 or based on 
other instruments such as Best Practices documents.62 The observed popularity of ‘soft’ commitments 
worldwide in the cooperative competition-related frameworks just described is the flipside of the story 
recounted above in relation to the failed WTO framework agreement, which would have entailed 
binding obligations and dispute settlement procedures. Particularly in an environment of uncertainty, 
the softer the obligation, the lower the risk of entering into a cooperative arrangement (and of 
unintended consequences and costly exit, if any); and possibly the greater the capacity of the parties to 
bypass lawmaking formalities that might end in deadlock (which also implies a correspondingly 
weaker base of legitimacy for the softer solutions).63 
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Union. The 1991 cooperation agreement with the United States thus had to be approved by a joint decision of the Council 
and the Commission in 1995. See Case C-327/91, France v Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, para. 43 (Commission 
lacked competence to conclude agreements with third countries). That does not mean, of course, that the mutual promises 
in the U.S./EU agreement are binding; to the contrary, the provisions are designed deliberately to avoid non-discretionary 
obligations and any kind of binding dispute settlement. As for the enhanced commitments undertaken in ‘second 
generation’ BCAs (see below notes 74-77 and accompanying text), such an agreement must be authorized ex ante by 
legislation or ex post by ratification, or both.  
59
 For example, in the free trade agreements concluded by the U.S. with other countries (mostly on a bilateral basis with the 
exception of NAFTA and, looking ahead, the Trans-Pacific Partnership), there are generally enforcement cooperation 
provisions but these are ‘soft’, non-binding terms within a broader ‘hard law’ instrument. By contrast, some competition-
related terms – in particular, those relating to state-owned/controlled enterprises or privileged monopolies – embody 
firmer commitments, and dispute settlement may be invoked by either contracting party. For more detail and nuance 
regarding forms of bilateral cooperation, see generally Guzman, Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy, cited 
above note 10; Papadopoulos, International Dimension, cited above note 34, at 52-92. For a detailed examination of the 
‘soft’ competition chapters in preferential trade agreements with a focus on Latin America, see D. Daniel Sokol, ‘Order 
without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter Into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade 
Agreements’, 83 University of Chicago-Kent Law Review 231-292 (2008) (underlining the contrast between the non-
enforceable competition provisions and the harder commitments covering other areas pertaining to trade policy in the 
same agreements). 
60
 The most important legal limitation concerns the exchange of confidential information, a delicate matter both legally and 
politically, not least because powerful business interests tend actively to oppose the development of lawful mechanisms 
by which such information may be shared. In the absence of authorized sharing, agencies can however exchange not just 
public information but also ‘agency confidential’ information, i.e., information generated internally regarding issues such 
as market definition, theories of harm or corrective remedies, or information, prior to any public announcement, 
concerning the fact that an agency is investigating a particular firm or group of firms. On the exchange of agency 
confidential information, see, e.g., Thomas Deisenhofer, ‘International Cooperation in Merger Cases – An EU 
Practitioner’s Perspective’, in Philip Lowe and Mel Marquis, eds., European Competition Law Annual 2010: Merger 
Control in European and Global Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013) 227-242.  
61
 OECD Council Recommendation concerning Co-operation between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices 
affecting International Trade (1967; last revised 1995), 
http://acts.oecd.org/Instruments/ShowInstrumentView.aspx?InstrumentID=192&InstrumentPID=188&Lang=en&Book=
False. On the Recommendation, see, e.g., Bruno Zanettin, Cooperation between Antitrust Authorities at the International 
Level (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002), at 56.  
62
 See, e.g., Revised Best Practices for Coordinating Merger Reviews (2011), adopted by the European Commission and by 
the U.S. agencies, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/international_cooperation.html. 
63
 Cf. W. Michael Reisman, Remarks (panel on ‘A Hard Look at Soft Law’), 82 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 373-377 (1991), at 377. See also, among others, Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in 
International Governance’, 54(3) International Organization 421-456 (2000), at 423 and 434-450 (discussing how soft 
law permits parties to calibrate lower levels of obligation, precision and/or delegation, and giving examples of different 
permutations); Sokol, ‘International Antitrust Institutions’, cited above note 10, at 196-197.  
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3.2.1. Bilateral cooperation agreements 
With regard to the first category, after the U.S. had already been party to BCAs with Canada, 
Germany and Australia since 1959, 1976 and 1982 respectively, the U.S. and the European 
Community in 1991 concluded a well-known BCA which included inter alia positive comity 
provisions64 and which has served as a template for many of the BCAs that followed in the next two 
decades.65 The EU has subsequently concluded similar agreements with Canada in 1999, Japan in 
2003 and South Korea in 2009.66 The U.S., which has a strong proclivity for bilateral agreements as a 
matter of foreign policy,67 struck agreements with Canada in 1995, then with Brazil, Israel and Japan 
in 1999 (together with a second-generation BCA with Australia the same year – see below), Mexico in 
2000, and with Chile’s competition authority in 2011. These agreements apply in addition to those 
with Germany and Australia, which remain in place.68  
Several authorities have suggested that the various ‘first generation’ BCAs have been of limited 
value, for example because they don’t provide for the exchange of confidential information absent the 
consent of relevant parties, or because positive comity has never gained any traction in practice.69 
Without denying the limitations of first generation agreements, one may also posit that the negotiation 
and use of such agreements has created real value for the jurisdictions concerned to the extent that it 
has enabled agencies to build a communicative infrastructure and to intensify personal contacts, 
develop trust and exchange expertise.70 A related point is that an implicit and less visible benefit, 
                                                     
64
 The U.S. also entered into specific positive comity agreements with the EU in 1998 and with Canada in 2004. The 
provisions of these agreements have never been formally employed, although some informal positive comity requests 
have been made, to little effect. 
65
 In brief, the 1991 agreement provided for mutual notification of relevant cases; coordinated investigations (with the aid, 
in particular in cases involving merger control or in cartel cases where a leniency application has been made, of waivers 
of confidentiality by key parties to permit the sharing of sensitive information); continual dialogue on a wide range of 
matters; traditional comity (basically, abstention out of respect for the important interests of a foreign jurisdiction); and 
positive comity (i.e., the possibility to request a foreign jurisdiction to act against conduct harming the important interests 
of the requesting jurisdiction).  
66
 DG Competition also has MOUs with the competition authorities of Brazil (2009), Russia (2011), China (2012) and India 
(2013). An earlier MOU with South Korea (2004) foresaw and then ripened into a more formal BCA. A similar upgrade 
could conceivably take place with the Chinese authorities in 2015 when the MOU comes up for review. 
67
 See, e.g., Kenneth Abbott, Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Ann-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal, ‘The Concept 
of Legalization’, 54(3) International Organization 401-419 (2000), at 401. 
68
 Like the EU, the U.S. agencies have also concluded a few MOUs with competition authorities of other countries, 
specifically those of Russia (1999), China (2011) and India (2012).  
69
 See, e.g., the ICPAC Report, cited above note 38, at Annex 1-C, xiii-xiv (“[I]n many respects, at present the bilateral 
agreements still remain limited instruments. Because they do not alter existing law or otherwise expand the powers of 
antitrust authorities, they do not expand the possibilities for the sharing of confidential or privileged information without 
the provider’s consent […]. They may not provide a mechanism for resolving disputes that continue after the end of 
consultations. Further, the agreements do not implicate substantive law nor seek to reach any formal procedural 
harmonization between the signatory jurisdictions.”). For discussion of the non-impact of positive comity, see, e.g., 
Philip Marsden, ‘The Curious Incident of Positive Comity – The Dog that Didn’t Bark (And the Trade Dogs that Just 
Might Bite)’, in Guzman, ed., Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy, cited above note 10. 
70
 In the workshop on which this contribution is based, I suggested that some first-generation cooperation agreements 
(including MOUs) might in this sense be regarded as ‘seeding’ agreements potentially preparing the ground for bolder 
steps. A similar perspective is put forward by Brendan Sweeney, who refers more specifically to positive comity: 
“Perhaps the greatest benefit of positive comity will be its intangible benefits, those that arise from the fact that states 
have agreed to communicate their competition concerns to one another. If this dialogue produces greater understanding, 
greater levels of trust and confidence and perhaps greater convergence, it will have served a useful purpose.” Sweeney, 
Internationalisation of Competition Rules, cited above note 36, at 297. See also Randolph Tritell and Elizabeth Kraus, 
‘The Federal Trade Commission’s International Antitrust Program’, presented at the ABA’s 61st Annual Antitrust Law 
Spring Meeting in Washington, 11 April 2013, at 4 (“In addition to providing a legal framework for cooperation, the 
agreements have been catalysts to facilitate closer working relationships.”). Of course, two agencies can also develop 
trust and coordinated communication or working methods in the absence of any agreement. From this point of view, a 
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which was also an important driver of the earliest agreements but which today appears to be taken for 
granted, may be the avoidance or management of tension due to the actual or potential extraterritorial 
enforcement of competition laws.71  
While it remains to be seen whether positive comity will ever come of age (which may depend on 
the jurisdiction pairs concerned), the obstacles to cooperation resulting from the confidentiality 
obligations imposed on competition agencies are in some limited measure addressed by other 
instruments, at least as concerns certain jurisdictions. In the first place, a country that has criminalized 
cartel conduct, e.g., the U.S., can employ the procedures provided for in (non-antitrust-specific) 
mutual legal assistance treaties, or ‘MLATs’, to obtain confidential information (and to cooperate in 
other relevant ways, such as by collecting evidence; evidence is gathered by police agents as opposed 
to competition authorities) if it has concluded an MLAT with another country, e.g., Canada.72 
However, a legal gap may remain in scenarios involving two countries X and Y where X seeks the 
transmission of confidential information by authorities in country Y but either Y has not criminalized 
cartels or it has done so but there is no MLAT or equivalent agreement between the two countries.73 
The constraints that limit the exchange of confidential information in the absence of an MLAT – 
which describes the vast majority of country combinations X and Y – have become increasingly acute, 
as anticompetitive behaviour with multi-jurisdictional effects are nowadays a pervasive or indeed an 
endemic characteristic of the globalized economy.  
The response of certain jurisdictions to confidentiality constraints and to the frequent need for 
access to evidence located abroad has been to turn to ‘second generation’ agreements, which embody 
enhanced commitments in hard law instruments (i.e., treaties agreed on the basis of enabling acts) and 
which thus take the original BCAs a significant step further. These agreements are heterogeneous but 
among their key common elements are provisions authorizing the exchange of confidential 
information between competition authorities without need for any waiver from the party or parties 
concerned – generally subject to restrictions intended to preserve the rights of defence, to limit 
disclosure of business secrets, personal data and leniency materials, and to ensure that the use of 
evidence in the requesting jurisdiction does not exceed the powers of the transmitting agency. For 
example, in the second-generation BCA signed in May 2013 between the EU and Switzerland, the 
requesting party (in particular, Switzerland) is barred from using information received from the EU via 
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first-generation agreement might be regarded by the agencies concerned as being superfluous; the same consideration 
would not apply, however, with respect to second-generation agreements (see below notes 74-77 and accompanying 
text), for which even systematic informal cooperation cannot substitute. Cf. Papadopoulos, International Dimension, 
cited above note 34, at 80-81.  
71
 See Tritell and Kraus, ‘The Federal Trade Commission’s International Antitrust Program’, cited previous footnote, at 4 
(“While the first agreements were motivated primarily by a desire to reduce and manage conflicts arising from 
extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust laws, modern agreements seek mainly to enhance enforcement cooperation.”). 
Conflicts have of course arisen, and have fed media frenzies, but overall what seems more remarkable is the absence of 
conflicts that boil over. The potential for conflict may however depend on various factors including among others the 
substantive field of law, geographic overlap, frequency of interaction and the magnitude of the commercial stakes, which 
may have political economy implications.  
72
 Technically, the 1990 MLAT between the U.S. and Canada, which has been used several times (in addition to their 1995 
and 2004 comity agreements), does not require that the underlying conduct be of a criminal nature in the country 
receiving the request (a feature which is not common to all the MLATS that the U.S. has concluded). However, requests 
between these countries are evaluated case-by-case and limitations are imposed on the use to which the transmitted 
information may be put. At least in the realm of antitrust, since requests between the U.S. and Canada are made 
essentially in relation to horizontal cartels, which are criminally illegal in both countries, the absence of a dual criminality 
requirement is academic.  
73
 For further details on MLATs, see, e.g., ABA Section of Antitrust Law, International Antitrust Cooperation Guide 
(ABA, 2004). More recently, see Sweeney, Internationalisation of Competition Rules, cited above, at 314-317; and 
OECD, Improving International Co-operation in Cartel Investigations, DAF/COMP/GF(2012)16 (November 2012), 29-
30 and 267-271. 
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the treaty mechanism as evidence to put individuals in prison.74 Another second-generation agreement 
is being negotiated between the EU and Canada.75 Australia concluded a second-generation agreement 
already in 1999 with the U.S., and in 2007 concluded another one with New Zealand. In the case of 
the U.S., despite its agreement with Australia, the underlying enabling legislation is problematic in 
that it appears to require foreign treaty partners to allow the use of shared information for purposes 
beyond the competition matter animating the request of the U.S. enforcer, which would present a 
legal-political obstacle in many jurisdictions.76 No country but Australia, which has its own enabling 
legislation in place,77 has ventured to negotiate with the U.S. an agreement of the same intensity. 
Finally, Denmark, Iceland and Norway in 2001 concluded a second-generation trilateral cooperation 
agreement, made quadrilateral when Sweden joined the group in 2003. 
3.2.2. Trade agreements with competition provisions 
In addition to bilateral agreements that specifically concern cooperation in the enforcement of 
competition law, bilateral trade agreements with competition law provisions or chapters are another 
means of pursuing a range of related objectives.78 Trade agreements with competition provisions 
(TACPs) are noteworthy because, among other reasons, they constitute a significant instrument of the 
EU’s external relations policy. The number of such trade agreements has grown significantly in the 
last 20 years, and the EU has been one of their prominent promoters, originally in the wake of the 
Soviet Republic’s disintegration and then, in the last decade, as a hedge against the remote odds of 
WTO members reaching consensus in the Doha Development Round.79  
With the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement (2010), the trilateral EU-Columbia-Peru Free Trade 
Agreement (2011) and the political deal on trade and investment announced in October 2013 between 
the EU and Canada,80 the number of bilateral (or trilateral) TACPs to which the EU is a party is now 
around 30. In general, the U.S. seems to have been less concerned with concluding TACPs, although 
there are such agreements in force between the U.S. and Singapore (2004), Australia (2005), Peru 
(2006) and South Korea (2007).81 Furthermore, the form of the EU’s TACPs often goes beyond 
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 Article 8(4) of the Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation Concerning Cooperation on the 
Application of their Competition Laws. For the relevant and understandably elaborate provisions on the exchange of 
confidential information, see Articles 7(4) to 10. Further details are discussed in Patrik Ducrey, ‘The Agreement between 
Switzerland and the EU Concerning Cooperation in the Application of their Competition Laws’, 4 Journal of European 
Competition Law and Practice 437-444 (2013); David Mamane and Samuel Jost, ‘Let’s work together – An EU/Swiss 
co-operation agreement has far reaching implications’, Competition Law Insight (13 November 2012), 8-10. 
75
 See Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Commission Report on Competition 2012, SWD(2013) 
159 final of 7 May 2013, at 15. 
76
 The relevant legislation is the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 (‘IAEAA’). See American 
Modernization Commission, Report and Recommendations (April 2007), at 39-40 (calling on the U.S. Congress to clarify 
that the IAEAA does not in fact require that treaty provisions must permit the U.S. authorities to use transmitted 
information for non-competition purposes), referenced in Edward Swaine, ‘Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy: 
United States’, in Guzman, ed., Cooperation, Comity and Competition Policy, cited above note 10, 1-20, at 19. 
77
 The relevant Australian laws are called the Mutual Assistance in Business Regulation Act 1992 and the Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987. 
78
 See Papadopoulos, International Dimension, cited above note 34, at 93-144. 
79
 Cf. Beatriz Galindo-Rodriguez, ‘European Competition Policy: Development and Protectionism’, speech, Moscow, 29 
May 2007, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/library.aspx?page=37, at 3, point 5 (“Given that competition 
matters are off the agenda of the multilateral negotiations for now, we would try to move on competition issues 
bilaterally in the context of the new generation of market-access driven Free Trade Agreements […].”). 
80
 The title of the EU-Canada agreement – the ‘Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement’ – reflects the extent of its 
ambitions.  
81
 If negotiations ultimately bear fruit, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement between the U.S. and 
the EU will contain competition provisions; their intensity remains to be seen. One may also mention the sector-specific 
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traditional free trade measures, and extends to a wide range of integration measures and other fields, 
particularly in the case of ‘association agreements’ (AAs) and ‘stabilization and association 
agreements’ (SAAs). In part this is explained by the fact that the agreements can serve as a pre-
condition for joining the restricted club of EU Member States, but the EU also concludes broad 
agreements with countries that have little or no hope or desire to accede. Papadopoulos assigns the 
EU’s bilateral trade agreements to three categories: (i) those with candidate or potential candidate 
countries; (ii) those with countries participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy (i.e., Euro-
Med countries and countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia); and (iii) those with selected trade 
partners, in particular Mexico (1997), Chile (2002), South Africa (1999), now joined by the above-
mentioned agreements with Korea, Columbia-Peru and Canada (with still other agreements under 
negotiation). 
The various agreements are heterogeneous not just across those categories but within the categories 
as well. The taxonomy will not be pursued further here in any detail, but some general observations 
can be made. One is the simple point that competition law is never neglected when the EU concludes 
bilateral (or trilateral) trade agreements. Even where the EU already has a bilateral cooperation 
agreement with the trading partner, as in the case of South Korea, a part of the trade agreement will 
nevertheless be devoted to competition, though typically with fewer details insofar as bilateral 
cooperation is concerned.82 Second, some of the agreements, specifically those concluded with actual 
or potential candidates for accession to the EU, tend toward ‘deep’ integration, i.e., they focus on 
‘behind the border’ issues. The EU enjoys sufficient political and economic leverage in these scenarios 
to make the trade agreements in some sense analogous to adhesion contracts, and the EU uses them to 
extend the reach of its internal market (although free movement, especially free movement of persons, 
may be subject to strict conditions and post-accession phase-ins). The EU thus tends to extract far-
reaching obligations from such countries.83 In the case of agreements between the U.S. and its trading 
partners, there may well be asymmetric bargaining power but, unlike the EU, the U.S. may not hold a 
comparable trump card strong enough to insist on an isomorphic remodelling of its trade partner’s 
substantive arrangements in the field of competition law.84 A third point is that while the EU may 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Open Skies agreement between these jurisdictions, which in Annex 2 contains specific cooperation provisions with 
regard to competition, administered by the Open Skies Joint Commission (with representatives of the European 
Commission and of the U.S. Department of Transportation). No provision is made for the exchange of confidential 
information. Joint work has been produced, however. See Report, Transatlantic Airline Alliances: Competitive Issues and 
Regulatory Approaches (November 2010), http://www.dot.gov/policy/aviation-policy/competition-data-analysis/alliance-
codeshares.  
82
 The inclusion of competition provisions in trade agreements gives DG Trade an opportunity to negotiate on matters 
which in the context of bilateral cooperation agreements would be negotiated by officials of DG Competition. It is not 
entirely clear how policy coherence is managed between the two Directorates. It has been intimated that the process may 
be relatively haphazard given the small number of individuals (i.e., ten) working in the International Affairs Unit of DG 
Competition, who have a host of other duties to discharge. See Papadopoulos, International Dimension, cited above note 
34, at 106, footnote 44.  
83
 The EU is undoubtedly alive to the risk that a potential candidate country will undertake to adopt or reform a competition 
law in such a way as to mimic EU rules but then fail to implement the reform in what the EU regards as an adequate 
manner. This may have been perceived as a risk particularly in the case of countries with illiberal economic legacies. Cf. 
David Gerber, Global Competition, cited above note 3, at 197-198 (noting the interest of the EU, in light of that risk, in 
exporting eastward its ‘more economic approach’). Such implementation problems can rarely be solved by the content of 
international agreements alone; however, with regard to actual and potential candidate countries, the EU has the leverage 
of conditionality not just until the conclusion of an agreement but until the closing of accession negotiations and the 
subsequent ratification of the accession treaty on the EU side (i.e., by all the Member States and by the EU itself).  
84
 An interesting question is why the EU has in fact not gone farther and experimented with institutional engineering in its 
agreements with suitor countries. For example, in the ‘Europe agreements’ that applied between the EU and the countries 
that acceded to the Union in 2004 and 2007, there was no attempt to require those countries to establish an ‘ideally’ 
designed agency. Cf. K.J. Cseres, ‘The Impact of Regulation 1/2003 in the new Member States’, 6(2) Competition Law 
Review 145-182 (2010). Two possible explanations suggest themselves. First, institutional reforms may imply many more 
direct and indirect costs than legislative reforms of a lesser order, and may thus appear to be more difficult to extract 
absent side payments. Second, the adoption by the EU of a standard institutional model for ‘export’ might be seen as 
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enjoy only limited direct leverage with other trade partners, i.e., those that have no realistic prospect of 
accession, this does not necessarily mean that the EU is unable to influence them meaningfully. The 
record is uneven but the EU – particularly where it is in a position to offer financial aid and/or 
technical assistance – has been able to steer national outcomes in the general direction of its 
preferences, as it has done for example in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even in relation to the third 
category enumerated above, i.e., countries that can negotiate with the EU on a more ‘equal’ footing (in 
particular because EU exporters are keen to gain access to their relatively larger markets), the EU can 
at least potentially shape outcomes in the ‘socialization through cooperation (repeated game)’ manner 
referred to in connection with first-generation bilateral cooperation agreements. 
3.2.3. Conclusion on bilateral relationships 
The idea proposed here is that the negotiation of a BCA or a TACP, and the corresponding 
cooperation that ensues thereafter – which can be either formal, with the actual triggering of the 
agreement’s provisions, or informal and pragmatic in order to avoid the involvement of diplomatic 
channels or cumbersome procedures – provides a conduit through which influence is exerted. If the 
BCA or TACP is concluded between jurisdictions/authorities of asymmetric power (or even where 
relative symmetry prevails), it may well be motivated in part by the desire to maintain or spread 
influence. To a certain extent there seems to be an ongoing competitive game involving the U.S. and 
EU among others, in which ‘getting to’ jurisdiction X before a rival does may yield dividends to the 
extent that ideas, beliefs and techniques can be shaped through those processes of negotiation and 
cooperation. The cultivation of bilateral relationships may thus be regarded as another mode of global 
competition. Within this mode of competition one may furthermore observe some degree of product 
differentiation, with the U.S. tending to favour bilateral cooperation agreements with ultimately 
discretionary commitments, and using MLATs where they apply, whereas the EU has generally 
preferred to incorporate competition provisions (alongside political/democratic, social and cultural 
provisions) in more formal agreements with its commercial partners, its neighbours, and the countries 
that are or may one day be candidates applying for membership. That is not to say that commitments 
made between the EU and its trading partners need be formally obligatory; in general, the intensity of 
obligation depends on the relative bargaining power of the parties, which means that those countries 
seeking specific benefits from the EU will be subject to the greatest de facto pressure, and those 
seeking membership will accept de jure commitments.85  
In addition to the varying degrees of normativity just mentioned, another feature that distinguishes 
the competition chapters of EU trade agreements compared to the provisions in U.S. agreements is the 
character and intensity of the substance of the relevant provisions. The EU agreements go further 
inasmuch as they provide that, when the common trade between the EU and its partner is affected by a 
given business practice, EU-compatible competition rules are to be applied to that conduct.86 
(Conversely, where the common trade is not affected, and where the trading partner is not an actual or 
candidate country harmonizing its internal regime with that of the EU, the foreign jurisdiction remains 
essentially free to maintain purely domestic rules that diverge entirely from the EU rules.87) Where the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
inconsistent with the fact that the shape of competition enforcement institutions across the incumbent Member States 
themselves is marked by considerable diversity. Nevertheless, despite the lack of obligations to embark on institutional 
reforms, most of the ‘new’ Member States have in fact responded to the system of networked governance in the field of 
EU competition policy by establishing institutional arrangements inspired by models typical of the older Member States 
(which are however in several cases currently experiencing significant or radical restructuring).  
85
 Cf. Papadopoulos, International Dimension, cited above note 34, at 138-141 (discussing the diverse methods of dispute 
settlement provided for in the EU’s trade agreements, their intensity and their implications for the 
delegation/precision/obligation formula mentioned above in footnote 63). 
86
 See ibid., at 105. 
87
 As a matter of EU law even the Member States are permitted zones of substantive divergence when trade between them 
cannot be affected, and sometimes even when it can be. However, a comparison between third countries and EU Member 
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EU can bring significant pressure to bear, in the manner described above, it will go further still and 
oblige its partner to converge substantively on EU rules by reforming national competition laws or 
adopting new ones. This channel of ‘exportation’ is not limited to rules on restrictive agreements and 
abuse of dominance. The strong tendency of the EU to insist on rules concerning state aid, public 
undertakings and undertakings with exclusive or special rights further illustrates how the EU seeks to 
use its trade agreements as vehicles of international (one-way) harmonization.88  
But there is another dimension of product differentiation that may be signalled here as well, which 
is again linked to the philosophy behind the external policies of the U.S. and the EU. This relates to 
the idea that promoting competition law and policy within the context of a regional grouping, i.e., in a 
manner modelled on the EU itself, is normatively desirable. For the countries engaged in such 
initiatives, EU-style regionalism, including in this case regional competition law, is often seen as a 
strategy that can at least potentially enable them to overcome a variety of difficulties. With the growth 
of regional models of competition law in their various forms, an implicit rivalry emerges between 
regionalism and the quite different model generally employed and espoused by the U.S. in its global 
relations. The next sub-section briefly considers these alternative models. 
3.3. Regional relationships 
On the one hand, the international community has been unwilling to move toward consensus on a 
formal multilateral framework for competition law (section 3.1 above). On the other, the shortcomings 
of nationally bounded competition law in a commercially globalized environment persist. In addition 
to the bilateral cooperation and trade agreements discussed above (section 3.2), a natural strategy for 
countries lacking the resources or experience necessary to maintain a credible enforcement system 
acting alone is to develop formal and/or informal cooperation mechanisms at a regional level. Lucian 
Cernat has observed that many developing and transition countries in Asia, Central and Latin America 
and above all Africa have in fact established such arrangements,89 some of which have significant and 
problematic overlapping membership; and Michal Gal has outlined the many reasons why in regional 
competition law solutions there is vast potential waiting to be let loose.90 The result is a feast for 
acronym enthusiasts: we may refer to, among others, ASEAN, CARICOM, OECS, CEMAC, SADC, 
SACU, WAEMU, EAC, ECOWAS and COMESA, and the possibilities multiply when other 
languages are used.  
Apart from the sensible theoretical arguments in favour of regional initiatives, the countries that 
have experimented with regional approaches to competition law enforcement had a clear point of 
reference: the European Community or European Union.91 The EU plainly embodies a regional 
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States is doubtful since, in general, it seems more likely for any given anticompetitive transaction or practice in a 
Member State to be capable of affecting trade between Member States than it is for a given transaction or practice in a 
third country to affect trade with the EU. The direct impact of a convergence rule in a third country will thus depend to 
some degree on the volume of its trade with the EU as a proportion of its overall commerce.  
88
 See Papadopoulos, International Dimension, Table 4.3 at 116-117. Of course, rules designed to minimize or eliminate 
unnecessary public obstacles to competition have been seen (somewhat akin to David Gerber’s point – see above note 83) 
as essential inoculants for countries formerly under soviet control. See ibid. at 115 (citing John Litwack, ‘Legality and 
Market Reform in Soviet-Type Economies’, 5(4) Journal of Economic Perspectives 77-89 (1991)).  
89
 Lucian Cernat, ‘Eager to ink, but ready to act? RTA proliferation and international co-operation on competition policy’, 
in Philippe Brusick, Ana Maria Alvarez and Lucian Cernat, eds., Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: 
How to Assure Development Gains (New York and Geneva: UN Publications, 2005), 1-36. 
90
 Gal has written numerous thoughtful papers on the topic. See, e.g., ‘Regional Agreements: An Important Step in 
International Antitrust’, 60 University of Toronto Law Journal 239-261 (2010); ‘International antitrust solutions: Discrete 
steps or causally linked?’, in Josef Drexl, Warren Grimes, Clifford Jones, Rudolph Peritz and Edward Swaine, eds., More 
Common Ground for International Competition Law? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 239-260, at 251-260. 
91
 See, e.g., Maher Dabbah, International and Comparative Competition Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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competition law regime par excellence. And the European experience suggests that an indirect, if 
long-term benefit of a successful regional regime is the reinforcement of concurrent national regimes. 
For example, it can no longer be said that the Netherlands is a ‘cartel paradise’.92 Competition 
decisions in the UK are generally (i.e., putting aside extraordinary cases) no longer made according to 
public interest criteria.93 And in France, invigorated public enforcement is matched by a ‘competition 
culture’ that has matured and is now almost taken for granted.94 For its part, and anthropomorphizing a 
bit, the EU may be intoxicated by its own success (the term ‘success’ being necessarily relative given 
Europe’s penchant for existential and constitutional crisis), and may be innately keen to encourage 
international efforts to develop facsimiles or derivatives of EU solutions with varying degrees of 
supranational content.  
While the EU common market and competition model have influenced several groupings to some 
extent, most explicitly so in the case of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 
a quite different model, that of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), has by comparison 
been neglected. The NAFTA Agreement provides for free trade among Canada, Mexico and the U.S., 
but with respect to competition its provisions are unambitious.95 Low-stakes cooperation in the 
NAFTA style also characterizes the South African Development Community (SADC) and the South 
African Customs Union (SACU); but nearly all other regional competition law frameworks have taken 
the EU approach as a source of inspiration (translating it, however, into highly diverse institutional 
structures and competences). The EU has not been a neutral observer of this tendency; to the contrary, 
the EU has financially underwritten some of the regional initiatives, including in particular the 
WAEMU, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Andean 
Community. 
Despite the hopes one may have for regional competition law around the world, it must be 
acknowledged that all of the initiatives, with the exception of the EU itself, have yielded disappointing 
results. This seems to be the clear thrust of recent evaluations.96 The situation is not hopeless. For 
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example, the tensions over jurisdictional claims regarding the application of competition and merger 
control rules by COMESA may be overcome with time and iterative adjustments. And a series of 
lessons may be drawn from the initial regional integration efforts, which may guide reforms in the 
coming years.97 But a note of pessimism is yet in order. With exceptions, the failings of regional 
agreements thus far may be linked to problems that defy any remedy in the medium term. One obvious 
cause of difficulty consists of the resource constraints afflicting the countries and institutions that 
participate in the regional groupings, and the finite well of international solidarity. Some of these 
countries also find themselves in groupings with other countries of radically different character and 
level of development. A still more brutal reality is that many of the latter countries bear the 
unflattering title of ‘basket case’ economies and political regimes, or even borderline failed or failing 
states. Some are rife with corrupt institutions, some are embroiled in civil or international wars or 
conflicts. Many of these regional efforts thus face a grim horizon. Some may yet gain momentum and 
succeed: the current intensification of cooperation within ASEAN, for example, is fuel for rising 
expectations, although that organization too faces formidable challenges.98 Others will likely go 
nowhere. They may have to be reborn or renounced, or they may quietly wither.  
For present purposes, one may simply note that competing models for international cooperation 
were ‘on offer’, and the model promoted by the EU proved to be far more appealing for ‘consumers’ 
worldwide than the available alternative. The general failure of these consumers to use the EU 
prototype in a sufficiently imaginative way, or the failure to realize that local conditions in some areas 
likely required a new prototype or a sufficiently differentiated hybrid, is a separate discussion and is 
omitted here. 
3.4. Competition in competition ideas 
In section 3.1 above, it was suggested that the U.S. and the EU endorsed competing visions for a 
global governance architecture, to use a popular term, in the field of competition law. At a different, 
more traditional level one may observe a competitive struggle concerning the question of how antitrust 
problems should be approached analytically by policy-making and decision-making institutions. This 
friendly rivalry inevitably reflects something of a cleavage in values and prior beliefs, and on each 
side of this cleavage a complex of smaller but significant second-order fault lines may also be found. 
The terms of discourse that follows are limited to ‘approaches’ and ‘models’. Such an analysis can 
only scratch the surface of the discussion surrounding values, beliefs and systems of belief.99 
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3.4.1. The American approach 
In the United States, the Supreme Court and the federal antitrust agencies (not to mention the 
heterogeneous state attorneys general) do not always see eye to eye. Occasionally, for example, a 
federal enforcer will express doubts or criticism regarding a Supreme Court judgment.100 Furthermore, 
while the Supreme Court has shown rather little interest in applying techniques of modern industrial 
economics (particularly where they seem to be merely speculative ‘possibility theorems’, as the 
standard epithet describes them), the high degree of expertise within the federal agencies enables them 
to engage in sophisticated policy prescriptions (as in, e.g., the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines) and sophisticated empirical work in connection with concrete cases (e.g., in challenging 
the Staples/Office Depot merger101). But although a majority of the Supreme Court may sometimes 
lean ‘to the right’ of the agencies, in particular when the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust has 
been appointed by a Democratic President and given the mandatory bipartisan composition of the 
Federal Trade Commission,102 the general paradigms and background assumptions embraced by each 
of these institutions are not very different. In-house, the agencies may engage routinely in game-
theoretic exercises and may explore dynamic competitive effects in great detail, but the point of 
departure when analysing a competition problem is the same question that has been asked throughout 
the 1980s and the 1990s: when assessing competitive effects, what will be the net effect on output?103 
Doubt is resolved in favour of non-intervention, which reflects a faith in the relative superiority of 
markets (vis-à-vis occasionally frail institutions) that remarkably persists even today, dissenters ‘on 
the left’ notwithstanding, within the antitrust milieu.104 This faith is captured in formulas that have 
been fondly recited on occasion by U.S. enforcers, such as ‘First, do no harm’ or ‘Let the markets 
work’.  
The output model, framed by the idea that type I errors are more costly than type II errors,105 and 
that abstention is therefore the proper course when it is not clear – either on ‘per se’ logic or following 
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a (full or truncated) ‘rule of reason’ inquiry – that a practice will lead to a net loss of output, may be 
encapsulated by the term ‘Chicago school antitrust’ (even though Chicago is composed of different 
strands of thought not free of internal tensions). But the idea of a Chicago-based output model must be 
nuanced because an ulterior question can determine non-intervention even where it is found that net 
output would suffer as a result of a given practice. The ulterior question is: even if we can say 
abstractly that certain behaviour can yield either greater or lesser output depending on a variety of 
factors that have to be examined case-by-case, is a typical judge (or a lay jury) capable of engaging in 
such inquiry, admittedly with the aid of an adversarial process, and reaching the right result within a 
tolerable margin of error? In the United States, the approach to the latter question is influenced by the 
consequences of erroneous judgments, as they can by statute lead to heavy civil liability (or to out-of-
court settlements in the shadow of that liability risk). Although this concept of ‘administrability’ – i.e., 
the question of whether tools and concepts (as applied to liability rules but also to remedies) can be 
applied workably in concrete settings – has driven first and foremost the Supreme Court, the federal 
agencies necessarily internalize the concept in their own decision-making. It is remarkable that with 
regard to both values just described (output is to be maximized, and liability rules must be 
administrable), doubt is to be resolved in favour of abstention. Two different ‘schools’ thus have 
common ground to stand on. Bill Kovacic has captured this confluence of ideas with the metaphor of a 
double helix.106 Beyond the pruning of liability rules and the strengthening of procedural filters to 
minimize the number of cases that survive, the double helix is also reflected in the Supreme Court’s 
philosophy of the scope of antitrust: in particular, in sectors governed substantially by regulation, such 
as network industries or markets subject to security laws, antitrust has in effect been relieved from its 
post.107  
To abbreviate, and though certain authors have sometimes used other labels, the U.S. model of 
antitrust can be summed up roughly as an ‘output’ model or a ‘double helix’ model, as nuanced above. 
What of the European Union?  
3.4.2. Europe’s approach(es) 
Here too, distinctions should be drawn between the way EU competition law is understood by the EU 
Courts, and especially the ECJ, and the way it is understood by the ‘agency’, i.e., the European 
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Commission.108 A further distinction may be made with respect to the authors of the competition rules 
contained in the Treaty of Rome, today known as the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. At least traditionally there has been a widespread belief in Europe that the competition rules 
were of ordoliberal content.109 There are good reasons to doubt that the shaping of the competition 
rules was driven solely by ordoliberal ideas. More accurately, their genesis reflected a compromise 
between very different competition-related values (e.g., on the one hand the desire to have an 
‘economic constitution’ protecting economic liberty against coercion from private and public sources 
of power, and on the other hand the desire to promote industrial upsizing, efficient production and 
global competitiveness).110 However, those who underline the ordoliberal character of European 
competition law are on firmer ground when referring to the policies and agency culture of DG IV 
within the European Commission, in particular during the period from the 1960s through the 1980s.111  
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Since the 1990s, DG IV (now DG Competition) has absorbed many influences that have shaped its 
policies. It has drawn eclectically on ‘modern’ approaches that it perceives to be consistent with its 
mission as a competition enforcer. Famously, it decided to break with old institutional habits and to 
turn toward a ‘more economic’ approach,112 a vague expression which has at least two related 
dimensions. First, in (i) selecting and de-selecting cases, (ii) resolving or settling selected cases, and 
(iii) building policy approaches, DG Competition has embraced tenets and techniques associated with 
certain branches of economic theory and research. Since the late 1990s, for example, its policies on the 
control of vertical agreements have been palpably influenced by transaction cost economics. And DG 
Comp has been open to the theoretical advances of post-Chicago industrial organization studies. Post-
Chicago concerns regarding unilateral conduct, vertical foreclosure in general, and, in the field of 
horizontal merger control (and like the U.S. agencies), unilateral effects from concentrations in 
differentiated markets, have shaped both the policies and practice of the Commission. A second 
dimension of the ‘more economic’ approach concerns the choice of policy objectives.113 In a move of 
both practical and symbolic significance, the Commission, particularly under the leadership of Mario 
Monti and Neelie Kroes, adopted ‘consumer welfare’ as its magnetic North. Consumer welfare, 
however, can be understood in different ways.114 In the U.S., consumer welfare is sometimes 
confusingly used as a synonym for the (generally short-run) welfare of society as a whole.115 As used 
in the EU, the standard view is that the term consumer welfare reflects a criterion of distributive 
justice116 and tends to denote a narrower concept in which producer welfare is important but ultimately 
of a lower rank.117 Truer to its name, consumer welfare thus does not refer to an ‘output’ model but to 
a long-run consumer welfare criterion more consistent with the idea of a dynamic ‘competitive 
process’ in which potential threats to competition, such as where new entrants or ‘mavericks’ might be 
suppressed or brought to heel, are treated seriously. The idea that defending the ‘competitive process’ 
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in the sense of maintaining ongoing rivalry and an ‘effective competition structure’118 (which today is 
often linked to competition from hypothetical equally-efficient rivals as opposed to competition from 
all comers irrespective of relative efficiency119) takes precedence over short-term efficiency gains is 
thought to be consistent with the Treaty; and at the same time it may preserve some (limited) degree of 
continuity with DG Comp’s ‘ordoliberal’ past, in which the policy paradigm depended on the 
conception of competition as a dynamic process (which in turn is partly informed by the notion of 
competition as a discovery procedure). The Commission’s interest in post-Chicago approaches and its 
tendency to avoid overvaluing short-term efficiency gains results in a greater readiness to intervene in 
competition cases, and implicitly signals a greater faith in its own relative ability to secure desired 
outcomes compared to the ability of ‘the market’ to do so. In this regard the Commission’s slogan, 
‘making markets work better’120 (emphasis added), is quite telling.  
Finally, there are the EU Courts, and in particular the ECJ. Contrary to what is sometimes loosely 
asserted, the idea that the Court was in its heyday (or was then and still is) an ordoliberal institution 
has never been convincingly established.121 It is submitted, rather, that perhaps with some exceptions 
any ordoliberal-inflected judgments of the Court were produced not on any endogenous basis resting 
on the identity or predilections of the judges individually or collectively, but rather because a 
disposition of a given case that was consistent with ordoliberal views fit well under the circumstances 
with the Court’s vision of the Treaty, in particular its free movement and competition rules and 
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 The ‘competitive process’ idea seems necessarily to require an approach to competition law that is sensitive to market 
structure, but any parallel to be drawn with the ‘structure-conduct-performance’ paradigm (pioneered and pursued by 
economists such as Edward Mason, Joe Bain, Corwin Edwards, Carl Kaysen and economist/lawyer Don Turner among 
others) must be qualified because of the generally static conception of the latter, from which the former diverges entirely. 
See, e.g. (in English), Erich Hoppmann, ‘The Development of an Idea on the Norm for a Policy of Competition’, 13 
Antitrust Bulletin 61-82 (1968); and for a concise account, Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, European 
Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective, 2nd edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 89-90 (also 
referring to post-Hoppmann approaches that differ on details). The idea of the competitive process is closely linked to 
that of the ‘freedom to compete’, or Wettbewerbsfreiheit. A recent description is provided in Roger Zäch and Adrian 
Künzler, ‘Freedom to Compete or Consumer Welfare: The Goal of Competition Law according to Constitutional Law’, 
in Zäch, Heinemann and Kellerhaus, eds., The Development of Competition Law, cited above note 14, 61-83. As the 
authors state, “[t]he goal of competition law […] is to ensure the freedom to compete of individuals and thus to safeguard 
the competitive process”. Ibid at 61. The freedom to compete then “generally leads to competition and competition leads 
to an efficient allocation of resources and thus to consumer welfare”. Ibid. Although it appears that protecting the 
freedom to compete is “thus to safeguard the competitive process”, this can be understood the other way around: if the 
competitive process is protected then individuals are guaranteed the possibility to exercise their economic liberty. But the 
central point for the European ‘efficiency versus freedom’ debate is that consumer welfare is expected to be no more 
than, and no less than, an anticipated by-product of the freedom to compete paradigm. For a discussion of varying views 
within the economic freedom tradition, see Lianos, ‘Some reflections’, cited above note 99, at 30-36.  
119
 Traces of the idea that foreclosure of equally efficient competitors may deserve closer scrutiny because their exclusion 
has more serious consequences for consumers may be seen in its earlier case law, but the ECJ now seems to be 
embracing the idea more firmly. See Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555 (various 
paragraphs); Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527 (various paragraphs); Case C-
209/10, Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECR I-000, not yet reported, paras. 21, 25 and 38). As a matter of 
policy, the Commission takes a similar position but nevertheless reserves for itself some room for manoeuvre in cases 
where dominant firm conduct threatens to expel from the market a less efficient rival whose presence is apt to lead to a 
more competitive outcome relative to the counterfactual. See Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement 
priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, [2009] OJ 
C45/7, para. 24 (“The Commission will take a dynamic view of [the constraint imposed by the less efficient rival], given 
that in the absence of an abusive practice such a competitor may benefit from demand-related advantages, such as 
network and learning effects, which will tend to enhance its efficiency.”). 
120
 This motto appears prominently on the Commission’s competition home page. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html.  
121
 A recent review of the ECJ’s antitrust jurisprudence rejects the notion that the Court has been concerned with the 
(German and Hayek-derived) concept of a ‘freedom to compete’ (see above note 118), which is an important but not the 
only version of an ordoliberal programme. See Pinar Akman, ‘The role of ‘freedom’ in EU competition law’, 34 Legal 
Studies 183-213 (2014).  
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associated doctrines such as the ‘effet utile’ of those rules, and of European integration. Here one 
could cite judgments such as those in Continental Can, Dassonville and perhaps Säger and France v 
Commission.122 It must be added, though, that in recent years the ECJ has embraced a notion which, 
among other interpretations, may appear to be compatible with ordoliberal thought. It is the idea that 
the EU legal order must protect competition “as such (as an institution)”.123 When taken literally, this 
idea seems to transform competition from a medium through which ulterior values such as social 
welfare or consumer welfare are pursued into a self-justifying end goal. The adoption of the ‘as such’ 
formula by the Court in its T-Mobile judgment124 may have seemed to vindicate, to some extent, the 
popular criticism that the ECJ was an ‘ordoliberal’ Court and was therefore (i) biased against concepts 
such as anticompetitive foreclosure, whereby foreclosure would only be a concern if the excluded rival 
were efficient, since otherwise consumers would not in general be any worse off, and (ii) biased, more 
generally, against any tradeoffs between liberty and efficiency.125 It is not clear that ordoliberalism is 
really at play here,126 but it is clear that there is a concern for market structure and for the plight of at 
least some competitors and some consumers, all of which if interpreted in a certain way can be 
reconstructed, by those who wish to do so, as being part of an ordoliberal approach. In any event, the 
ECJ’s preoccupation with competition ‘as such’ now seems to be a staple of Article 101 
jurisprudence.127 In the context of Article 102 the Court has not (yet) seized the opportunity to 
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 Respectively: Case 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215; Case 8/74, Procureur du 
Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837; Case C-76/90, Säger v Dennemeyer & Co Ltd [1991] ECR I-4221; Case C-202/88, 
France v Commission [1991] ECR I-1223. 
123
 This formula originated in the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-95/04 P, British Airways plc v Commission 
[2007] ECR I-2331, paras. 68, 86 and 125 of the Opinion. As the Advocate General states in para. 68: “Article [102 
TFEU], like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests 
of individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as an 
institution), which has already been weakened by the presence of the dominant undertaking on the market.” (Emphasis in 
original; citations to case law omitted.) The foregoing quote, which on the surface appears to reflect an ordoliberal 
commitment to competition’s ‘constitutional’ nature, should be considered in light of the text that immediately follows in 
the same paragraph: “In this way [i.e., by protecting competition as such], consumers are also indirectly protected. 
Because where competition as such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared.” The latter idea – that 
the structure of the market is protected in pursuit of an ulterior objective (i.e., the avoidance of consumer disadvantage) – 
appears to be at odds with the standard ordoliberal view that consumer benefits, while important, materialize as a 
subsidiary by-product of the competitive process (see above note 118). Similarly, the counterintuitive idea that the 
‘competition as such’ imperative in fact instrumentalizes competition in service of efficient resource allocation and the 
diverse aims of the EU has been noted as a plausible interpretation. See Lianos, ‘Some reflections’, cited above note 99, 
at 53.  
124
 Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV and others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit 
[2009] ECR I-4529, para. 38: “[A]s the Advocate General pointed out at point 58 of her Opinion, [Article 101 TFEU], 
like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is designed to protect not only the immediate interests of individual 
competitors or consumers but also to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such.” For her part, 
Advocate General Kokott had directly transposed to the instant case the “as such (as an institution)” concept that she had 
announced in British Airways (quoted in the previous footnote). Paragraph 58 of her Opinion in T-Mobile Netherlands 
states: “[Article 101 TFEU], like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or primarily to protect the 
immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus 
competition as such (as an institution). In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected. Because where competition 
as such is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared.” (Emphasis in original.) 
125
 However, the Court in British Airways also confirmed that dominant firms could come forward in Article 102 cases with 
evidence of efficiencies counterbalancing the anticompetitive effects of their behaviour. See British Airways, ibid., para. 
86. 
126
 There is a risk that the “as such (as an institution)” language will be decontextualized. See above note 124, particularly 
where Kokott’s coda to the quoted language appears.  
127
 See Cases C-501/06 P etc., GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2009] ECR I-9291, para. 63 (“like other 
competition rules laid down in the Treaty, Article [101 TFEU] aims to protect not only the interests of competitors or of 
consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition as such”); Case C-68/12, Protimonopolný 
úrad Slovenskej republiky v Slovenská sporiteľňa a.s., judgment of the ECJ of 7 February 2013, not yet reported, para. 
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‘reimport’ the ‘competition as such’ logic, even if it is where firms are dominant that the presumed 
‘weakness’ of the market structure is most likely to be a concern.128 An opportunity for such a 
‘reimport’ presented itself in a 2012 case that attracted some attention, but the Court took a different 
tack and proceeded to clarify that Article 102 in no way precludes dominant companies from 
competing ‘on the merits’.129 This normally ambiguous phrase – on the merits – is now defined by the 
ECJ as competition on the basis of features appreciated by consumers: better offers in terms of price, 
quality, choice and innovation.130 The fate of the ‘competition as such’ concept remains to be seen, 
and the Court might well decide to incorporate it within its Article 102 case law (rather than allowing 
the apparent asymmetry of the two fields to persist). But whether it is ‘competition as such’ or 
‘competition on the merits’ as now defined (or an awkward admixture of the two) that guides the 
Court’s future jurisprudence, neither concept is likely to alter the Court’s trademark approach in cases 
where agreements or practices have the actual or potential impact of dividing the internal market along 
territorial lines coinciding with national borders.131 Here all bets are off, and the integrationist 
‘genome’ of the Treaty will in most cases pre-determine the outcome. In the absence of very 
exceptional circumstances any practice that significantly hinders the free movement of goods or 
services will be held unlawful. This special and crucial zone of jurisprudence also aligns the Court, for 
‘exogenous’ rather than ‘endogenous’ reasons, with the ordoliberal idea that public and private 
constraints on economic liberty must be prevented or dismantled.  
While the US model can be reduced either to the words ‘output model’, which is simplistic but on 
the whole reasonably accurate, or to the more nuanced ‘double helix’ model, it is more difficult to 
capture the EU model in a short phrase, especially since it may be an amalgamation of several models. 
A point of departure is that EU competition law is not statutory law subject to lex posterior derogat, 
but ‘primary’ law. It is elevated, in material though not formal terms to the rank of constitutional law 
(since by judicial interpretation the Treaty, materially but not formally, establishes a constitutional 
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18. Similarly, see Case T-461/07, Visa Europe and Visa International Service v Commission [2011] ECR II-1729, para. 
126 (interests of competitors and of consumers, the structure of the market and “competition as such”).  
128
 The conventional judicial wisdom has been that, in Europe, dominant firms have a ‘special responsibility’ not to distort 
competition any more than the very existence of the dominant position has already distorted it. This line of thinking is 
sometimes portrayed as quite innocuous but it seems to establish a kind of informal and unconscious suspicion of 
aggressive competitive behaviour by dominant firms; it has occasionally led to dangerous conclusions. For example, in 
Case T-201/04, Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para. 664, the then-Court of First Instance stated that 
“Microsoft impaired the effective competitive structure on the work group server operating systems market by acquiring 
a significant market share on that market”. This improvident remark, when taken literally, evinces a gross 
misunderstanding of Article 102, under which a firm can by no means infringe the provision merely by gaining market 
share or even growing to become a monopoly in a given market. For further discussion of the ‘special responsibility’ 
doctrine, see Kathryn McMahon, 'A Reformed Approach to Article 82 and the Special Responsibility Not To Distort 
Competition', in Ariel Ezrachi, ed., Article 82 EC: Reflections on its Recent Evolution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 
121-145.  
129
 Case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, cited above note 119, paras. 22 and 25. See also para. 21. For 
discussion of Post Danmark, see Ekaterina Rousseva and Mel Marquis, ‘Hell Freezes Over: A Climate Change for 
Assessing Exclusionary Conduct under Article 102 TFEU’, 4 Journal of European Competition Law and Policy 32-50 
(2013). While the judgment is welcomed as a positive development, Rousseva and Marquis point out at pp. 47-48 that the 
case law of the ECJ seems to be moving simultaneously in different directions, particularly when its jurisprudence on 
conditional rebates granted by dominant firms is taken into account. It appears likely that the Court will have the 
opportunity to rectify this, or to fail to do so, within a few years.  
130
 See Post Danmark, ibid., para. 22.  
131
 As Barry Hawk said, the aim to establish and maintain a single market was the “first principle” of European competition 
law. As Arved Deringer said, impeding market integration was a “basic sin”. See for references Clifford Jones, ‘The 
Second Devolution of European Competition Law: Empowering National Courts, National Authorities, and Private 
Litigants in the Expanding European Union’, presented at the European Union Studies Association Conference, 
Nashville, Tennessee, 29 March 2003, http://aei.pitt.edu/2882/, at 3. Many have written about the centrality of the market 
integration objective in the sphere of EEC/EC/EU competition law. For a recent summary, see Lianos, ‘Some 
reflections’, cited above note 99, at 17-19.  
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order).132 This implies, among other things, that from a legal point of view, and contrary to the U.S. 
position (see above), it would be entirely objectionable if the Court of Justice were to hold simply that 
the presence of sector-specific regulation renders application of the EU competition rules in the given 
sector redundant or wasteful. To the contrary, in the EU system, competition rules co-habit with 
regulation (whether of national or EU legislative origin), and will generally take precedence in case of 
conflict.133 The rules can be applied in particular where, for example for public choice reasons,134 such 
regulation is incompatible with the competition rules or where a regulatory system has failed, 
systematically or as applied in a given case.135 This system of hierarchy follows from basic principles 
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 The premise here that while the Sherman Act may be a potent social symbol it is not legally imbued with constitutional 
status may be contrasted with the less orthodox view presented in Roger Zäch and Adrian Künzler, ‘Freedom to Compete 
or Consumer Welfare: The Goal of Competition Law according to Constitutional Law’, in Zäch, Heinemann and 
Kellerhaus, eds., The Development of Competition Law, cited above note 14, 61-83. According to Zäch and Künzler, 
antitrust legislation in the U.S. “came to be viewed as a charter of freedom on a par with the Bill of Rights. The 
constitutional status of American anti-trust legislation is emphasized in the paradigmatic arguments of the US Supreme 
Court ruling in the case of United States v Topco Associates: ‘Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in 
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our 
free enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom 
guaranteed each and every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete […]’ The goal of [the Sherman Act, 
as amended by the Clayton Act] is to protect the individual’s freedom to compete. In contrast, consumer welfare as such 
is not mentioned. Thus the legislation correctly implemented the constitutional mandate.” Ibid. at 65-66.  
 From the standpoint of constitutional law, it cannot be concluded that the lush language used by the Supreme Court in 
Topco elevated the Sherman Act to the rank of constitutional law, or even to any intermediate super-statutory status. 
First, as a matter of context, and putting aside the obiter nature of the quote (and putting aside the Court’s studied neglect 
of the judgment in its later case law on horizontal restraints), Justice Marshall in Topco spoke for five justices; Chief 
Justice Burger dissented, Justice Blackmun concurred only in the result (not the reasoning), and neither Powell nor 
Rehnquist participated in the judgment. Against that background, consider a case decided shortly after Topco but before 
the Court’s volte face in the well-known Sylvania case in 1977. Specifically, in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 
Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 685-686 (1975), the same Supreme Court justices (but with Powell and Rehnquist this time) held 
unanimously that a law adopted by Congress after it adopted the Sherman Act – in this case the Securities and Exchange 
Act of 1934 – had repealed the Sherman Act insofar as SEC implementing regulations allowed a stock exchange to 
determine the commissions charged by member brokerage firms; in essence, the Congress was thereby able to carve out 
an exemption for such an agreement, which otherwise would have been per se illegal, from the application of Section 1 
of the Sherman Act. There is a conspicuous absence of the Magna Carta language of Topco, or of any comparable 
language, and the Sherman Act was treated as an ordinary statute. Several other (and more recent) examples of both 
express and implied repeal of the Sherman Act by the Congress – including even the Clayton Act itself, which trimmed 
the scope of the Sherman Act in relation to labor unions and agriculture – could be mentioned. See further Ginsburg and 
Haar, ‘Resolving Conflicts between Competition and Other Values’, cited above note 107.  
133
 There is a well-known derogation for services of general economic interest, but it does not apply automatically and it 
does not entail sector-wide exemptions. Indeed, the sectoral exemptions (or partial exemptions) that apply today under 
EU law are comparatively few. The Euratom Treaty creates a special regime in the field of non-military use of nuclear 
materials, but this does not establish a blanket exemption for the nuclear industry; in light of Article 106a(3) Euratom, 
and despite a textual deletion made by the Treaty of Lisbon, Euratom precludes the application of the TFEU competition 
rules where supply or pricing activities are specifically regulated under the latter Treaty (agreements concerning the 
supply of nuclear equipment and agreements between producers of nuclear materials are not so regulated). The TFEU 
establishes partial derogations for agriculture and transport (where secondary law is relevant) and for military equipment. 
Secondary law establishes limited exemptions in the insurance and motor vehicle sectors. To consult the relevant 
provisions, see Commission, Rules Applicable to Antitrust Enforcement, Volume III: Sector Specific Rules (2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/handbook_vol_3_en.pdf.  
134
 See, e.g., Heimler, ‘Competition Policy as a Tool of EU Foreign Policy’, cited above note 40 (highlighting the option of 
insulating competition law from the vagaries and distributional effects of special interest politics by way of 
constitutionalizing competition rules framed in general terms, as the Treaty of Rome does (and citing the ‘Hilmer 
Report’: Frederick Hilmer et al., National Competition Policy (Australian Government, 1993), available at 
http://ncp.ncc.gov.au/docs/National%20Competition%20Policy%20Review%20report,%20The%20Hilmer%20Report,%
20August%201993.pdf)).  
135
 If the regulation (or the relevant public authority’s decision) has the effect of removing an undertaking’s autonomy so 
that the undertaking is essentially compelled to act contrary to the competition rules, the undertaking will legally be free 
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of EU law.136 Sometimes, in discussions of institutional design the crucial question of the rank that 
should be assigned to competition law is neglected,137 but this simple example of differences in the 
scope of U.S. law and that of EU law underlines the importance of that issue. Moving beyond the 
matters of scope and hierarchies of norms, Eleanor Fox emphasizes that EU competition law protects 
rivalry and ‘openness’ of markets,138 and in doing so she describes the enforcement tendency without 
needing to identify the underlying philosophy. It is sometimes said that Europe embraces a 
‘competitive process’ model,139 but this immediately poses difficulties because in the US, the term 
‘competitive process’ has very different, often Darwinist connotations linked closely to short-term 
welfare and output.140 For that matter, this problem of language is being compounded in the sense that 
the protection of an ‘effective competitive process’ has become a popular formulation of competition 
law objectives for a variety of jurisdictions and is thus becoming increasingly entrenched, as seen in 
the work of the ICN.141  
Perhaps a way to avoid that confusion, which has already caused significant damage, is to say that 
EU competition law is driven by a ‘dynamic competitive process’ model. But EU competition law is 
ultimately inseparable from the Treaty in which it is embedded (whose character is revealed through 
the Court’s well-known canons of interpretation, including selectively applied teleology142). From the 
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of fault but the Treaty rules may nevertheless potentially apply as against the author of the regulation (or the against the 
authority, as the case may be).  
136
 See Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom, cited above note 119; Damien Geradin, ‘Limiting the Scope of Article 82 of the 
EC Treaty: What can the EU learn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s Judgment in Trinko in the wake of Microsoft, IMS, and 
Deutsche Telekom?’, 41 Common Market Law Review 1519-1553 (2004), at 1549; Pierre Larouche, ‘Contrasting legal 
solutions and the comparability of EU and US experiences’, in François Lévêque and Howard Shelanski, eds., Antitrust 
and Regulation in the EU and US (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009) 76-100, at 84-86; Alexandre de Streel, 
‘Background Paper’ in OECD, The Regulated Conduct Defence, DAF/COMP(2011)3 (September 2011), 21-54, at 39-40 
(Box 3); G. Monti, ‘Unilateral conduct’, cited above note 6, at 355; Ginsburg and Haar, ‘Resolving Conflicts between 
Competition and Other Values’, cited above note 107, at footnote 13 and accompanying text. For further discussion on 
the relationship between the EU competition rules and sectoral regulation, see, e.g., Alexandre de Streel, ‘Interaction 
between the Competition Rules and Sector-Specific Regulation’, in Laurent Garzaniti and Matthew O’Regan, 
Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Internet - EU Competition Law and Regulation, 3rd edition (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2010) 867-885. 
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 One can appreciate the pragmatic reasons for this neglect. Constitutional reform tends to be a rare event, and building up 
the necessary momentum to reform a constitution merely to embed competition rules within it is not realistic. Any such 
reforms would normally have to accompany wider discussion of constitutional change. Furthermore, the conventional 
idea of constitutional law tends to pre-suppose that the rule of law is firmly in place, which is certainly not universally so. 
138
 Eleanor Fox, ‘We Protection Competition, You Protect Competitors’, 26 World Competition 149-165 (2003), section III. 
This is a recurring theme in Fox’s work. See, e.g., ‘The Efficiency Paradox’, cited above note 104, at 86; ‘Linked-In’, 
cited above note 39, at 153 (the European institutions protect “dynamic rivalry, market access, and the competitive 
structure of the market”).  
139
 See above note 118. 
140
 One way to underline the difference in usage is to note that in the EU, the term ‘competitive process’ is used when an 
authority seeks to intervene, whereas in the US the term is more often used to caution against false convictions in cases of 
aggressive market conduct. By way of digression, protecting the competitive process in the EU context must be 
reconciled with the prohibition of excessive prices under the EU case law, whereas even the highest monopoly prices 
cannot be touched by Section 2 of the Sherman Act outside the realm of de facto essential facility cases. Although it may 
not be immediately obvious how the excessive pricing offence can fit with the competitive process paradigm, one could 
say that an appropriate remedy in such a case under Article 102 TFEU is the dismantling of (artificial) entry barriers that 
enable the dominant firm to charge exorbitant prices. Such a remedy would then permit the competitive process to 
reassert itself.  
141
 See G. Monti, ‘Unilateral conduct’, cited above note 6, at 352-354 (discussing the ICN Report on the Objectives of 
Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-created Monopolies of 2007, 
and noting the language difficulty). 
142
 See, e.g., Joxerramon Bengoetxea, The Legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice: towards a European 
jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 233-270 (discussing the Court’s various interpretive techniques). The 
idea that the Court uses teleological reasoning selectively may arguably be supported by its recourse to literalism in some 
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point of view of the ECJ, the objectives of the competition rules must be situated coherently within the 
objectives pursued by the Treaty as a whole.143 Therefore, even the designation ‘dynamic competitive 
process’ is a simplification that should be used with caution. An alternative term that has been put 
forward aspirationally is ‘holistic’ competition law.144 This too calls for caution, as holism might be 
overinclusive and could be turned into an epithet by critics quick to equate a complex goal structure 
with rule by expansive discretion, unpredictability, and errors in both directions resulting in 
overdeterrence as well as underdeterrence. 
3.4.3. Competition between the American and European approaches to competition law 
The US model (emphasizing outcomes first and last) and the more complicated EU model (treating 
outcomes as important but giving process the final word) are rivalrous and ultimately, it would seem, 
irreconcilable145 – even if in general they may converge on case results.146 How have the two models 
fared? It may come as no surprise that the European Community/European Union model of 
competition law has enjoyed far more success on the ‘market’ than has the U.S. model. Although 
further research should detail jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction why the ‘output’ or ‘double helix’ has not 
been more readily accepted in the majority of jurisdictions worldwide, the general reasons may be 
stated without difficulty. In the 1970s, when antitrust was transformed in the U.S., the few 
jurisdictions elsewhere with fully functional competition law systems (essentially, Germany and the 
European Economic Community147) already had intellectual foundations underpinning their 
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instances. See ibid. at 234-237. Many other studies are devoted to the styles of reasoning employed by the ECJ. See, e.g., 
Anthony Arnull, The European Court of Justice, 2nd edition (Oxford: OUP, 2006), chapter 13. 
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 For a recent statement of the systematic interpretation argument, particularly with reference to the post-Lisbon era, see 
Suzanne Kingston, ‘Competition and Environmental Protection: A Case of Ne’er the Twain Shall Meet?’, in Lowe and 
Marquis, eds., Competition, Regulation and Public Policies, cited above note 36. The significance of new or altered 
provisions in the Lisbon Treaty has been observed by other scholars as well. See, e.g., Ioannis Lianos and Arianna 
Andreangeli, ‘The European Union: The Competition Law System and the Union’s Norms’, in Fox and Trebilcock, eds., 
The Design of Competition Law Institutions, cited above note 36, 384-443, at 406-407.  
144
 See Lianos, ‘Some reflections’, cited above note 99, at 47-62. 
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 Cf. G. Monti, ‘Unilateral conduct’, cited above note 6, at 353 (referring to a “fundamental schism” between “those who 
believe that one should merely protect the process and not consider the likely outcomes (on the basis that beneficial 
outcomes will result provided we ensure markets remain competitive) and those who think that absent proof of 
anticompetitive effects in terms of higher prices or reduced output, one is likely to over-enforce the law, reducing 
economic welfare” (footnote omitted)).  
146
 Notwithstanding the relevant differences, Monti warns against assuming that a welfare-driven approach and a European 
‘traditionalist’ approach will diverge on outcomes; such will be the case only on the margins. See Monti, ‘EU 
Competition Law from Rome to Lisbon – Social Market Economy’, in Caroline Heide-Jorgensen, Christian Bergqvist, 
Ulla Neergard and Sune Troels Poulsen, eds., Aims and Values in Competition Law (Copenhagen: DJøF Forlag, 2013) 
27-66, at 45 (“Three beliefs underpin the traditionalist response: first, economic freedom is more important than 
efficiency; second, monopoly is less likely to yield economic benefit than competition; third, it is hard to predict all 
welfare effects. This is the essence of the difference, which will arise only rarely.” (footnote omitted) Monti’s example of 
where outcomes would diverge is a proposed ‘merger to monopoly’ that would be efficient inasmuch as it would reduce 
the production costs of the merged entity, which then may or may not entail reduced prices for consumers. Clearly, 
‘traditionalists’ would decline to approve such a merger, whereas adherents of the efficiency paradigm would merely 
insist on rigorous evidence of the claimed efficiencies. This example highlights the fact that a pure efficiency approach, 
as opposed to a genuine consumer welfare approach, omits or at least yields to other policy domains the additional 
distributive question of whether consumers will truly benefit from the efficiencies gained as a result of the merger. The 
assumption, rather, is that society will be better off when such efficient elimination of rivalry is allowed.  
147
 In Japan, the JFTC in the 1970s reasserted itself and began to make a rather dramatic impact (until competition policy 
faded again in the 1980s), but nevertheless it would be a stretch to characterize Japanese competition law even in the 
1970s as fully functional. There were other competition law regimes in place in the 1970s, of course, but each was held 
back by a variety of factors such as faulty legislative drafting, institutional and political economy factors, overbroad 
exemptions and so on. For example, competition law enforcement in India under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act 1969 was notoriously weak. Another example is Australia, where, despite competition rules going back to 
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competition law paradigm which precluded a reductionist output model. In the 1980s and especially 
the 1990s, when interest in competition law around the world began to surge, the countries adopting 
new competition laws – mostly developing countries – realized that their needs and background 
conditions were quite different from those of the U.S. As Dan Crane suggests, for example, “many 
developing countries weren’t ready to adopt an antitrust policy that seemed designed to do very 
little”.148 Crane adds that the EU “arguably filled the gap and became a much more important source 
of ideas for developing antitrust regimes like China, India, South Africa, and Brazil”.149 Eleanor Fox – 
who was herself instrumental in the early development of the competition laws of certain developing 
countries such as South Africa – shares Crane’s assessment: “The EU has a more copious view than 
the U.S. of harm to competition. It seeks to preserve competitive rivalry in concentrated markets and 
to safeguard openness and access (albeit sometimes without a sufficient rudder). Openness of markets 
is in the DNA of Europe. EU law is more sympathetic to economies that have suffered severe 
blockage of markets as a result of pervasive state ownership, privilege, cronyism, and 
discrimination.”150 Of course, the U.S. has not failed in all respects when promoting competition 
policy ideas. The use of leniency programmes by competition agencies worldwide in their efforts to 
detect cartels, and the punishment of cartels by sanctions of ‘felony’ rather than ‘misdemeanor’ 
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1906, enforcement under the amended Trade Practices Act 1974 did not gain strong momentum until the 1990s (largely 
by virtue of the recommendations in the 1993 Hilmer Report, cited above note 134).  
148
 Crane, ‘Interview with Eleanor Fox: Networking the world’, Concurrences No 4-2011, at 2. It is likely that Crane’s 
words, “designed to do very little”, are deliberately caricaturized in order to capture popular perceptions of the Chicago 
school that might colour its image abroad. In the first place, it has been argued that Chicago’s normative edifice was not 
‘designed’ but was (re)constructed following successive analyses of antitrust-relevant business practices conducted by, 
above all, Aaron Director and his students and associates in the 1950s and 1960s. See Richard Posner, ‘The Chicago 
School of Antitrust Analysis’, 127 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 925-948 (1979) at 926; William Page, ‘The 
Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency’, 75 
Virginia Law Review 1221-1308 (1989), at 1228. (That seems to be a valid argument as far as the grand Chicago 
syntheses of Posner and Bork are concerned: these were achieved in 1976 and 1978.) Second, the question of whether 
Chicago antitrust essentially prescribes agency inaction (outside of cartel enforcement) and presumptive case dismissal of 
private claims depends on which of its adherents is taken to be its spokesman: Posner, whom Crane calls a ‘Chicago 
School centrist’, has by no means pleaded for a hands-off antitrust policy. See Daniel Crane, ‘Chicago, Post-Chicago, and 
Neo-Chicago’, 76 University of Chicago Law Review 1911-1933 (2009), at 1917-1918 (enumerating fact patterns to 
which Posner has suggested antitrust liability rules are relevant).  
149
 Crane, ‘Interview’, cited previous footnote, at 2. Michal Gal and Jorge Padilla provide evidence of this in ‘The Follower 
Phenomenon: Implications for Design of Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy’, 76 Antitrust Law Journal 899-928 
(2010), at 903 and 920 (at least 43 jurisdictions have “copied” the EU’s prohibition on the abuse of dominance). Cf. 
Heimler and Mehta, ‘Monopolization in developing countries’, cited above note 105 (noting the popularity among 
developing countries of an abuse of dominance provision that can be applied to excessive pricing scenarios, unlike 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act; but also highlighting that developing countries have followed the UNCTAD model law, 
which also covers compulsory contract terms that may directly or indirectly limit competitors). Of course, it is not taken 
for granted that the literal replication of a foreign provision of law such as Article 102 TFEU reliably indicates that its 
interpretation and enforcement will parallel or even compare with the emulated jurisdiction, not least because the 
institutions responsible for these tasks are different (i.e., legislators are not normally charged with interpreting or 
applying the law). Nevertheless, the notable frequency of the ‘grafting’ of the EU rule seems significant. In some cases, 
Article 102 may have been perceived as attractive on the strength of its own apparent merits and accepted spontaneously. 
In other areas, its acceptance likely reflects active promotion by the EU, including by way of bargaining and/or 
conditionality.  
150
 ‘Interview’, ibid. at 3. With regard to the way US antitrust is perceived from the outside, see David Gerber, Global 
Competition, cited above note 4, at 204 (“US experience has long been at the center of the competition law story, but the 
path of US antitrust law development and the set of issues included within it appear narrow from a global perspective. In 
comparison with European experience and issues, they often have limited relevance to decision makers in other countries 
and to the issues of global competition law development that many others consider important.”). Further discussion is 
provided in ibid. at 160-161 (pointing to factors that make the EU experience resonate more with numerous other 
jurisdictions, including, for example: the history of state ownership and privilege mentioned by Fox; the use of 
competition law to oppose excessive economic power; Europe’s civil law tradition and its clearer dividing line between 
public and private law institutions; and the role competition law has played in Europe’s process of political and economic 
integration). 
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intensity, seem to be quite successful U.S. exports,151 even though the criminal law gambit for cartel 
conduct remains immature or embryonic in most ‘importing’ jurisdictions due to institutional 
impediments and/or reasons of culture.152 Another idea that the U.S. has pushed with some success (in 
Europe and elsewhere) is that, as alluded to above, outside of hard core categories of irredeemable 
conduct – horizontal price fixing, market sharing, bidrigging and the like – competition problems 
should be resolved only after an assessment of their competitive effects has been conducted.153 
Nevertheless, by and large the picture presented by Crane and Fox rings true: the EU-oriented ideas of 
open market maintenance and faith in prophylactic market intervention by public institutions have 
been broadly accepted worldwide; the Chicago model has in general been studied more for its pitfalls 
than for its accuracy and appropriateness. Lest we leave the impression that the EU paradigm is a 
universally irresistible model, however, it may be added that many developing countries are searching 
for a competition policy that goes beyond that of the EU. The overriding imperative for these countries 
is economic development. Competition law is often seen as a tool of development policy insofar as 
having such a law in place can support growth,154 and of wealth redistribution insofar as it can 
                                                     
151
 It has been explained that beginning in the 1990s and roughly through 2001, while the U.S. succeeded in stirring up 
worldwide interest in the fight against cartels and secured at the OECD a 1998 Council Recommendation against ‘hard 
core’ cartels, the substantive areas to which the European Community had been seeking to draw attention – abuse of 
dominance and vertical restraints – faded into the background. See Fox, ‘Linked-In’, cited above note 39, at 156-157. In 
footnote 17 of her article, Fox describes this turn of events as a U.S. ‘victory’. If this process is seen as a global struggle, 
one might also say that it reflected externally Europe’s introspective modernization experience in the 1990s. That is to 
say, seeds had already been sown which eventually led to the European Commission to reassess priorities internally and 
to devote far more attention to hard core cartels than to vertical restraints. Arguably, this means that the ‘victory’ 
dynamic to which Fox refers partly manifested itself earlier, not so much in the global antitrust discourse but in complex 
diffusion elements that more directly concerned the interplay between U.S. and EEC/EC antitrust (which cannot be 
explained adequately in the context of this essay). The story with regard to abuse of dominance problems is somewhat 
more complicated, and this is where the ‘victory’ is arguably most apparent, as non-interventionism in this regard 
probably did not reflect the preferences of the EC/EU even taking account of its internal evolution and investigations.  
152
 See Harry First, ‘Your Money and Your Life: The Export of U.S. Antitrust Remedies’, in Sokol, Cheng and Lianos, eds., 
Competition Law and Development, cited above note 3, 167-181 (discussing institutional variations in criminal penalties 
in a sample of 13 jurisdictions and noting that, with exceptions, few price fixers really go to jail outside the U.S.); Donald 
Baker, ‘Trying to Use Criminal Law and Incarceration to Punish Participants and Deter Cartels Raises Some Broad 
Political and Social Questions in Europe’, in Philip Lowe and Mel Marquis, eds., European Competition Law Annual 
2011: Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law – Implications for Courts and Agencies (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2014) 41-61 (questioning the cultural ripeness of criminal sanctions in the European context and 
suggesting a variety of alternative administrative tools that could be used as substitutes to achieve deterrence objectives). 
153
 This idea was actively promoted to undercut a tradition of competition law enforcement in the European (Economic) 
Community whereby many competition problems could be solved on the basis of categorical reasoning. For example, it 
was often assumed by EEC/EC enforcers that if restrictions in a vertical agreement were designed to provide territorial 
protection for a distributor, the agreement was ipso facto inimical to the ideal of market integration, and fell necessarily 
to be condemned irrespective of possible countervailing effects – an insufficiently nuanced view. In the field of unilateral 
conduct by a firm with a dominant market position, it was traditionally believed (and may still be believed by the EU 
Courts – a matter to be revealed when a pending controversy reaches final judgment) that conditional sales discounts that 
create fidelity on the part of customers were ipso facto inimical to the ‘competitive process’, and that there was no need 
to delve further into the presence/absence of anticompetitive distortions or efficiency effects. 
154
 It seems clear that a functioning competition law regime is not, strictly speaking and all else equal, a necessary condition 
for economic growth. See, e.g., Thomas Ulen, ‘The Uneasy Case for Competition Law and Regulation as Decisive 
Factors in Development: Some Lessons for China’, in Michael Faure and Xinzhu Zhang, eds., Competition Policy and 
Regulation: Recent Developments in China, the US and Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011) 13-44; Aditya 
Bhattacharjea, ‘Who Needs Antitrust? Or, Is Developing-Country Antitrust Different? A Historical-Comparative 
Analysis’, in Sokol, Cheng and Lianos, eds., Competition Law and Development, cited above note 3, 52-65, at 58-59. 
(The possibility of growth absent effective competition law, at least where conditions are ripe, is not confined to Asia. To 
cite just two examples: the U.S. economy grew at a rate of around 7% from 1869 to 1879; and the Italian economy grew 
at rates of 6% to 8% between the late 1950s and the late 1960s, thus ramping up essentially before the EEC competition 
law system could even partially compensate for the lack of a genuine Italian competition law.) Nevertheless, several 
studies have indicated a positive correlation between effective enforcement of competition laws in developing countries 
and increased economic growth. See, e.g., John Preston, ‘Investment Climate Reform. Competition Policy and Economic 
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ameliorate inequitable wealth transfers and distortions associated with (possibly state-supported) 
market power.155 The question of how to integrate development and social inclusion objectives (which 
may be commingled with cultural specificities as well) within a competition law framework is thus in 
many parts of the world an issue of immediacy and prime importance.156 
3.4.4. Widening of the geographic field and of the competitive parameters 
The implicit contest between U.S.-born and E.U.-born ideas does not exhaust the competitive field in 
this context. The impulse to develop and advocate competition-related ideas and concepts is also felt 
in other discrete jurisdictions. Examples of such jurisdictions can be mentioned only briefly here, but 
one of them is the United Kingdom. The now-retired Office of Fair Trading (OFT) for many years 
sought to provide intellectual leadership via its unusually prolific publication of studies, surveys and 
introspective initiatives on a variety of subjects.157 The OFT’s efforts had a persuasive impact in 
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Development: Some Country Experiences’, Report for the UK Dept. of International Development (November 2003) (but 
noting the need for more country-specific analysis); Fox and Gal, ‘Drafting Competition Law for Developing 
Jurisdictions’, cited above note 7, at 2-3, with references. And empirical research seems to confirm that sectors marked 
by competitive pressures tend to exhibit greater relative productivity. See, e.g., Mateus, ‘What Competition Law 
Regime?’, cited above note 23, at 117-118, with references. It may therefore be unsurprising that, when other growth 
models, such as Chalmers Johnson’s ‘developmental state’ model, reach a point of exhaustion and diminishing returns, a 
government may consider a stronger commitment to competition, and a corresponding shift away from excessive 
intervention or discriminatory industrial policy, as essential factors contributing to productivity and growth or at least 
buffering against the possibility of worse conditions. Cf. Marquis and Shiraishi, ‘Japanese Cartel Control in Transition’, 
cited above note 26. In this sense, discussions of whether a functioning competition law regime is a necessary condition 
of growth should consider the prospects of sustained growth and should take account of a country’s medium-term and 
long-term economic evolution.  
155
 One notable version of this perspective is that (notwithstanding the caveat of the previous footnote) effective competition 
law promotes functional markets, and well-functioning markets are essential to developing countries because of their 
intertwined instrumental and ethical characteristics. Markets produce wealth necessary for economic development and for 
the protection of human rights, each of which are necessary conditions for self-actualization and socioeconomic mobility; 
and they constitute (on both the supply and demand side) a social institution wherein, provided the possibility of 
participation is assured, personal freedom can flourish. For an earlier discussion of sets of opportunities (capabilities) as 
an alternative measure of well-being, see Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (Amsterdam and New York: 
North-Holland, 1985). More recently, see Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Knopf, 1999) 4-6, also 
cited in several recent studies such as: Robert D. Anderson and Anna Caroline Müller, ‘Competition and Poverty 
Reduction: A Holistic Approach’, WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-02 (February 2013); Bhattacharjea, ‘A 
Historical-Comparative Analysis’, cited previous footnote, at 63; and D. Daniel Sokol, Thomas K. Cheng and Ioannis 
Lianos, ‘Introduction’, in Sokol, Cheng and Lianos, ibid. As Sokol, Cheng and Lianos state at p. 5: “If one were to 
subscribe to the freedom-based approach to economic development […], one might need to incorporate in competition 
law analysis special considerations about the impact of competitive behavior on the poor’s access to education, health 
care, and other essentials in life”. This could be done, perhaps controversially, at a micro level in individual cases, but at 
a minimum and more importantly it could be done as a matter of policy planning, prioritization, advocacy and joint 
international efforts (see also Anderson and Müller, ‘A Holistic Approach’, cited above; Bhattacharjea, ‘A Historical-
Comparative-Analysis’, cited above, at 53 and 62-65; and Zsofia Tari and Jeremy West, Background Note, Competition 
and Poverty Reduction, DAF/COMP/GF(2013)1 (February 2013) 1-60). In any case, once again, a long-term and 
optimistic perspective would suggest that the role of equity-based redistributive concepts incorporated within competition 
policy as a means to address extreme socioeconomic inequality (and hence extreme political inequality) can be re-
evaluated at a later point in time – particularly as applied, if at all, at the micro level – if a developing country ‘graduates’ 
to middle income status with tolerable levels of wealth distribution and mobility.  
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 See Mor Bakhoum, ‘A Dual Language in Modern Competition Law? Efficiency Approach versus Development Approach 
and Implications for Developing Countries’, 34 World Competition 495-522 (2011) (advocating a hybrid concept of 
“efficient development”). See also See Dina Waked, ‘Competition Law in the Developing World: The Why and How of 
Adoption and its Implications for International Competition Law’, 1 Global Antitrust Review 69-96 (2008), at 82-84. 
157
 One may just cite here a small sample of these internally and externally prepared studies, with the following titles: The 
impact of reverse-fixed payments on competition; The Economics of Secondary Product Markets; Competition and 
Growth; Consumer behavioural biases in competition; The competition impact of environmental product standards; The 
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foreign quarters,158 and were likely intended, in part, to do so. It will not be surprising if the new 
Competition and Markets Authority follows this pattern. Another example of a competition authority 
staking a claim for itself by providing intellectual leadership and thereby ‘punching above its weight’, 
to use this phrase again, is the Swedish Competition Authority (i.e., the Konkurrensverket). For the 
last decade the Swedish authority has been hosting annual conferences with noted experts (‘the pros 
and cons of X practice’) and publishing the proceedings.159  
In a different vein but still in relation to the power of ideas, and with a clear connection to the 
contrasting ‘systems of belief’ marking U.S. antitrust and EU competition law, one may also refer to 
the alternative conceptions and objectives of the defence of competition in jurisdictions worldwide. A 
notable example in this regard is South Africa, where the idea of competition law cannot be confined 
exclusively to concepts such as economic efficiency, well-functioning markets, or the freedom to 
compete, among others. In South Africa antitrust has been partly conceived of as contributing to a 
post-Apartheid form of economic democratization, to borrow a phrase normally used in discussions of 
certain Asian countries.160 Concerns relating to employment impacts, Black Economic Empowerment, 
and more generally protection of the public interest partly define its distinctive ‘goal structure’,161 and 
understandably so. Apart from the terms of the law, the decision-making of the South African 
Competition Tribunal has been praised for being “specifically tailored to the goal of inclusive 
development”.162 In short, and although the appellate courts have occasionally rejected the purposive 
statutory interpretations of the Tribunal,163 South Africa has produced a novel, culturally attuned 
philosophy of competition law.164 The model may not travel well to other social settings that lack a 
history or present reality of extreme economic inequality and/or caste-like social strata analogous to 
those that have afflicted South Africa. Yet the idea that competition policy can be a tool to destabilize 
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competitive effects of buyer groups. These publications are available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/publications/. 
158
 For example, the OFT’s work on prioritization of agency activities and the resulting report issued in 2008 attracted the 
interest of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. See William Kovacic et al., The Federal Trade Commission at 100: Into 
Our 2nd Century – The Continuing Pursuit of Better Practices (2009), www.ftc.gov/os.2009/01/ftc100rpt.pdf., at 88-89 
and 116. The report reviews the approaches of several other authorities as well; it is not suggested that the OFT was 
uniquely influential. 
159
 Since 2002, the Konkurrensverket has hosted ‘Pros and Cons’ conferences covering a variety of competition-related 
subjects including consumer protection, standard setting, vertical restraints, high prices, low prices, information sharing, 
the pros and cons of merger control, and more pros and cons of merger control. For details, see Arvid Fredenberg, ‘Ten 
Years of Pros and Cons Conferences’, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, August 2012 (1). 
160
 The South African version of economic democratization is described in part by Lewis, ‘Embedding a Competition 
Culture’, cited above note 21, at 233 (robust antitrust was to be an instrument “whereby the economic kingdom would be 
conquered by the post-apartheid rulers. […] [C]oncentrated markets and centralized ownership structures, and the 
powerful interest groups that they supported, were going to be fragmented.”). A Kenyan perspective on the idea of 
economic democracy to parallel political democracy is referenced in the speech of Uhuru Kenyatta, cited above note 46.  
161
 On the public interest objectives in the South African context, see Trudi Hartzenberg, ‘Competition policy and enterprise 
development: the role of public interests in South Africa’s competition policy’, in Paul Cook, Raul Fabella and Cassey 
Lee, eds., Competitive Advantages and Competition Policy in Developing Countries (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007) 
136-154. For a discussion of ‘goal structures’, see David Gerber, ‘The Future of Article 82: Dissecting the Conflict’, in 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis, eds., European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to 
Article 82 EC (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 37-54. 
162
 Fox, ‘Competition, development and regional integration’, cited above note 7, at 284. Moreover, competition law has 
been used in South Africa (by the Competition Commission) to remedy what may also have been a failure of public 
health policy, in particular in the context of the pharmaceutical sector and medicines for HIV patients. See G. Monti, 
‘Unilateral conduct’, cited above note 6, at 364.  
163
  See Janice Bleazard, ‘Pigeon-holed by precedent: form versus substance in the application of South African competition 
law’, in Lewis, ed., Building New Competition Regimes, cited above note 9, 81-109. 
164
 For a fuller picture of competition law in South Africa and of the problems facing it, see Dennis Davis and Lara 
Granville, ‘South Africa: The Competition Law System and the Country’s Norms’, in Fox and Trebilcock, eds., Design 
of Competition Law Institutions, cited above note 36, 266-328.  
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entrenched social structures, promote socioeconomic mobility and alleviate poverty may resonate in a 
large number of countries.165 David Lewis argues, moreover, that a competition authority can be well-
positioned to balance between competition issues, such as market power and efficiency, and seemingly 
incommensurable public interest issues such as employment impacts and small business concerns.166 If 
a country follows in the footsteps of the South African legislator and competition authorities, it should 
however also plan for the accumulation of the necessary political capital and coalition partners, and 
ensure that it has the necessary legal mechanisms, to add to its portfolio the contestation and 
dismantling of unjustified state-imposed restrictions of competition.167 Further, the authority entrusted 
to balance competition and non-competition concerns should be prepared for the possibility that such a 
mandate might attract ad hoc attempts by government officials to influence that balance.168  
As yet another example in the context of alternative visions of competition policy goals one may 
also mention China. In the People’s Republic, competition law is now presented as an integral part of 
the socialist market economy and serves, in tandem with (albeit in conflict with) industrial policy as an 
instrument of State-led capitalism.169 China’s competition law framework (which must be considered 
together with the country’s institutional features, including a highly specific judiciary170) has borrowed 
some genetic materials from the EU model but it is in its present state a far cry from its cousin and 
bears only a slight resemblance. Chinese competition law presents yet another model from which to 
‘choose’ – potentially a rather appealing one for countries not ready to cut their economies free from 
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 The links between competition policy on the one hand and poverty reduction, inclusiveness and mobility on the other 
have stirred great interest. For example, the African Competition Forum states that its principal objective is “to promote 
the adoption of competition principles in the implementation of national and regional economic policies of African 
countries, in order to alleviate poverty and enhance inclusive economic growth, development and consumer welfare by 
fostering competition in markets, and thereby increasing investment, productivity, innovation and entrepreneurship”. 
ACF Press Release of 8 March 2011. According to researchers at the OECD, the links between competition policy and 
poverty, and the possible ameliorative effects of competition policy, require further empirical research; in the meantime, 
competition authorities should prioritize their work taking into account impact on the poor (e.g., by focusing on essential 
goods and services, banking and communications), and they should actively engage in advocacy to encourage market-
based policies and to counter-balance vested interests. See Zsofia Tari and Jeremy West, Background Note on 
Competition and Poverty Reduction, cited above note 155. See also Anderson and Müller, ‘A Holistic Approach’, cited 
above note 155.  
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 See David Lewis, Contribution to the Global Forum on Competition (Competition and Poverty Reduction), 
DAF/COMP/GF(2013)3 (January 2013) 1-13, at 7-11. In the context of the EU, the European Commission sometimes 
acts, theoretically under the control of the EU Courts, as mediator of a range of interests unconfined to competition 
concerns strictly defined. See G. Monti, ‘The Dominance of Economic Analysis?’, cited above note 14, for example at 
15-16 (citing Giandomenico Majone, ‘Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance’, 2 
European Union Politics 103-122 (2001) (Commission as a ‘trustee’ rather than merely an agent, and as a part owner of 
the policies for which it is responsible)). With specific regard to Article 101(3) TFEU, whose breadth continues to 
provoke debate, the Commission’s role as mediator of interests raises questions as to how to define the role national 
courts and agencies ought to play when applying that provision (or when applying EU competition law generally). 
Different solutions could have different consequences for the principle of the uniform application of EU law. For a brief 
presentation of this set of dilemmas, see Whish and Bailey, Competition Law, 7th edition, cited above note 110, at 159-
160.  
167
 See Lewis, ‘Embedding a Competition Culture’, cited above note 21. 
168
 See ibid., for example at 243 (describing intrusions by a senior official of the South African Department of Trade and 
Industry). 
169
 For more on the theme of the socialist market economy, see, e.g., Mel Marquis, ‘Abuse of administrative power to restrict 
competition in China: four reflections, two ideas and a thought’, in Faure and Zhang, eds., The Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law, cited above note 25, 73-141, at 87-88. 
170
 Recently and encouragingly, some efforts have been made at the level of the central government to rein in the habitual 
interference with the judicial process by local officials. See, e.g., Keith Zhai, ‘Courts see less cadre meddling in 
judgments’, South China Morning Post (13 December 2013), at A6. However, judicial independence in China is bound to 
remain merely relative in nature. There is little doubt that the judicial process will remain subject to intervention in 
politically sensitive disputes, whether the intervention is surreptitious and unapproved by the political hierarchy or 
whether it is done by order from above.  
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the umbilical cord of the State – or for countries with changing preferences wishing to restore a close 
connection that has been lost.  
4. Conclusion 
This essay was prepared for a workshop focusing on the transnational circulation of policy paradigms 
wherein the case study chosen was the field of competition law. The argument presented in the essay 
is that policy paradigms in this context are actively ‘pushed’ and ‘pulled’ according to forces 
analogous to those of the market, and that policy entrepreneurs (typically competition law agencies) 
operate in a setting where – notwithstanding various cooperative platforms – competition and rivalry 
occur and manifest themselves along a number of dimensions. An important premise of the paper is 
thus the notion advanced by other scholars that competition enforcers across jurisdictions compete 
among themselves on a global market. Building on that premise, the essay has sought to elaborate on 
certain arenas or ‘modes’ through which such competitive behaviour is pursued. With the 
multiplication of antitrust jurisdictions around the world, which may act simultaneously as both 
‘sellers’ and ‘buyers’, new competitive opportunities may likewise emerge. While the paper has not 
dwelled upon the normative desirability of global ‘yardstick’ competition among rival agencies, the 
alternative would promise little if any dynamism, adaptability or motivation for innovation and agency 
self-improvement
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